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With evolution of our species and the subsequent development of the human brain came 
our ability to think, to reflect and reason. It is an ability from which mankind has hugely 
profited and which has placed us at the top of the food chain, however, in its extreme 
forms it has proven to be counterproductive, hold us back and make us ill. Although from a 
psychiatric perspective cognitions were long viewed as a side product of psychopathology 
this all changed with the introduction of cognitive theory in the 1960’s (Beck, 1967). 
Cognitions suddenly became the focal point in explaining psychological dysfunction. 
This paradigm shift put cognitive content and its associated processes at the forefront. 
Two cognitive processes that have received a lot of attention are worry and rumination. 
Worry is typically defined as a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and 
relatively uncontrollable. It is considered to be an attempt to engage in mental problem-
solving on issues of which the outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or 
more negative outcomes (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983, p. 10). Worry is 
the cardinal feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and has mainly been studied in 
this context. One of the main differences with rumination is that worry is considered to be 
future oriented and rumination past oriented. Rumination can be defined as an attempt to 
analyse the causes and consequences of negative events, problems and moods (Watkins 
& Baracaia, 2001) and is typically linked to depression. In contrast to depression, GAD 
was long a relatively understudied disorder (Dugas, 2000; Dugas, Anderson, Deschenes, 
& Donegan, 2010) and consequently, not much attention was initially paid to the process 
of worry. In the last couple of decades worry has been placed in a different perspective 
and together with rumination it is now at the centre of an ongoing debate on whether 
these processes are possibly the driving force across many psychological disorders, 
emotional disorders in particular. Besides the question surrounding the transdiagnostic 
nature of worry and rumination it is also debated whether worry and rumination are in 
fact conceptualizations of the same underlying cognitive process (e.g. Ehring & Watkins, 
2008). At first glance there seem to be many similarities between the two concepts and 
they are often referred to by the overarching term repetitive negative thinking (RNT) 
which has been defined as “repetitive thinking about one or more negative topics that 
is experienced as difficult to control” (Ehring & Watkins, 2008, p.193). Whether there is 
more to this than meets the eye is currently debated. The main aim of this thesis is to 
clarify some of the pending issues surrounding the transdiagnostic nature of worry and 
rumination as well as whether they share the same underlying processes and functions.
Worry and rumination compared
If worry and rumination are indeed conceptualizations of the same underlying trans-
diagnostic process then they are expected to meet two sets of criteria: those for a 
transdiagnostic process and those for establishing a shared underlying process.
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  A truly transdiagnostic process should meet several criteria: 1) to be present across 
multiple disorders but not due to comorbidity with one specific disorder; 2) exhibit similar 
process characteristics across these disorders; and 3) contribute to the onset, maintenance 
and/or recurrence of psychopathology across disorders.
  Even if worry and rumination are indeed established to be transdiagnostic processes 
this does not necessarily mean that they share the same underlying process. In case 
of a shared underlying process between worry and rumination, it is to be expected 
that they 1) are present in the same disorders, 2) have the same causal status regarding 
these (emotional) disorders, 3) share the same process characteristics and 4) are highly 
interrelated.
  Over the past few decades important steps have been made in unravelling these 
issues and many have at least in part been successfully addressed. A few of the main 
developments as well as the pending issues are briefly discussed here.
Worry and rumination as transdiagnostic processes
Worry levels have been found to be higher among patients diagnosed with GAD 
compared to all other anxiety disorders (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992) and levels of 
rumination have been reported to be higher among patients suffering from depression 
than those suffering from anxiety disorders (for an overview of the literature see Olatunji, 
Naragon-Gainey, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2013). These findings seem to advocate a disorder 
specific approach. However, the well documented differences in temporal orientation 
between worry and rumination (worry-future; rumination-past) are probably at least in 
part responsible for the observed differences in levels of worry and rumination between 
anxiety and depressive disorders. Moreover, when comparing worry and rumination 
levels found in clinical populations to those in healthy controls, heightened levels are 
found across nearly all axis-I disorders (see Ehring & Watkins, 2008 for an overview). This 
observation has led to the proposition that worry and rumination are transdiagnostic 
processes (Harvey et al., 2004). Still, it has to be noted that a vast majority of the studies 
on worry and rumination have been conducted in MDD and GAD leaving other axis-I 
disorders relatively understudied. Also, most studies focussed on individual disorders while 
disregarding comorbidity which is well known to be the rule rather than the exception 
and which may pose an important confound. That being said, if worry and rumination 
are indeed transdiagnostic processes then it is to be expected that they are also in part 
responsible for the occurrence of comorbidity.
Similarities at process level
The assumption that worry and rumination share the same process is largely based on 
studies showing substantial correlations between the two constructs (e.g. Segerstrom et 
al., 2000, r=.32 to r=.46; Muris et al., 2004, r=.55; Watkins, 2004, r=.51; Hong, 2007, r=.42). 
The mere fact that these processes seem to co-occur is however not sufficient to conclude 
that they are the same. If they truly are reflections of one shared underlying process then it 
is to be expected that they also show the same process characteristics and operate via the 
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same mechanisms. A few aspects have received specific attention in this regard among 
which the format in which worry and rumination present themselves and the processing 
style they represent. To date evidence suggests that both worry and rumination contain 
more verbal thoughts than imagery (e.g. Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Fresco et al., 2002) and 
that they are characterized by a more abstract style of processing (i.e. cross-situational, 
indistinct and unclear) as opposed to a concrete processing style which is situationally 
specific, unequivocal and clear (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). These 
are promising avenues which are being explored, and will be discussed in more detail in 
the next section of this introduction.
Causal status
Worry and rumination are generally referred to as trait variables, stable over time, and 
are proposed to constitute vulnerability factors for emotional disorders. Longitudinal 
prospective studies concerning rumination have shown that rumination predicts the 
occurrence of both anxiety and depressive symptoms over time, including new onset of 
depressive disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Likewise, worry has been found to be a 
vulnerability factor predicting increments of anxiety and depressive symptoms over time 
(Hong, 2007). The role of worry and rumination is further confirmed by an extensive review 
of the literature on repetitive (negative) thinking (RNT) revealing that RNT is a vulnerability 
factor for both anxiety and depressive disorders (Watkins, 2008). In sum, evidence on the 
causal status of worry and rumination is accumulating. So far both cognitive constructs 
seem to be involved in very similar ways which is a prerequisite for identical processes.
Unresolved issues
As already mentioned, the worry-rumination debate would benefit from studies examining 
the transdiagnostic nature of these cognitive processes across axis-I disorders (not solely 
in GAD and MDD), and also by taking comorbidity into account. At the moment this is 
often not the case, limiting the interpretation of the findings. Moreover, there are only 
few studies that examine whether worry and rumination contribute to the occurrence of 
comorbidity which would be expected from a transdiagnostic process. In line with this 
they would be expected to mediate the prospective relationship between anxiety and 
depressive disorders and vice versa. McLaughlin and Nolen-Hoeksema (2011) found some 
support for these predictions however they focussed on symptoms, not disorders, and 
only examined rumination.
  Regarding the causal status of both cognitive constructs existing studies have 
certain limitations. Often there is no correction for severity of (sub)clinical symptoms or 
the presence of previous episodes (see overview Watkins, 2008). Also, it is unknown to 
what extent rumination and worry have incremental predictive validity over and above 
more general predictors. Hierarchical vulnerability models (Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 
1998; Brown & Naragon-Gainey, 2013) distinguish different dimensions of which the 
higher order ones are very general and involved in all disorders whereas lower-order 
dimensions are more disorder specific. In existing studies it is seldom clear whether the 
12
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lower-order processes of worry and rumination add anything to well established higher 
order components such as personality traits (e.g., neuroticism or extraversion).
  Besides the (methodological) limitations of existing studies there are also several 
other aspects which are in need of further exploration/clarification. First of all the 
assumption that worry and rumination are stable across substantial periods of time has 
to be addressed. Test-retest periods are usually short whereas true trait components 
are expected to be stable across long periods of time. Secondly, it has to be examined 
whether fluctuations in worry and rumination scores co-occur as would be expected if 
they share the same underlying process. Finally, the direction of effects between worry-
rumination and emotional disorders are in need of attention. So far most studies have 
focused on cross-sectional or uni-directional relationships of worry and rumination with 
each other and with particular emotional disorders, and did not examine reciprocal effects 
nor the temporal character of the effects. Considering that experimental studies have 
repeatedly shown that experimentally induced worry or rumination directly and negatively 
affects anxious and depressed mood states (e.g. McLaughlin, Mennin, & Farach, 2007; 
McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007; Behar, Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2005) as well as the 
opposite effect of mood inductions leading to the activation of cognitive processes 
(Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001; Miranda, Gross, Persons, & Hahn, 1998; Miranda 
& Persons, 1988) it would be interesting to investigate whether such relationships are 
also present when studied using a longitudinal design and if so which direction of effects 
prevails. Furthermore elucidation on the presence of a mutually reinforcing downward 
spiral between repetitive negative thinking and emotional disorders would provide 
important insights into the mechanisms involved in psychopathology and shed light on 
the role of worry and rumination herein. If worry and rumination indeed constitute one 
shared process then it is to be expected that the results will show identical patterns for 
both types of repetitive negative thinking.
 Finally, although evidence of similarities between worry and rumination at process 
level has accumulated over the last few years there are still issues which need to be 
addressed. In this thesis the focus will be on worry and its avoidance function. In the next 
section this will be discussed more in depth.
Worry & Avoidance
Both worry and rumination have been proposed to serve as a type of avoidance. In a 
recent review Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) described that worry and rumination both 
appear to have an avoidance component, however motivated by different goals/aims. 
They proposed that the unconscious motive when engaging in rumination is to avoid 
aversive situations and the responsibility to take action whereas the unconscious motive 
involved in worry is to avoid core negative affect and painful images. In this thesis the 
focus is solely on the processes via which worry serves its avoidance purpose and the 




Avoidance is considered the hallmark of anxiety disorders (Barlow, 2004), a view that has 
consequently led to the development of therapies targeting this specific aspect. Exposure 
based therapies in particular are aimed at breaking the reinforcing avoidance mechanism 
and have since their introduction been applied across anxiety disorders. Most of these 
disorders are typified by clear overt behavioural avoidance which then becomes the 
focal point of therapy. GAD however, is characterized by a wide range of mainly internally 
generated feared outcomes (Borkovec, Hazzlett-Stevens, & Diaz, 1999) between which 
individuals suffering from GAD appear to switch frequently (Butler, 1994; Borkovec & 
Roemer, 1994). The absence of clear behavioural markers complicates traditional exposure 
based therapies which have thus far only been moderately successful in treating GAD 
(e.g. Gould et al., 2004). This does not necessarily mean that behavioural avoidance does 
not occur, it may just not be in a circumscribed domain. Roemer and Orsillo posit that 
attention should also be given to behavioural inaction. Worrying takes up a lot of energy 
and is time-consuming with GAD patients reporting to spend as much as 50% to 90% of 
their time engaging in worrying and feeling anxious (Sanderson & Barlow, 1990). All this 
mental activity does generally however not result in the accomplishment of desired goals. 
On the contrary; procrastination and quest for absolute certainty slows down decision 
making (Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka, & Borkovec, 1990) and is believed to undermine 
successful problem solving. Thus, although worriers are mentally active their behavioural 
activity range seems restricted (Roemer & Orsillo, 2002).
Cognitive avoidance
The continued search for the avoidance component in GAD combined with the limited 
success of traditional exposure therapy and the inclusion of worry as the cardinal feature 
of GAD in the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) has swung the focus from behavioural avoidance 
to that of cognitive avoidance. This new perspective is best captured in the Avoidance 
Theory of worry (Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998) which postulates that worry is a form of 
cognitive avoidance that operates via the reduction of aversive imagery with the purpose 
to avoid somatic anxiety reactions. Studies indeed show that worry is a predominantly 
verbal thought (rather than imagery-based) activity, and that the percentage of imagery 
is greatly reduced when engaging in worry instead of a relaxation condition (Borkovec & 
Inz, 1990; East & Watts, 1994; Freeston, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1996). Moreover, individuals 
with GAD report less imagery than non-psychiatric controls both during worry and 
relaxation (Borkovec & Inz, 1990). In turn, it has been found that verbal thought activity 
yields significantly less cardiovascular fear responses than imagery (Vrana, Cuthbert, & 
Lang, 1986) leading to the hypothesis that verbal worry might be an attempt to avoid 
the physiological sensations that accompany aversive imagery. This process of avoidance 
however interferes with successful emotional processing of threat related material for 
which activation is deemed necessary (Foa & Kozak, 1986). The evasion of emotional 
experiences is in line with self-reported reasons for worrying by GAD patients (Borkovec 
& Roemer, 1995) and may reinforce engagement in the worry process; however, it has 
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long term negative consequences as it inhibits closure on worry topics consequently 
maintaining anxiety/worry.
  A caveat in the avoidance theory is that it does not address the question of how 
worrying leads to reduced imagery. A possible explanation comes from the Reduced 
Concreteness theory of worry (Stöber, 1998; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002). This theory 
posits that the mediator between worrying and reduced imagery is reduced concrete 
thinking (increased abstract thinking), which is presumed to be characteristic of worry. 
Concrete thinking is defined as “distinct, situationally specific, unequivocal, clear, singular” 
whereas abstract thinking is described as “indistinct, cross-situational, equivocal, unclear, 
aggregated” (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002, p. 92). Paivio and Marschark (1991) found that the 
concreteness of words and sentences is related to the quality of imagery and that abstract 
thinking not only evokes less imagery but also less vivid imagery. Hence, the Reduced 
Concreteness theory hypothesizes that it is the relatively abstract style of thinking during 
worry which is responsible for reduced aversive visual imagery, which in turn contributes 
to the maintenance of worry. It does so not only by hindering emotional processing but 
also by thwarting the problem solving function of worry as abstract thinking is less likely 
to produce a specific conclusion and effective problem solutions.
Unresolved issues
So far evidence supports the notion of reduced concreteness in the problem analysis phase in 
worriers (Stöber, 1996; Stöber, Tepperwien, & Staak, 2000; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002), but this 
has not yet been established in the next phase within the problem solving process: i.e., the 
solution generation phase. Critically, although the reduced concreteness theory predicts that 
reduced concreteness of thinking during worry will impair problem-solving, this prediction 
has not yet been directly tested. Although the theory originated in worry, to date, the only 
direct evidence that concreteness of thinking influences problem solving is in patients with 
depression (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Thus a logical next step 
is to examine this issue in its original context i.e. worry. If worry and rumination are indeed 
conceptualizations of the same underlying process as is often proposed, then it is to be 
expected that they establish their (negative) effects through the same mechanisms.
 Besides cognitive avoidance, behavioural avoidance or better the behavioural inaction 
that typifies worriers is thought to slow down decision making (Metzger et al., 1990). The 
aspiration of obtaining complete certainty and the tendency to prepare for all possible 
scenarios often results in worriers postponing or abandoning decision making altogether. 
This situation in which they do not move forward nor backwards is likely to undermine 
learning due to lack of ‘learning by experience’. However, there is some evidence that 
contradicts this idea. Mueller et al. (2010) found that people suffering from GAD show 
better decision making than healthy controls as evident through their steeper learning 
curve on a forced decision making task. This proposed positive effect of worrying could 
pose a reinforcement mechanism underlying pathological worrying. However, the question 
remains whether worriers still show this superiority when not forced to make a decision 




The aim of the present thesis was twofold; (a) to compare worry and rumination 
in their relationship with each other and with emotional disorders; (b) to examine 
worry at a more functional/process level. In order to address these issues we used 
epidemiological data from the Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA). 
NESDA is an ongoing longitudinal study including 2981 participants who are followed 
for many years. The study has several important strengths among which a large sample 
size, longitudinal designand the inclusion of multiple waves. The NESDA study allowed 
us to investigate the first main aim of this thesis (i.e., comparing worry and rumination 
in their relationship with each other and with emotional disorders). The NESDA study 
however is not designed to investigate worry and rumination at process level. To 
accommodate for this, additional experimental studies were conducted to examine 
the second main aim of this thesis (i.e., studying process and functional characteristics 
of worry).
The first part of the thesis focusses on the comparisons between worry and rumination 
using epidemiological data from the NESDA.
   Chapter 2 includes a study with a cross-sectional design examining the predictive 
utility of both worry and rumination. Specifically, it is investigated whether worry and 
rumination have incremental validity in predicting the presence of a history or current 
occurrence of emotional disorders over and above more general personality traits while 
taking comorbidity into account.
  Chapter 3 includes a study with a three-wave longitudinal design and focusses on 
the stability of worry, rumination and psychopathology over time as well as the reciprocal 
relationships among these three aspects. This is done by establishing the trait and state 
components of worry, rumination and psychopathology and examining the correlations 
between these different trait and state components across time. Specifically, the presence 
of a mutually reinforcing downward spiral between repetitive negative thinking and 
emotional disorders is examined.
  Chapter 4 presents a study using a cross-sectional and longitudinal (three wave) 
design, examining whether worry and rumination account for the comorbidity among 
emotional disorders. Specifically it is investigated whether both worry and rumination 
account for the cross-sectional overlap of emotional disorders at baseline and whether 
they mediate the prospective cross-disorder (fear  distress and distress  fear) relations 
among emotional disorders.
The second part of the thesis contains experimental studies which focus on worry at 
process level and highlight the role of avoidance in maintaining pathological worry. 
  Chapter 5 includes two experimental studies that investigate whether reduced 
concreteness is a pivotal component in explaining the cognitive avoidance function of 
worry and indeed leads to poorer problem solving as is often suggested.
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  Chapter 6 presents an experimental study focussing on the presence of behavioural 
avoidance in decision making and how this affects the maintenance of worry. The study 
investigates whether the positive effect that worry has previously shown to have on 
decision making is also present when worriers are given the opportunity to avoid making 
decisions.
Finally, chapter 7 contains a summary and integration of the main findings, clinical 
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General, specific and unique cognitive factors involved in 
anxiety and depressive disorders
Jolijn Drost









Comorbidity among anxiety and depressive disorders is the rule rather than the exception. 
The Integrative Hierarchical Model proposes that each of these disorders contains general 
(common to all), specific (common to some) and unique components. However, research 
into this model is limited and hampered by small (clinical) sample sizes. The aim of the 
present study is to investigate the incremental validity of the cognitive constructs Anxiety 
Sensitivity, Pathological Worry and Cognitive Reactivity to sad mood over and above the 
personality traits neuroticism and extraversion. Symptomatic (N = 1111) and remitted 
(N = 834) patients were selected from the 2981 participants of the Netherlands Study 
of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA). Results revealed both specific and unique cognitive 
components of anxiety and depression. Across symptomatic and remitted groups, Anxiety 
Sensitivity was specific to social anxiety disorder and panic disorder, Aggression Reactivity 
was a unique component of dysthymia, and Rumination on Sadness was unique to major 
depressive disorder. We conclude that cognitive constructs have additional value in 
understanding anxiety and depressive disorders. Moreover, they prove to be more than 
mere epiphenomena of current disorders. 
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Introduction
Anxiety and depressive disorders not only have high prevalences, but also high 
comorbidity rates (Angst, 1996; de Graaf, Bijl, Smit, Vollebergh, & Spijker, 2002; Kessler et 
al., 1994; Sartorius, Ustun, Lecrubier, & Wittchen, 1996). This has resulted in an ongoing 
debate about the breakdown of disorders as postulated in DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000). There 
is considerable overlap between anxiety and depressive disorders, which is also expressed 
in a certain degree of similarity in symptomatology, etiology, vulnerability factors and 
therapeutic interventions.
  Etiological models have followed these developments and introduced common 
higher order factors accounting for comorbidity. The most promising psychological model 
explaining the findings reported in research and matching the experiences in clinical 
practice is the Integrative Hierarchical Model (IHM) for anxiety and depression introduced 
by Mineka, Watson and Clark (1998). This model, a revised version of the tripartite model 
(L. A. Clark & Watson, 1991), has recently attracted a lot of interest (e.g., Prenoveau et 
al., 2010). According to this model each disorder contains a general, a specific, and a 
unique component. The general component refers to a factor that anxiety and depressive 
disorders have in common, the specific component is shared with certain disorders but 
not all, and the unique component is an aspect characteristic of a particular disorder 
differentiating it from all the others. Hence, the model addresses the comorbidity issue 
while still acknowledging the heterogeneity of the disorders (Kotov, Watson, Robles, & 
Schmidt, 2007; Mineka, et al., 1998). 
  In line with its predecessor – the tripartite model – the general component of IHM 
consists of the personality trait Neuroticism. Elevated scores across anxiety and depressive 
disorders have been reported numerous times and studies investigating a hierarchical 
structure within the emotional disorders have confirmed its position as a higher order 
factor (Norton & Mehta, 2007; Norton, Sexton, Walker, & Norton, 2005; Sexton, Norton, 
Walker, & Norton, 2003). Extraversion is another influential Big Five personality trait. In 
both Clark and Watson’s  tripartite model as well as Barlow’s Three Factor Model, extraversion 
constitutes a component unique to depression. This position was questioned however 
after several studies demonstrated links with Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) (e.g., Brown, 
Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Norton & Mehta, 2007) and to a lesser extent Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (GAD) (Norton, et al., 2005). While not in line with the original hierarchical 
models it does fit well within the IHM where it reflects a specific component. 
  Potential candidates for specific or unique components can be found within the 
wide array of cognitive constructs which includes factors such as rumination on sadness, 
self-focused attention, and attentional bias to threat. Some of these constructs, like 
self-focused attention, were originally linked to one or several disorders but as research 
progressed have later been established as more general components (Ingram, 1990). 
Others are still awaiting further clarification. Three of these cognitive constructs which, 
though related to trait anxiety or neuroticism, cannot be totally accounted for by these 
general traits are anxiety sensitivity (AS), pathological worry (PW) and cognitive reactivity 
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to sad mood (CR) (Cox, Borger, Taylor, Fuentes, & Ross, 1999; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990; Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & Mcnally, 1986; Van der Does, 2002). AS has 
been defined as the fear of anxiety related sensations resulting from beliefs held about 
their potentially harmful physical, psychological or social consequences (Reiss & McNally, 
1985; Reiss, et al., 1986). It is viewed as a dispositional characteristic which is relatively 
stable over time (for an overview see p.68 of R. A. Peterson & Plehn, 1999) and has mainly 
been linked to panic disorder (PD). PW on the other hand is the key feature of GAD (DSM-
IV-TR; APA, 2000) and can be defined as an unwanted, uncontrollable, aversive cognitive 
activity associated with negative thoughts and emotional discomfort (Borkovec, 1994). It 
is considered a trait like construct and is thought to share the same underlying cognitive 
process as rumination (Watkins, 2008). Contrary to AS and PW where the main focus is 
on anxiety disorders, the concept of CR has so far only been investigated in relation to 
depression. CR is defined as the extent to which dysfunctional schemas are activated 
when mood decreases. It is reported to successfully distinguish euthymic individuals with 
and without a history of depression with the remitted group showing consistently higher 
reactivity (Merens et al., 2005; Miranda, Gross, Persons, & Hahn, 1998; Moulds et al., 
2008; Van der Does, 2002, 2005; Williams, Van der Does, Barnhofer, Crane, & Segal, 2008). 
Furthermore, high CR has also shown to increase the risk of depressive relapse (Segal, 
Gemar, & Williams, 1999; Segal et al., 2006).
  Although all three constructs are mainly linked to one specific form of psycho-
pathology which suggests that they are unique factors in the IHM model, there are also 
studies reporting otherwise. AS for example, has besides its connection to PD also been 
linked to all the other anxiety disorders as well as depression (Otto, Pollack, Fava, Uccello, 
& Rosenbaum, 1995; Rector, Szacun-Shimizu, & Leybman, 2007; Rodriguez, Bruce, 
Pagano, Spencer, & Keller, 2004). Similar findings have been reported for PW (Chelminski 
& Zimmerman, 2003; Starcevic, 1995; Starcevic et al., 2007) suggesting its relationship with 
GAD is not an exclusive one. CR has thus far only been studied in relation to depressive 
disorders, specifically those with a history of depression, where theoretically its influence 
is expected to be the most pronounced.
  Studies investigating the role of cognitive constructs within hierarchical models are 
limited. PW has been mainly studied as a measure representing a key characteristic of 
GAD, but GAD is more encompassing than unwanted, uncontrollable, aversive cognitive 
activity and this cognitive process may have a wider relevance as a predictor of GAD, 
but also of related disorders (Watkins, 2008). To our knowledge, both PW and CR have 
thus far not been tested as predictors in a hierarchical model. AS on the other hand has 
been included in a few such studies, where it differentiated PD from other anxiety and 
depressive disorders (Norton & Mehta, 2007; Norton, et al., 2005). However, studies did 
not investigate the direct contributions of lower order factors of AS and were hampered 
by either the use of analogue or small clinical samples. Moreover, only a couple of 
cognitive constructs were used and outcome measures consisted of symptoms, not actual 
psychiatric diagnoses.
  The main aim of the present study is to investigate the incremental validity of the 
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cognitive constructs AS, PW and CR in predicting specific depressive and anxiety disorders 
over and above the Big Five personality traits of neuroticism and extraversion. We will 
investigate this question both in symptomatic patients and in participants who are in 
remission, hence exploring whether elevated scores on cognitive constructs merely reflect 
an epiphenomenon of current psychopathology or not. We will address several limitations 
from previous studies by using both clinical and healthy samples. Moreover, the availability 
of a very large sample permits us to investigate multiple personality traits and cognitive 
constructs simultaneously in order to investigate their relative predictive power, while also 
taking comorbidity into account. The sample comes from diverse settings (community, 
primary care, and specialised mental health care) and includes patients in various stages 
of illness, enhancing generalizability. 
Method
Participants and Setting
Participants were selected from the Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA), 
an ongoing 8-year multi-site naturalistic, longitudinal cohort study including 2981 adult 
subjects aged 18 through 65 years. The sample consists of 687 healthy controls, 2294 persons 
with a life-time diagnosis of depression or anxiety disorder of which 1342 have a current 
diagnosis (past month). In order to be representative of those with depressive and anxiety 
disorders respondents in different stages of the developmental history of the disorders 
(normal, high familial risk, subthreshold disorders, first and recurrent episodes) and from 
different health care settings (community, primary care and specialized mental health 
care) were included. The NESDA community sample had been previously identified in two 
population based studies: the Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study 
(NEMESIS; Bijl, van Zessen, Ravelli, de Rijk, & Langendoen, 1998) and the Adolescents 
at Risk of Anxiety and Depression (ARIADNE) study (Landman-Peeters et al., 2005). The 
recruitment of primary care patients took place through 65 general practitioners –using 
a three-stage screening method- and the recruitment of psychiatric outpatients through 
17 mental health care institutions. 
  Across recruitment settings uniform in- and exclusion criteria were used. A general 
inclusion criterion was an age of 18 through 65 years. An exclusion criterion was a primary 
psychotic, obsessive compulsive, bipolar or severe addiction disorder. In addition patients 
who were not fluent in Dutch were excluded. A more extensive description of the rationale, 
method and recruitment strategy can be found elsewhere (Penninx et al., 2008).
  In the current study the psychological disorders of interest are anxiety disorders SAD, 
GAD, PD (with or without agoraphobia), and depressive disorders dysthymia (DD) and 
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). Two psychiatric groups will be investigated; patients 
with a diagnosis at time of assessment (current diagnosis) and patients who fulfilled criteria 
of the disorder of interest at some point in life but did not meet full DSM-IV criteria in the 
past month (remission). Using a current sample dovetails nicely with existing literature 
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allowing results to be easily compared. The remission sample provides an opportunity 
to replicate the findings of the current sample and to challenge the possibility of results 
merely reflecting epiphenomena of current disorders. This was further safeguarded by 
controlling for residual symptoms.
Measures
Within the scope of NESDA many different measures have been administered. Only the 
ones relevant to the present study will be discussed here.
Assessment of psychiatric diagnoses
Depressive disorders (DD, MDD) and anxiety disorders (SAD, GAD, PD) were diagnosed 
using the Composite Interview Diagnostic Instrument (CIDI-WHO lifetime version 2.1; Ter 
Smitten, Smeets, & Van den Brink, 1998). The CIDI is a worldwide used instrument which 
classifies diagnoses according to DSM-IV criteria (APA, 1994). It has shown high interrater 
reliability (Wittchen et al., 1991), high test-retest reliability (Wacker, Battegay, Mullejans, 
& Schlosser, 2006) and high validity for depressive and anxiety disorders (Farmer, Katz, 
Mcguffin, & Bebbington, 1987; Wittchen, 1994; Wittchen et al., 1989). The CIDI was 
conducted by specially trained clinical research staff.
Assessment of general factors
Neuroticism
The personality trait neuroticism was measured using the NEO Five-Factor Inventory 
(NEO-FFI) personality questionnaire (Costa & Mccrae, 1995). This 60-item questionnaire 
contains a subscale for Neuroticism consisting of 12-items which are scored on a five-
point scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. Scores ranged from 1 – 5 
for each item, and the total score for each domain ranged from a minimum of 12 to a 
maximum of 60. The psychometric characteristics are satisfactory (Costa & Mccrae, 1995). 
In the present study internal consistency was satisfactory with α = .75.
Assessment of specific factors
Extraversion
The personality trait extraversion was measured in the same manner as neuroticism using 
a subscale of the NEO-FFI personality questionnaire. Internal consistency in the present 
study reached an adequate level with α = .78.
Anxiety sensitivity
Anxiety sensitivity was assessed using the Anxiety Sensitivity Index -16 items (R.A. Peterson 
& Reiss, 1992; Reiss, et al., 1986). This self-report questionnaire indicates the degree to 
which respondents are concerned about possible negative consequences of anxiety-
related sensations. Items are scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘0 = very little’ 
to ‘4 = very much’. Total scores range from 0 to 64. The ASI has high levels of internal 
consistency, good test-retest reliability, and good validity (R. A. Peterson & Plehn, 1999; 
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Reiss, et al., 1986). Evidence from previous studies concerning the lower-order factorial 
structure of the ASI was nonconclusive (Cox, Parker, & Swinson, 1996; Schmidt & Joiner, 
2002; Vujanovic, Arrindell, Bernstein, Norton, & Zvolensky, 2007; Zinbarg, Barlow, & Brown, 
1997). Consequently, the NESDA data were screened beforehand to determine the best 
fitting factor structure. Considering the large sample size of NESDA this is expected to 
prove a reliable method. Exploratory factor analyses presented 4 factors with eigenvalues 
greater than 1, of which 2 showed relatively poor internal consistency. This is in line with 
previous findings by Vujanovic (2007) who also reported low internal consistency for 2 of the 
4 factors. To maintain good internal consistency factors were combined to form 2 factors: 
a physical concerns factor (ASI-phc) and a social-cognitive concerns factor (ASI-scc). This 
was based both on theoretical and on statistical grounds. Theoretically it was most logical 
to combine factors of which the content was related. This theoretical solution matched 
the statistically emerging solution of a factor analysis with a forced 2 factor solution. The 
two factors explained 54.6% of the total variance in ASI scores. Items 7 and 13 were left out 
as both items showed very low loadings on each of the 2 factors and reliability analyses 
revealed that removal would improve the internal consistency. Removal of these two items 
did not affect the factor structure. The internal consistency of the 2 factors used in this 
study are adequate with α = 0.89 for the physical concerns factor (items 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 14) and α = 0.80 for the social-cognitive concerns factor (items 1, 2, 5, 12, 15, 16). The 
subdivision into two factors makes AS a candidate for a unique as well as a specific factor.
Assessment of unique factors
Pathological worry
Pathological worry was operationalized using the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; 
Meyer, et al., 1990). Items consist of statements related to worry, each rated on a 5-point 
Likert-scale ranging from ‘1 = not at all typical of me’ to ‘5 = very typical of me’. The PSWQ 
consists of two subscales: a ‘General worry’ subscale (11 items) and a ‘Not-worry’ subscale 
(5 items) (van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, & Vervaeke, 1999). The ‘General worry’ subscale is 
the strongest of the two (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992; Meyer, et al., 1990; van Rijsoort, 
et al., 1999) and only this subscale was administered in the NESDA study. Psychometric 
properties of this Dutch 11-item version are not available but the original PSWQ has 
been proven to be a valid measure of trait worrying unaffected by the content of the 
worry (Davey, 1993; Molina & Borkovec, 1994) with high internal consistency, good test-
retest reliability and unaffected by social desirability (Meyer, et al., 1990). The adjustments 
made to the original PSWQ are not expected to have had a negative effect on these 
characteristics. Internal consistency in the present study was high, namely α = 0.96.
Cognitive reactivity to sad mood
Cognitive reactivity to sad mood was measured using the revised version of the Leiden 
Index of Depression Sensitivity (LEIDS-R; Van der Does, 2002; Williams, et al., 2008). The 
LEIDS-R is a self-report instrument which has been found to reliably discriminate between 
never-depressed and recovered depressed groups (e.g., Firk & Markus, 2009; Merens, et 
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al., 2005; Moulds, et al., 2008; Van der Does, 2002). LEIDS-R scores also correlate with 
biological vulnerability markers of depression: response to acute tryptophan depletion 
(Booij & Van der Does, 2007) and a serotonin transporter gene polymorphism (Antypa, 
Van der Does, & Penninx, 2010). 
  The LEIDS-R consists of 34 items divided over six subscales: Hopelessness/
Suicidality Reactivity (HOP), Acceptance/Coping (ACC), Aggression Reactivity (AGG), 
Control/Perfectionism (CTR), Risk Avoidance (RAV) and Rumination on Sadness (RUM). 
Participants are asked to indicate whether and how their thinking patterns change when 
they experience mild dysphoria by scoring each item on a 5-point Likert-scale ranging 
from 0 ‘not at all’ to 4 ‘very strongly’ applicable to me. In the present sample internal 
consistencies of the subscales ranged from α = 0.62 (ACC) to α = 0.86 (HOP). 
Covariates
Assessment of demographic and personal characteristics
Detailed sociodemographic and socioeconomic data were collected, of which sex, age 
and number of years of education, were used in the present study.
Assessment of symptom levels 
In order to control for residual symptoms in the remission sample, two broad and well 
established measures of anxiety and depressive symptomatology were used:
Anxiety
The 21-item Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck, Brown, Epstein, & Steer, 1988) provides a 
reliable and valid assessment of anxiety symptomatology. In previous research it has shown 
high internal consistency, high test-retest reliability and good concurrent and discriminant 
validity (Ferguson, 2000). Internal consistency in the present study was high with α = 0.95.
Depression
Depressive symptoms were measured using the Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology 
(IDS) a 30-item self report questionnaire. Psychometric properties are satisfactory (Rush, 
Gullion, Basco, Jarrett, & Trivedi, 1996). In the present study internal consistency was 
satisfactory with α = 0.91.
Procedure
The study protocol was approved centrally by the Ethical Review Board of the VU University 
Medical Centre and subsequently by local review boards of each participating centre. 
NESDA subjects were assessed during a 4-hour clinic visit at one of the seven field centre 
locations.
 Once full verbal and written information about the study was given, written informed 
consent was obtained from all participants of the baseline assessment. Interviews were 
administered with computer-assisted personalized interviewing (CAPI) procedures with 
data entry checks on outliers and routing. When necessary the interview was taken in 
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more than one session to avoid fatigue. Specially trained research assistants conducted 
the assessments. All interviews were taped to monitor data-quality and interviewer 
performance. In addition, the data monitoring centre routinely carried out data quality 
checks to review missing data and check for inconsistencies. After completion of the 
assessment respondents were compensated with a small incentive (gift certificate of 
15 euros and payment of travel costs) for their time and cooperation.
Statistical Analyses
First scores on all measures were compared between participants meeting criteria for 
current disorder and participants who did not meet these criteria, as well as comparing 
participants with a disorder in remission to a control group with no lifetime disorders.
 The ability of measures to (independently) predict an anxiety or depressive diagnosis 
was investigated within the total sample of participants who fulfilled criteria for a current 
anxiety or depressive disorder as well as in a group with a disorder in remission (cp. Gibb, 
Chelminski, & Zimmerman, 2007). A benefit of this analysis is that it includes a built-
in psychiatric control group. Binominal logistic regression was conducted to assess this 
relative specificity of cognitive constructs using a hierarchical procedure. Demographics 
(gender, age and number of years of education) were entered as covariates by using forced 
entry into the model. In order to test whether the cognitive constructs would uphold their 
predictive value after correcting for neuroticism and extraversion, personality traits were 
also entered into the model using forced entry. The independent variables of interest, 
namely PSWQ, ASI-phc, ASI-scc and the six LEIDS-R-subscales were entered last, using 
a stepwise backward procedure (likelihood ratio) with a removal probability of 0.01. A 
stepwise backward procedure was chosen over a stepwise forward procedure because the 
latter has a higher risk of Type II error due to suppressor effects (Field, 2005).
  Analyses were conducted for both the current diagnosis and diagnosis in remission 
group, with the only difference being that in the remission models BAI and IDS were 
added as covariates to control for residual symptoms. 
  A significance level of .01 was applied in order to control the familywise error rate 
and reduce the chances of a Type I error. To guard against multicollinearity the VIF score 
for each variable in each model was examined. No VIF statistic for any variable was found 
with a value above 2.7 (tolerance not below .37), suggesting that multicollinearity was not 
a problem for these regression models (Menard, 1995; Myers, 1990). All analyses were 
conducted using PASW Statistics package 17.0 (SPSS, INC, Chicago, Illinois, 2009).
Results
Sample Description
Demographic information on the sample and detailed information on the personality 
traits and cognitive constructs can be found in Tables 1 and 2. The NESDA sample 
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including NEO-FFI, PSWQ, ASI and LEIDS-R scores were available for 2590 participants 
(86.9%). The study sample mean age is 42.3 years (SD = 13.1), and 67.2% is female. 
Almost half (43.2%) of the participants has one or more current anxiety or depressive 
disorders and three-quarters (75.6%) has a lifetime anxiety or depressive disorder.
Comparison of Healthy Controls with Acute and Remitted Diagnostic Groups
When comparing participants with a current disorder (N = 1111) to the group without 
current psychopathology (N = 1462) the former group scores significantly higher 
(p < 0.001) on the personality traits (except for extraversion where the relationship is 
reversed) and all cognitive constructs. Cohen’s d effect size is 0.33 (small effect) for 
LEIDS-R-acc and all others vary between 0.56 and 1.37 (large effect). 
 With regard to demographics, a significant difference (p < 0.001) for education 
was found, with the current disorder group completing fewer years of education 
(d = 0.27). Differences in gender and age were not significant.
  Similar results were found when comparing participants with a disorder in 
remission (N = 834) to participants who had never experienced psychopathology in 
their lives (N = 628), with highly significant (p < 0.001) differences for all personality 
traits and cognitive constructs. LEIDS-R-acc had a Cohen’s d effect size of 0.29 (small 
effect) and all others varied between 0.50 and 0.96 (large effect). Results were all in 
the expected direction.
  In demographics, a significant difference was observed in the gender distribution 
(φ = -.10) indicating that the remission group contained a higher percentage of 
females. Further, there was a negligible effect (d = 0.13, p = 0.02) for age reflecting 
a slightly older remission sample. No difference was found for number of years of 
education. Demographic variables were included as covariates in all analyses, and 
between group differences in demographics were thereby controlled for.
Hierarchical Regression Analyses Investigating Incremental Validity
Binomial logistic regression was conducted for each of the disorders. Logistic 
coefficients, Wald statistic, odds ratio and 95% confidence intervals from each logistic 
regression analysis are presented in Tables 3 to 6. As shown above, psychopathology 
groups scored significantly higher than healthy controls (with the exception of 
extraversion where -as expected- an inverse relation was reported). Because the 
present analysis is conducted in participants with an acute disorder or a disorder in 
remission only (excluding healthy controls), associations in an unexpected direction 
merely reflect that the predictor is not so important for that particular disorder in 
comparison to the other disorders it is compared to. These associations indicate 
that the predictor is less dominant in a particular disorder and does not imply that 
the predictor constitutes a protective factor for that disorder. Therefore below only 
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Prediction of current diagnosis by cognitive constructs after correction for personality 
traits
In the first series of analyses only participants with a current diagnosis were included 
(N = 1111). Results of the binominal logistic regressions are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
These tables also show model fit and explained variance (Nagelkerke R² ) for each model.
 After correction for demographics and personality traits results reveal PSWQ as a 
predictor of GAD, ASI-physical concerns of PD and ASI-social-cognitive concerns of SAD. 
Hence, indicating that these cognitive constructs possess additional predictive value over 
and above neuroticism and extraversion. Inspection of the LEIDS-R-subscales reveals that 
the hopelessness subscale (LEIDS-R-hop) predicts MDD as does the rumination subscale 
(LEIDS-R-rum). Finally, the LEIDS-R-aggression is a predictor for DD.
  The omnibus binomial logistic regression model indicated a significant model 
overall for each of the disorders (see Tables 3 and 4) as well as a reasonable proportion 
of explained variance (Nagelkerke R² - varied from .12 to .18). Considering the type of 
analysis -using a built in psychiatric control group and thus exclusion of healthy controls- 
these figures indicate that a reasonable proportion of the variance can be explained by 
each of the models. 
When comparing these final models to the versions without the cognitive constructs, – only 
including demographics and the personality traits of neuroticism and extraversion –, all 
models significantly improved their fit as a result of adding the cognitive constructs. For 
SAD the improvement was χ² (2, N = 462) = 28.20, p < 0.001, for GAD χ²(1, N = 319 ) 
= 33.93, p < 0.001, for PD χ² (1, N = 419) = 124.60, p < 0.001, for DD: χ² (1, N = 226) 
= 11.85, p = 0.001 and for MDD: χ² (3, N = 644) = 57.95, p < 0.001.
Prediction of disorders in remission by cognitive constructs after correction for 
personality traits
In contrast to the previous models that aimed to predict current diagnosis, the next models 
aim to investigate whether the established relationships will hold up when disorders are in 
remission without current diagnoses being able to dominate the relationship. In order to 
do so all participants with no history of depressive or anxiety disorders and all participants 
currently suffering from a disorder were excluded from the analyses, resulting in a sample 
of N = 834. Moreover, in order to correct for residual symptoms the covariates BAI and 
IDS where added to the models. Results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. These tables also 
show model fit and explained variance (Nagelkerke R² ) for each model.
  Results for the anxiety disorders were very similar to what was reported for current 
diagnosis: ASI-social-cognitive concerns predicted SAD and ASI-physical concerns PD. 
Surprisingly PSWQ was the only exception as its contribution became non-significant in 
the prediction model of GAD where its influence seems to be completely overruled by 
neuroticism which now is a highly significant predictor. 
  Results for the depressive disorders show LEIDS-R-agg as predictor for DD and 
LEIDS-R-rum as a predictor of MDD. Most notable is the non-significant contribution of 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  All models are significant overall (see Tables 5 and 6) although the explained variance 
is slightly lower than for the current disorders. Nagelkerke varied from .04 to .13 with PD 
scoring at the higher and GAD at the lower end.
  When comparing these final models to the versions without the cognitive constructs 
-only including demographics, the BAI and IDS, and the personality traits of neuroticism 
and extraversion- all models, except for GAD where neuroticism dominated, significantly 
improved their fit as a result of adding the cognitive constructs. For SAD the improvement 
is χ² (2, N = 192) = 21.20, p < 0.001, for PD χ² (2, N = 187) = 42.13, p < 0.001, DD χ² (1, 
N = 157) = 9.20, p < 0.01 and for MDD χ² (2, N = 693 ) = 20.30, p < 0.001. 
Repeating Analyses with Comorbidity Correction
As comorbidity among anxiety and depressive disorders is very common this could have 
influenced the results. In order to check this, analyses for both the current and remission 
sample were re-run, controlling for comorbidity by adding to each model the different 
diagnoses (dummy coded variables: absent/present) as covariates (data not shown). Hence, 
in each sample five binomial logistic regression analyses were run. The models consisted 
of demographics, personality traits and the different diagnoses with the exception of the 
index disorder (forced entry), and the cognitive variables (stepwise backward procedure). 
The same was done for the remission sample with the addition of BAI and IDS (forced 
entry) to control for residual symptoms.
Compared to the analyses without comorbidity correction, results in the current diagnosis 
sample showed only a minor difference in the model of DD: neuroticism no longer made 
a significant contribution. The models on disorders in remission showed no differences. 
Overall the results are very similar to the analyses without correction for comorbidity, with 
the same significant cognitive predictors still present in the models, indicating that the 
reported results are very robust and not critically confounded by comorbidity.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate the incremental validity of the cognitive constructs 
AS, PW and CR in predicting depressive and anxiety disorders over and above the 
personality traits of neuroticism and extraversion, while controlling for sociodemographic 
characteristics. This was investigated in both symptomatic and remitted patients.
 Results from the symptomatic group revealed that both specific and unique cognitive 
components exist: Anxiety Sensitivity is a specific component involved in both SAD and 
PD, and Pathological Worry a unique component for GAD. Within the depressive disorders, 
Aggression Reactivity (LEIDS-R-agg) is unique for DD, and Rumination on Sadness 
(LEIDS-R-rum) and Hopelessness Reactivity (LEIDS-R-hop) are unique factors in MDD. As 
expected, odds ratios were small, but when considering that we applied a stringent test 
by using a psychiatric control group, these results are noteworthy and robust. 
  The subscales of AS have unique aspects; social-cognitive concerns (ASI-scc) is 
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solely related to SAD and physical concerns (ASI-phc) to PD. At a higher-order level both 
factors capture the same underlying mechanism -the fear of anxiety related sensations. 
The involvement of AS in both PD and SAD was no surprise, as misinterpretation of bodily 
sensations and maladaptive cognitions such as the fear to lose control are well known to 
play a prominent role in these disorders (e.g., D. M. Clark, 1988; D.M. Clark & Wells, 1995). 
  PW is also a unique component. Note that ‘uniqueness’ does not mean that the 
construct is not involved in other disorders, but that it has a dominant role in one disorder. 
As pointed out by Mineka, Watson and Clark (1998) “symptom specificity must be viewed 
in relative rather than absolute terms.”. So even though PW is elevated in many disorders, 
it has a more defining role in GAD, which is in line with both cognitive models and the 
DSM classification (APA, 2000). Two other unique components are Rumination on Sadness 
and Hopelessness Reactivity, which are both linked to MDD. This relationship is unique 
in the sense that their predictive value of MDD is over and above that of personality 
traits and anxiety constructs, and remains limited to this one disorder. Further, this 
finding is consistent with previous research highlighting the core role of rumination and 
hopelessness in maintaining and predicting depression (e.g., Alloy et al., 1999; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000).
 Contrary to the above findings, the relationship between DD and Aggression 
Reactivity (LEIDS-R-agg) was somewhat unexpected. Irritability is a common symptom of 
DD but has not been investigated as a (cognitive) vulnerability factor. For example, Fava 
et al. (1997) reported increased anger attacks among people with dysthymia or atypical 
depression compared to normal controls. More recently, irritability was examined as a 
potential subtype of MDD in the general population and it was found that the presence of 
irritability (versus its absence) in MDD is associated with higher comorbid dysthymia and 
lifetime persistence of symptoms (Fava et al., 2009). Further, a recent large-scale longitudinal 
study showed that irritability during adolescence predicts an adult diagnosis of dysthymia, 
and to a lesser extent GAD and MDD, over a period of 20 years (Stringaris, Cohen, Pine, 
& Leibenluft, 2009). The present finding expands on this literature by showing a unique 
association between aggression reactivity and dysthymia, but not major depression. It 
is noteworthy that dysthymia was also related to lower extraversion in our sample. At 
first glance this pattern of results is suggestive of an introvert profile characterizing the 
dysthymic patient consistent with older psychoanalytic theories focusing on the central 
role of anger in depressive disorders. In this orientation difficulties with the expression 
of anger are thought to cause intrapsychic conflicts that lead to anger being directed 
inwards (Busch, 2009). As a result, defence mechanisms, such as passive aggression, are 
triggered and maintained in dysthymic patients (Bloch, Shear, Markowitz, Leon, & Perry, 
1993). It should be noted however, that aggression reactivity is conscious, self-reported 
aggression.
The findings found in acute patients also appeared in the remission group, and the 
similarities are striking. With the exception of LEIDS-R-hop and PW all cognitive constructs 
uphold their position in the prediction models. An explanation for the non-significant 
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contribution of LEIDS-R-hop to MDD can be found in a recently conducted study. 
This study showed that only remitted depressed participants with a history of suicidal 
ideation during their prior depressive episode are likely to experience high hopelessness 
reactivity scores during remission, whereas participants without such history do not 
show elevated hopelessness (Antypa, et al., 2010). Consequently, the level of LEIDS-R-
hop during remission seems to be dependent upon prior suicidal ideation status. This 
implies that although hopelessness was not represented in the overall MDD remission 
model it could still be a unique component for a specific subgroup. Another cognitive 
predictor conspicuous by its absence is PW. In the remission model of GAD, PW was 
no longer a significant predictor. This is most likely due to the high shared variance 
with neuroticism (e.g., Wells, 1994). The cognitive predictors that continued to make a 
significant contribution to the remission models are AS (specific component: SAD and 
PD), LEIDS-R-agg (unique component: DD) and LEIDS-R-rum (unique component: MDD). 
The fact that these constructs uphold their position in the remission models, even when 
corrected for current symptomatology, supports the idea that these constructs are not 
merely epiphenomena of current disorders. Whether the results reflect scarring or more 
stable vulnerability factors cannot be derived from the present data. 
The present study has several strengths such as the large (clinical) sample size, the 
recruitment from diverse settings, the replication in a remission group and the inclusion 
of several affective disorders and cognitive constructs. 
  There are also some limitations. The cross-sectional design limits insight into the 
direction of relationships. This was partly circumvented by also investigating remitted 
patients, however longitudinal data are needed to investigate cause and effect 
relationships. Another limitation lies in the selection of cognitive constructs. There are 
many other cognitive constructs which would have been interesting to include, such as 
intolerance of uncertainty, and experiential avoidance. Thirdly, the self-report nature of 
some of the instruments used in the present study has obvious downsides. Most of these 
measures are well established and accepted in research, however. The only exception is 
the LEIDS-R, which has a relatively short history. Although the present golden standard 
for CR measurement involves a mood induction (Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005), this has 
also its drawbacks and the success rates of inducing sadness also varies. Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, the support for the LEIDS-R as a valid measure of CR is accumulating 
(e.g., Moulds, et al., 2008). Finally, the categorical diagnosis/no-diagnosis approach 
is necessarily accompanied by the issue of subsyndromal symptoms. In the remission 
sample the BAI and IDS were added as control variables in order to correct for residual 
symptoms. These measures however, do not cover the entire symptomatology spectrum 
of anxiety in particular and thus the presence of some residual (anxiety) symptoms cannot 
be excluded. The current diagnosis sample did not allow for a similar approach to correct 
for subsyndromal (comorbid) symptoms as this would have corrected for the severity of 
the current index disorder itself and hence analyses would have provided non-informative 
results. Therefore it cannot be excluded that subsyndromal comorbid symptoms might 
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account for some of the associations of current disorders with global or specific cognitive 
factors. Overall the findings support the Integrative Hierarchical Model. Moreover, when 
considering the additional value of cognitive constructs in understanding anxiety and 
depressive disorders, one can conclude that reliance on a few general measures does not 
do justice to the complexity of these psychopathologies. On a more practical level the 
results imply that although a patient might no longer meet (symptomatic) criteria of a 
disorder, cognitive mind sets might still be latently present, increasing the risk for relapse. 
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Background: It is undecided whether worry and rumination are conceptualizations of 
the same underlying process of repetitive negative thinking, which is hypothesized to be 
a transdiagnostic factor underlying various emotional disorders. The aim of this study is 
to investigate stable and time specific aspects of worry and rumination in fear disorders 
(social anxiety, panic disorder, agoraphobia) and distress disorders (dysthymia, depressive 
disorder, generalized anxiety disorder).
Method: Longitudinal cohort study in 2981 participants (healthy controls, persons with a 
prior disorder history and persons with a current distress and/or fear disorder). Assessment 
of DSM-IV diagnoses and worry/rumination took place at baseline (T1), 2-year follow-
up (T2), and 4-year follow-up (T3). Latent trait-state models were fitted using structural 
equation analyses. 
Results: Results revealed that i) worry and rumination each contain stable trait 
components, which are strongly correlated; ii) state level fluctuations of worry and 
rumination are moderately and positively correlated; iii) trait worry and trait rumination 
are strongly associated with the stable components of both distress and fear disorders; iv) 
state fluctuations in distress/fear disorder predict state fluctuations in worry/rumination 
2 years later and not vice versa.
Conclusion: Our results highlight the similarities between worry and rumination and 
support their conceptualization as transdiagnostic processes.
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Introduction
Worry is a central feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and rumination of major 
depressive disorder (MDD), although, levels are elevated across anxiety and depressive 
disorders. Both cognitive processes are characterized by uncontrolled, excessive and 
repetitive thinking about current concerns, problems, past experiences or worries 
about the future; so called Repetitive Negative Thinking (RNT; Ehring & Watkins, 2008, 
p. 192). If a distinction is to be made, worry is more about the future, rumination about 
the past – although this distinction is a simplification. The question is justified whether 
worry and rumination are conceptualizations of the same underlying process. Another 
question is whether these process(es) are transdiagnostic or that their presence across 
emotional disorders is due to comorbidity with one specific disorder. If they are indeed 
conceptualizations of the same underlying process we would expect the stable trait 
components of worry and rumination to be highly related, fluctuations at state level to 
occur in sync and similar relations of worry and rumination with emotional disorders. If 
worry and rumination are transdiagnostic processes we would also expect them to be 
present across emotional disorders independent of comorbidity with a specific disorder. 
Finally, a third question is whether -in line with cognitive theory- reciprocal lagged 
relations between worry/rumination and emotional disorders are mutually reinforcing 
each other, setting off a downward spiral towards enduring psychopathology.
  The proposition that worry and rumination are transdiagnostic processes (Harvey et 
al., 2004; Ehring & Watkins, 2008) is predominantly based on studies revealing elevated 
levels across disorders. These studies were generally focussed on individual disorders 
(major depressive disorder (MDD) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) in particular) 
while disregarding comorbidity. Comorbidity is however the rule rather than the exception 
(e.g. Kessler et al., 1994) especially between MDD/DYS and GAD (e.g. Spinhoven et 
al., 2009; Kessler et al., 1999) and could be responsible for the similar findings across 
disorders. A recent cross-sectional study by Lamers and colleagues (2011) reported that 
among MDD patients the co-occurrence with GAD was 31% and life-time comorbidity 
was as high as 38%. In GAD patients comorbidity numbers were even higher with up to 
78% (lifetime 88%) of the patients reporting to suffer from a depressive disorder. The 
limitation of studying separate disorders is further highlighted by findings that suggest 
that MDD and GAD share a genetic based common cause (Gorwood, 2004; Kendler et al., 
2007). Given the high comorbidity among emotional disorders, studying the relation of 
worry and rumination with various emotional disorders simultaneously while accounting 
for their comorbidity may provide additional insight into their potentially transdiagnostic 
characteristics. One way to address this issue is to cluster related disorders and study 
them simultaneously. An example of this would be to examine ‘emotional disorders’ or to 
use the traditional DSM-IV division of emotional disorders into ‘anxiety’ and ‘depressive’ 
disorder clusters. Another, increasingly popular categorization of emotional disorders is 
that into fear and distress disorders. The latter division is supported by recent studies of 
the structure of psychopathology that show that GAD is better placed with the depressive 
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disorders than the anxiety disorders (for an overview see Beesdo-Baum et al., 2009). The 
present study will take comorbidity into account by applying this fear-distress model 
when investigating worry and rumination. 
  So far most studies have focused on cross-sectional or uni-directional relationships 
of worry and rumination with each other and with particular emotional disorders, and 
did not examine reciprocal effects nor the temporal character of the effects. Longitudinal 
studies concerning rumination have shown that rumination predicts the occurrence of 
both anxiety and depressive symptoms over time, including new onset of depressive 
disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Likewise, worry has been found to be a vulnerability 
factor predicting increments of anxiety and depressive symptoms over time (Hong, 2007). 
Unlike the longitudinal studies examining rumination, studies concerning worry usually 
covered limited time frames of around one week to two months (e.g. Calmes & Roberts, 
2007; Hong, 2007; Segerstrom et al., 2000). The role of worry and rumination is further 
confirmed by an extensive review of the literature on repetitive (negative) thinking (RNT) 
revealing that RNT is a vulnerability factor for both anxiety and depressive disorders 
(Watkins, 2008). A reverse effect of psychopathology predicting the occurrence of RNT 
has, to the best of our knowledge, not been investigated longitudinally. 
  The assumption that worry and rumination share the same process is largely based 
on studies showing substantial correlations between the two constructs (e.g. Segerstrom 
et al., 2000, r = .32 to r = .46; Muris et al., 2004, r = .55; Watkins, 2004, r = .51; Hong, 2007, 
r = .42). By using a latent trait-state model (see Naragon-Gainey, Gallagher, & Brown, 
2013, and Ormel & Schaufeli, 1991, for the development of similar models) it is possible 
to separate stable and state components of worry and rumination. This will provide 
information on whether these supposedly vulnerability factors are indeed stable over time 
and how they relate to each other and to the stable components of psychopathology. 
Worry and rumination state levels are also of interest as levels are known to fluctuate 
and to be heightened during periods of psychopathology (e.g. Bagby et al., 2004; Kasch, 
Klein, & Lara, 2001). These fluctuations around a person’s set point may put into motion 
a downward spiral in which increases in worry/rumination lead to heightened levels 
of psychopathology which in turn triggers worry/rumination. If reciprocal influences 
are present this could potentially be an important mechanism underlying enduring 
psychopathology. 
  The NESDA study, with presently three-wave data available on worry/rumination and 
emotional disorders, offers an unique possibility to analyse the temporal and directional 
character of a reciprocal relationship between worry and rumination as well as between 
emotional disorders and worry/rumination, on the basis of longitudinal data in a relatively 
large and representative sample of participants with depressive and ⁄or anxiety disorder from 
different recruitment settings. Using a latent trait-state model, we expect the trait components 
of worry and rumination to be highly related and fluctuations at state level to occur in sync. 
Further, we expect that worry/rumination and emotional disorders are mutually reinforcing 
each other over time in a downward spiral. Finally, we expect both worry and rumination to 
show stronger associations with distress disorders than with fear disorders.
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Method
Participants and Setting
The Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA) is an ongoing multi-site 
longitudinal cohort study including 2981 adult subjects aged 18 through 65 years. The 
baseline sample consists of 687 (23.0%) healthy controls and 2294 (77.0%) persons with a 
life-time diagnosis of depression or anxiety disorder of whom 1701 (57.1%) have a current 
diagnosis (past 6 months). In order to be representative of those with depressive and 
anxiety disorders respondents in different stages of the developmental history of the 
disorders (normal, high familial risk, subthreshold disorders, first and recurrent episodes) 
and from different health care settings (community, primary care and specialized mental 
health care) were included. A general inclusion criterion was an age of 18 to 65 years. 
An exclusion criterion was a primary psychotic, obsessive compulsive, bipolar or severe 
addiction disorder. In addition patients who were not fluent in Dutch were excluded. An 
extensive description of the rationale, method and recruitment strategy can be found 
elsewhere (Penninx, et al., 2008).
Procedure
The study protocol was approved centrally by the Ethical Review Board of the VU University 
Medical Centre and subsequently by local review boards of each participating centre. 
Participants provided written informed consent. Baseline assessment (T1) took place at one of 
the seven field centre locations during a 4-hour clinic visit. Assessment included demographic 
and personal characteristics, medical assessment and the standardized diagnostic psychiatric 
interview Composite Interview Diagnostic Instrument (CIDI, version 2.1). 
 A face-to-face follow-up assessment, including the same diagnostic interview, was 
conducted after 2 years (T2 response: n = 2596, 87.1%) and after 4 years (T3 response: 
n = 2402, 80.6%). During each assessment presence of DSM-IV (APA, 1994) based depressive 
[Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), Dysthymia (DYS)] or anxiety [Panic Disorder (PAN), Social 
Anxiety Disorder (SAD), Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), Agoraphobia without panic 
(AGO)] disorders was established. Presence of the disorders was defined as the occurrence 
of the disorder at any time during the six months preceding each assessment (T1, T2, and T3). 
Measures
Assessment of psychiatric diagnoses
Diagnostic status (6 month recency diagnosis) was established using the Composite 
Interview Diagnostic Instrument (CIDI-WHO lifetime version 2.1; Ter Smitten, Smeets, & 
Van den Brink, 1998). The CIDI is a worldwide used instrument which classifies diagnoses 
according to DSM-IV criteria (APA, 1994). It has shown high interrater reliability (Wittchen 
et al., 1991), high test-retest reliability (Wacker, Battegay, Mullejans, & Schlosser, 2006) and 
high validity for depressive and anxiety disorders (Farmer, Katz, Mcguffin, & Bebbington, 





Worry was measured with the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, et al., 1990). 
This questionnaire consists of 16 items rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘1 = 
not at all typical of me’ to ‘5 = very typical of me’. The PSWQ consists of two subscales: 
a ‘General worry’ subscale (11 items) and a ‘Not-worry’ subscale (5 items) (van Rijsoort, 
Emmelkamp, & Vervaeke, 1999). The ‘General worry’ subscale accounts for most of the 
variance in PSWQ scores (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992; Meyer, et al., 1990; van Rijsoort, 
et al., 1999), and only this subscale was administered in the NESDA study. Psychometric 
properties of this Dutch 11-item version are not available but the original PSWQ has 
been proven to be a valid measure of trait worrying unaffected by the content of the 
worry (Davey, 1993; Molina & Borkovec, 1994) with high internal consistency, good test-
retest reliability and unaffected by social desirability (Meyer, et al., 1990). The adjustments 
made to the original PSWQ are not expected to have had a negative effect on these 
characteristics. Internal consistency in the present study was high, namely α = .96 at T1, 
T2 and T3.
  Rumination was assessed with the subscale Rumination on Sadness of the revised 
version of the Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity (LEIDS-R; Van der Does, 2002; Williams, 
et al., 2008). The LEIDS-R is a self-report instrument which measures cognitive reactivity 
to sad mood and has been found to reliably discriminate between never-depressed and 
recovered depressed groups (e.g., Firk & Markus, 2009; Merens, et al., 2005; Moulds, et 
al., 2008; Van der Does, 2002). LEIDS-R scores also correlate with biological vulnerability 
markers of depression: response to acute tryptophan depletion (Booij & Van der Does, 
2007) and a serotonin transporter gene polymorphism (Antypa, Van der Does, & Penninx, 
2010). 
  The subscale Rumination on Sadness (RUM) consists of 6 items. Participants are 
asked to indicate whether and how their thinking patterns change when they experience 
mild dysphoria by scoring each item on a 5-point Likert-scale ranging from 0 ‘not at all’ 
to 4 ‘very strongly’ applicable to me. In the present sample the internal consistency of the 
RUM-scale was 0.82 at T1, 0.84 at T2 and 0.85 at T3. 
Statistical Analyses
Psychopathology measurement model
We expected the distress-fear model (Distress: MDD, DYS, GAD; Fear: PAN, SAD, AGO) 
to best represent the latent structure and stability of emotional disorders based on high 
comorbidity rates between GAD and depressive disorders as well as on previous research 
supporting the distress-fear measurement model (for an overview see Beesdo-Baum 
et al., 2009). In order to test this assumption confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were 
performed to examine the fit of the distress-fear model, the DSM-IV model and a single-
factor model to the longitudinally collected diagnostic CIDI data. In these analyses the T1, 
T2 and T3 assessments of the 6 diagnostic variables (i.e., MDD, DYS, GAD, SAD, PAN, and 
AGO) were considered as repeated measures. Factor loadings of the observed disorders 
on their latent trait factor(s) were constrained to be equal over time. Goodness-of-fit was 
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assessed using: chi-square test of the model (p > .05), Comparative Fit Index (CFI; ≥ .96), 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI; ≥ .95), and Weighted Root-Mean-Square Residual (WRMR; ≤ 1.0). 
However, we considered the Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA; ≤ .05), as 
the main index of model fit as it has been shown to be sensitive to model misspecification 
and less sensitive than other global fit measures to distribution and sample size in badly 
fitting covariance structure models (Hu & Bentler, 1998). 
Trait and State Models (T&S)
Next, we analysed five structural models ((1) Rumination and Worry; (2) Distress Disorders 
and Worry; (3) Distress Disorders and Rumination; (4) Fear Disorders and Worry; and 
(5) Fear Disorders and Rumination). See Figures 1-5 for an overview of these models. In 
order to clarify these models we will describe the four Emotional Disorder-RNT models 
together (model 2-5). The Rumination-Worry model (model 1) has a similar structure. 
The models consist of three parts: two identical trait and state (T&S) models for three 
time points, one addressing psychopathology (Distress or Fear Disorders, top half of the 
model) and one repetitive negative thinking (Worry or Rumination, bottom half of the 
model), four correlations (Paths c, d, e, and f) and four regression effects (Paths a1, a2, 
b1, b2) linking the T&S models. The T&S Disorders model assumes that psychopathology 
(Distress or Fear disorders) at each time point is the function of two latent (unobserved) 
variables: a trait component (common factor) and a state component. The state component 
represents the variance not accounted for by the common factor and consequently reflects 
time-variant fluctuations within-subject over the 2-yr study period including measurement 
error. The same assumptions are made for the T&S models of repetitive negative thinking 
(worry and rumination).
  The across-time structure of the latent state psychopathology variables (State 1, 
State 2, State 3) in the T&S model was modeled as a first-order auto-regressive model. 
Hence, State 2 and 3 variances consist of variance transmitted from an earlier time point 
(paths p and q) and new variance resulting from the effects of unobserved variables active 
during the interval between the measurement points as well as measurement error. The 
across-time structure of the latent repetitive negative thinking variables was modeled in a 
similar way (paths r and s).
  By combining the T&S models for psychopathology and repetitive negative thinking 
an integrated model is obtained in which the latent state variables of psychopathology 
can act as a change agent of repetitive negative thinking and, vice versa, the cross-variable 
effects. The model allows correlation between the common trait factors (correlation f) 
and between the state components of psychopathology and repetitive negative thinking 
(correlations c, d, e). Finally, the effects of the latent state variables can be lagged (Paths 
a1, a2, b1, b2). 
Model Specification and Identification
To solve the structural equations of the full model, the following assumptions for both the 
psychopathology and repetitive negative thinking T&S parts of the models were made: 
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(a) the regressions of the observed RNT scores and psychopathology factors scores (as 
derived from the CFA modeling) on their respective latent trait factor are equal over time 
(equality constraints x1 = x2 = x3; y1 = y2= y3); (b) the lagged cross-variable effects at 
Time 2 equal those at Time 3 (a1 = a2, b1 = b2) (c.f., Duncan-Jones et al., 1990; Ormel & 
Schaufeli, 1991); and (c) the residual variances of the observed variables equal 0. 
  Descriptive statistics as well as model fitting were obtained using the MPlus computer 
program (version 7; Muthén & Muthén, 1998 - 2012). Participants who did not participate 
in the T2 and T3 assessment were included in the analyses by using Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation for missing data. The full model, depicted in 
Figures 1-5, necessitates the estimation of 18 parameters (variance of the six latent state 
variables was fixed at unity). Consequently the full model has 3 degrees of freedom left. 
Standardized estimates, or path coefficients, with a theoretical range from zero (no effect) 
to +1 (maximum positive or negative effect) are provided. Path coefficients of < .10 were 
considered to be negligible, of ≥ .10 and < .30 to be small, of ≥ .30 and < .50 to be 
moderate and ≥ .50 to be large. As estimation method we used MLR -maximum likelihood 
parameter estimates with standard errors and a chi-square test statistic that are robust to 
non-normality and non-independence of observations. 
Results
Participant Characteristics
The NESDA sample (T1) consists of 2981 adult participants of whom 66.4% is female and 
the mean age is 41.9 years (SD = 13.1). At T1 1701 participants had a current diagnosis: 
MDD = 37.4%, DYS = 10.2%, GAD = 15.6%, SAD = 22.3%, PAN = 22.5%, and AGO = 6.3%. 
As expected comorbidity rates were high with 57.5% of the participants with a current 
(6-month recency) diagnosis meeting criteria for two or more disorders (see Table 1 for 
an overview of comorbidity rates). After 2 years (T2) the sample consisted of 2596 (87.1%) 
participants and after 4 years (T3) of 2402 (80.6%) participants. Potential bias due to 
selective attrition was checked. Compared to completers, dropouts at T2 and T3 were 
less educated, younger, had higher latent factor scores for fear and distress disorders, 
and reported higher worry levels (all p < .05). Gender and rumination scores were not 
associated with attrition.
The relationship of worry with rumination 
The rumination-worry model (Figure 1) with cross-variable lagged effects had a good 
model fit, RMSEA = 0.031. The estimated trait variance of worry scores varied from 
59% (.772) at T1 to 67% (.822) at T3 and for rumination between 55% (.742) and 66% 
(.812) indicating that up to two thirds of the between subject differences in worry and 
rumination scores are stable over time. The remaining variance, i.e. state variance, 
consequently varied between 34% and 45%. See Figure 1 for an overview of the 
results.
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  Worry and rumination were strongly related at trait level (.76) underlining the 
interrelatedness of the two forms of RNT. At state level the cross-variable concurrent 
relationships (c, d, e) were moderate in strength (.44, .39, .45), indicating that participants 
who increased their engagement in worry also started to ruminate more and vice versa. 
The cross-variable lagged effects of rumination on worry (a1, a2) were significant but small 
(.13 and .15). The opposite effects of worry on rumination (b1, b2) were non-significant. 
Overall it seems that state fluctuations in worry/rumination levels present themselves in 
sync, while only state fluctuations in rumination have a small effect on state fluctuations 
in worry 2 years later.
Psychopathology Measurement Model Selection
In line with expectations CFA showed the best goodness-of-fit for the Distress-Fear 
(MDD, DYS, GAD vs. SAD, PAN, AGO) model — χ2(110) = 201.140; TLI = .988; CFI = .991; 
RMSEA = .017; WRMR = 1.056. Followed by the DSM-IV (MDD and DYS versus SAD, 
PAN, AGO and GAD) model χ2(110) = 275.464; TLI = .978; CFI = .984; RMSEA = .022; 
WRMR = 1.258 and finally the single-factor model χ2(124) = 374.281; TLI = .971; 
CFI = .976; RMSEA = .026; WRMR = 1.491). Based on these results and on previous 
literature supporting a Distress-Fear two factor solution (for a review see Beesdo-Baum 
et al., 2009) this model was chosen for further statistical analyses. Latent factor scores for 
Distress and Fear disorders were used as input variables in subsequent Trait&State models 
(see Table 2 for factor loadings on the latent variables).
The relation of rumination with psychopathology 
Rumination’s estimated trait variance within the Fear-model (Figure 2) varied from 48% 
(.692) at T1 and T2 to 58% (.762) at T3 indicating that about half of the between-subject 
differences in rumination scores are stable over time. The other half of the variance consists 
of state variance and subsequently varied between 52% (.722) at T1 and T2 to 42% (.652) at 
Table 1: Comorbidity at T1 for the current (6 month recency) sample
MDD DYS GAD SAD PAN AGO
MDD (n = 1115) - 23.5% 30.5% 34.7% 35.9 8.2%
DYS (n = 305) 85.9 - 45.6 43.6 39.7 10.5
GAD (n = 464) 73.3 30.0 - 44.0 42.5 10.3
SAD (n = 665) 58.2 20.0 30.7 - 45.9 9.6
PAN (n = 670) 59.7 18.1 29.4 45.5 - -
AGO (n = 187) 48.7 17.1 25.7 34.2 - -
Note. MDD = Major Depressive Disorder; DYS = Dysthymia; GAD = Generalized Anxiety Disorder; 
SAD = Social Anxiety Disorder; PAN = Panic Disorder; 
AGO = Agoraphobia w/o panic.
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Figure 1:  Rumination and Worry T&S models linked at trait level via correlations between 
trait factors (f) and at state level through contemporaneous correlations (c,d,e,) 
and cross-variable 2-year lagged effects (a,b).
Note. Equality constraints applied to identify model equations were: x1 = x2 = x3; y1 = y2 = y3; 
a1 = a2; b1 = b2. Significant (p < .05) correlations and regression coefficients are depicted in bold.
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T3. An almost identical pattern of results was found in the Distress model (Figure 3) where 
estimated trait variance of rumination ranged from 50% (T1 and T2) to 62% (T3) and state 
variance ranged from 50% (T1 and T2) to 38% (T3).
 The trait fear factor accounted for 67% (.822) of the variance in fear scores at T1, 
61% (.782) at T2 and 76% (.872) at T3. These scores are slightly higher than those of the 
trait factor distress with variances of 52% (T1), 50% (T2) and 59% (T3), suggesting that 
individual differences in fear scores are slightly more stable over time.
 The fear and distress trait factor are both strongly (.54, respectively .66) related to 
the rumination trait factor. These numbers demonstrate the interconnection between the 
stable components of the emotional disorders and the stable trait of rumination. 
 The cross-variable effects revealed a fairly similar pattern for the fear and distress 
model. Both models show that all concurrent relationships (c, d, e) are significant and 
small to moderate in strength, indicating that participants who became more fearful or 
distressed also engaged more in rumination and vice versa. Small to moderate lagged 
effects (a1, a2) were also found for state level fluctuations of distress or fear disorders 
on state rumination indicating that more distress or fear resulted in higher levels of 
rumination 2 years later. Results of lagged effects (b1, b2) of state level rumination on 
state level psychopathology differed between the distress and fear model. Where the fear 
model showed a significant positive effect of state fluctuations in rumination on state 
fluctuations in fear disorder this effect was not observed for distress disorder. Regression 
coefficients (.09 and .06) were however so small that these effects can be considered 
negligible. In sum, state fluctuations in rumination seem to be primarily driven by state 
fluctuations in psychopathology and not vice versa. 
The relation of worry with psychopathology 
The estimated trait variance of Worry scores within the Fear-model (Figure 4) varied from 
55% (.742) at T1, to 58% (.762) at T2 and 62% (.792) at T3 indicating that over half of the 
between-subject differences in worry scores are stable over time. The remaining variance, 
i.e. state variance, consequently varied from 45% (.672) at T1 to 42% (.652) at T2 and 38% 
Table 2: Factor loadings on the latent variables for the distress-fear CFA solution
Factor Distress Fear
T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3
MDD .81 .85 .82 SAD .72 .76 .69
DYS .81 .86 .83 PAN .66 .69 .62
GAD .69 .73 .70 AGO .39 .41 .37
Note. MDD = Major Depressive Disorder; DYS = Dysthymia; GAD = Generalized Anxiety Disorder; 
SAD = Social Anxiety Disorder; PAN = Panic Disorder; 
AGO = Agoraphobia w/o panic.
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Figure 2:  Rumination and Fear T&S models linked at trait level via correlations between 
trait factors (f) and at state level through contemporaneous correlations (c,d,e,) 
and cross-variable 2-year lagged effects (a,b).
Note. Equality constraints applied to identify model equations were: x1 = x2 = x3; y1 = y2 = y3; 
a1 = a2; b1 = b2. Significant (p < .05) correlations and regression coefficients are depicted in bold.
59
Longitudinal associations between repetitive negative thinking and emotional disorders
Figure 3:  Rumination and Distress T&S models linked at trait level via correlations between 
trait factors (f) and at state level through contemporaneous correlations (c,d,e,) 
and cross-variable 2-year lagged effects (a,b).
Note. Equality constraints applied to identify model equations were: x1 = x2 = x3; y1 = y2 = y3; 
a1 = a2; b1 = b2. Significant (p < .05) correlations and regression coefficients are depicted in bold.
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Figure 4:  Worry and Fear T&S models linked at trait level via correlations between trait 
factors (f) and at state level through contemporaneous correlations (c,d,e,) and 
cross-variable 2-year lagged effects (a,b).
Note. Equality constraints applied to identify model equations were: x1 = x2 = x3; y1 = y2 = y3; 
a1 = a2; b1 = b2. Significant (p < .05) correlations and regression coefficients are depicted in bold.
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Figure 5:  Worry and Distress T&S models linked at trait level via correlations between trait 
factors (f) and at state level through contemporaneous correlations (c,d,e,) and 
cross-variable 2-year lagged effects (a,b).
Note. Equality constraints applied to identify model equations were: x1 = x2 = x3; y1 = y2 = y3; 
a1 = a2; b1 = b2. Significant (p < .05) correlations and regression coefficients are depicted in bold.
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(.622) at T3. In the Distress model (Figure 5) about two-thirds to three quarters of the total 
estimated variance in Worry scores can be accounted for by the trait rumination factor 
(scores ranging from 61% to 74%) with state variance scores consequently ranging from 
26% to 39%. 
 The psychopathology parts of the T&S models revealed estimated trait variance 
for fear and for distress disorders scores comparable to those in the rumination models. 
Trait components of both psychopathology categories were strongly related to the trait 
component of worry, .62 for fear and .79 for distress disorders, demonstrating that worry 
is intertwined with these components.
 The results of the cross-variable effects of the concurrent relationships (c, d, e) were 
all significant. In the fear model they were moderate to large in strength whereas in the 
distress model relationships were small to moderate. This suggests that state fluctuations 
in worry go more hand in hand with state fluctuations in fearfulness than with distress. 
Cross-variable lagged effects (a1, a2, b1, b2) in both the distress and the fear model were 
either non-significant or of negligible strength. The only exception was the effect of state 
fear on worry (.21 and .36) with more fear resulting in higher levels of worry 2 years later. 
In sum, state fluctuations in psychopathology are not driven by state fluctuations in worry 
and only for fear disorders do state fluctuations in psychopathology affect subsequent 
worry levels. 
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate how trait and state components of worry 
and rumination relate to each other and to emotional disorders (fear and distress). The 
3-wave setup of our study design enabled us to separate trait and state effects and to 
examine the temporal and directional character of reciprocal effects. Results confirmed 
our expectation that trait components of worry and rumination are highly related and 
that fluctuations at state level occur in sync. Regarding repetitive negative thinking (RNT; 
worry & rumination) and emotional disorders we predicted that they would mutually 
reinforce each other over time, setting off a downward spiral. This hypothesis was not 
confirmed by the present study: fluctuations in psychopathology predicted state levels 
of worry/rumination 2 years later but not vice versa. Finally, we expected both worry and 
rumination to show stronger associations with distress disorders than with fear disorders. 
Results showed strong associations with both fear and distress disorders but as expected 
those with the distress disorders were the strongest. Overall, these results support the 
idea that worry and rumination contain a shared underlying process as well as that they 
both have transdiagnostic characteristics.
  The relationship between worry and rumination was assessed in one comprehensive 
design using trait-state models which enabled us to operationalize each cognitive 
process as the function of a trait component, stable across time, and a state component 
reflecting fluctuations over the 4 year period. The trait variance was substantial across 
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waves (explained variance for worry: 59% - 67%; and for rumination 55% - 66%) 
suggesting the presence of a stable underlying trait. Moreover, the trait components of 
worry and rumination were highly correlated (.76) and at state level correlations between 
concurrently measured worry and rumination were of medium strength (.39 - .45). These 
findings support the idea that worry and rumination have a solid, shared, base.
  The similarities between worry and rumination were further explored by examining 
whether worry and rumination differed in their relationships with psychopathology. The 
latent structure and stability of emotional disorders was as expected – and in accordance 
with previous studies (for a review see: Beesdo-Baum et al., 2009) – best represented 
by the distress (GAD, DYS, MDD) - fear (PAN, SAD, AGO) model allowing for analyses to 
be performed while taking comorbidity among these disorders into account. The latent 
factor scores derived for fear and distress disorders permitted us to examine reciprocal 
and temporal relationships of repetitive negative thinking (worry and rumination) with 
psychopathology. Traditionally worry is linked to GAD and rumination to MDD. Considering 
that both disorders are now placed within the distress disorders category it was expected 
that RNT would show stronger associations with the distress than the fear disorders. This 
was indeed the case although differences were modest and correlations between the trait 
components of RNT and psychopathology were strong in all four T&S models investigated. 
These results suggest that trait worry and trait rumination show similar relationships to 
both trait distress and trait fear disorders, which has several implications. Firstly, there is 
no differential effect of worry and rumination regarding fear and distress disorders, thus 
underlining the similarities of the two constructs. Secondly, repetitive negative thinking is 
involved in both distress and fear disorders even when GAD is grouped with the depressive 
disorders, hence supporting the notion of a transdiagnostic process (Harvey et al., 2004; 
Ehring & Watkins, 2008). It should be noted however, that the direction of the relationships 
between the trait components cannot be determined within our study design. It could 
reflect the influence of a third variable in line with the common cause model (e.g. genetic 
vulnerability) (for an explanation of the model see Klein, Kotov, & Bufferd, 2011) or for 
instance a directional relationship, c.q. predisposition model. There are studies supporting 
the predisposition model showing a causal relationship with repetitive negative thinking 
preceding changes in psychopathology (for an overview see Watkins, 2008; and Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008). Rumination has received more attention in this regard than worry (Topper, 
Emmelkamp, & Ehring, 2010). Our results suggest that it would be informative to conduct 
prospective studies on the nature and direction of the relationship of trait RNT (as also 
measured with generic measures for RNT, such as the Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire 
(RTQ; McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 2010) or the Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire 
(PTQ; Ehring et al., 2011)), with various emotional disorders while taking comorbidity into 
account. 
  By combining T&S models for psychopathology and repetitive negative thinking we 
were also able to examine whether state level fluctuations on either one led to state level 
fluctuations on the other. The 3-wave set up of our study provided a unique opportunity 
to examine both concurrent relations and lagged cross-variable effects. As is to be 
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expected the concurrent relations showed that state fluctuations in psychopathology 
were accompanied by state fluctuations in repetitive negative thinking in the same 
direction (positive correlations d and e). This is in line with experimental studies which 
have repeatedly shown that experimentally induced worry or rumination directly and 
negatively affects anxious and depressed mood states (e.g. Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; McLaughlin, Mennin, & Farach, 2007). Similarly, in accordance 
with the ‘differential activation’ hypothesis of Teasdale (1988) and the ‘mood state’ 
hypothesis of Miranda and Persons (1988) latent dysfunctional attitudes have been found 
to become activated during sad mood. 
  Contrary to our expectations, analyses concerning cross-variable lagged (2-yr follow-
up) effects at state level did not support our mutual reinforcement hypothesis. State 
fluctuations in worry and rumination were not predictive of state fluctuations in fear or 
distress levels two years later. However the opposite cross-variable lagged effects – state 
fluctuations in psychopathology on state fluctuations in repetitive negative thinking – 
were significant albeit small to moderate in strength. 
  Cognitive theory posits that change in cognition precedes change in symptoms of 
psychopathology, a view that has led to the development of therapies aimed at altering 
cognition (i.e. CBT) and the assessment of cognitive change in establishing treatment 
progress (e.g. Dozois, Covin & Brinker, 2003). However evidence for this supposition is 
not unequivocal as some studies have shown that cognitive change is not specific to 
therapies tackling cognitions and that this even occurs when using pharmacotherapy 
(e.g. Simons, Garfield, & Murphy, 1984). Moreover, and in line with our state level 
findings, it has been reported that changes in cognitive content during CBT are not 
predictive of changes in depressive symptoms (Jarrett et al., 2007). Also, it has been 
found that changes at cognitive level and changes in symptomatology occur in tandem 
and a recent review of cognitive mediation in CBT for anxiety disorders concluded that 
it is too early to conclude that cognitive changes cause improvement and that cognitive 
change is not a proxy for other third variables (Smits et al., 2012). The state-trait 
distinction may also be relevant in this context. Changes in state cognitions (such as 
negative automatic thoughts) may be primarily a reflection of changes at symptom level. 
However, as has been stressed in the earliest formulations of cognitive theory (Beck, 
1967), it may well be that in order to establish long lasting changes in psychopathology 
it is necessary to alter underlying cognitive vulnerabilities (i.e., cognitive structures 
and schema’s) which, when activated, give rise to momentary cognitive content c.q. 
negative automatic thoughts. The therapeutic relevance of altering stable underlying 
cognitive vulnerabilities instead of more time variant cognitions is in line with the 
present findings which show that RNT and psychopathology are highly interrelated at 
the trait level in particular.
  Several limitations should be taken into account when interpreting the current 
results. Firstly, distress and fear disorders had to be analyzed in separate models and 
as a consequence results may have been confounded by the high comorbidity of these 
disorders. Secondly, attrition was not completely random. The response rate was 87.1% 
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at wave 2 and 80.6% at wave 3, and non-response was significantly higher among 
those with younger age, lower education, higher levels of psychopathology and higher 
levels of worry consequently somewhat restricting generalizability of study results. 
Thirdly, the present models did not differentiate between groups of first onset, current 
psychopathology and remitted anxiety/depression. These groups may show slightly 
different response patterns for instance due to scarring effects. Fourthly, rumination 
was assessed using the subscale ‘rumination on sadness’ of the LEIDS-R, an instrument 
measuring cognitive reactivity. There are several other questionnaires that measure 
rumination; results may differ depending on the instrument chosen. Finally, the present 
study did not include a generic RNT instrument. Therefore, our findings may not be 
representative of all types of repetitive negative thinking such as post-event processing. 
  The present study also has several strengths: i) a longitudinal design in a representative 
sample of participants with depressive and ⁄ or anxiety disorder from different recruitment 
settings; ii) use of a structured diagnostic interview to assess presence of depressive and 
anxiety disorders; iii) examining the structure of anxiety and depressive disorders instead 
of individual disorders separately; iv) use of trait and state model in analyzing temporal 
and reciprocal relationships of emotional disorders with RNT. 
Conclusions 
The present data show that worry and rumination have strong trait-like components, 
which are also strongly interrelated. Moreover, state fluctuations around set-point in 
worry level covary with state fluctuations in the level of rumination. These findings 
combined with the similar relationships of worry and rumination with emotional 
disorders are in line with the idea that they are conceptualizations of the same 
underlying process of repetitive negative thinking. Furthermore, the lack of differential 
relationships of worry and rumination with fear and distress disorders supports the 
notion that they can be conceptualized as transdiagnostic processes critically involved 
in emotional disorders.
  However, we did not find support for the hypothesis that state fluctuations of 
RNT offset a downward spiral in which psychopathology and RNT mutually reinforce 
each other. State fluctuations in worry/rumination are preceded by state fluctuations in 
psychopathology but not vice versa. This pattern suggests that fluctuations in RNT may 
merely be epiphenomena of emotional disorders. From a clinical perspective it seems 
more pertinent to modify the underlying trait component(s) of worry and rumination in 
order to obtain endurable therapeutic benefits.
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Background: Comorbidity among affective disorders is high. Rumination has been found 
to mediate cross-sectional and prospective relations between anxiety and depressive 
symptoms in adolescents and adults. We examined whether rumination and worry, both 
forms of repetitive negative thinking, also explain the associations between affective 
disorders. 
Method: Prospective cohort study. In a mixed sample of 2,981 adults (persons with a 
prior history of or a current affective disorder and healthy individuals) we assessed DSM-
IV affective disorders (CIDI), rumination (LEIDS-R) and worry (PSWQ). All measures were 
repeated 2 years and 4 years later.
Results: Using structural equation models, we found that baseline rumination and worry 
partly mediated the association of baseline fear disorders (social anxiety disorder, panic 
disorder, agoraphobia) with distress disorders (dysthymia, major depressive disorder, 
generalized anxiety disorder). Moreover, baseline fear disorders predicted changes in 
distress disorders and changes in worry and rumination mediated these associations. 
The association between baseline distress disorders and changes in fear disorders was 
mediated by changes in rumination but not by changes in worry. 
Conclusions: Repetitive negative thinking is an important transdiagnostic factor. 
Rumination and worry are partly responsible for the cross-sectional and prospective co-
occurrence of affective disorders and may be suitable targets for treatment.
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Introduction
Comorbidity of mental disorders is the rule rather than the exception, especially among 
anxiety and depressive disorders (Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 2001). 
Efforts to unravel why there is such a high comorbidity rate have drastically increased in 
recent years, as has the call for broad and disorder transcending therapies (e.g. Fairburn, 
Cooper, & Shafran, 2003; Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2004). Generally it is assumed that there 
are certain factors that are shared between multiple disorders, which not only contribute 
to the occurrence of a specific disorder but are also (in part) responsible for comorbidity 
among these disorders. Such disorder transcending factors are commonly referred to as 
transdiagnostic factors (e.g. Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; Ehring & Watkins, 
2008). Better understanding of these shared factors is not only of theoretical importance, 
but also clinically relevant as it could lead to the development of more effective therapeutic 
interventions. 
  One of the main candidate cognitive processes involved in comorbidity among 
emotional disorders is repetitive negative thinking (RNT: Ehring & Watkins, 2008). In the 
anxiety literature RNT is referred to as worry, in the depression literature it is referred 
to as rumination. Both processes are characterized by uncontrolled, excessive and 
repetitive thinking about current concerns, problems, past experiences or worries about 
the future (Ehring & Watkins, 2008, p. 192). The main difference between the two is that 
worry is more future focused and rumination is more past focused (e.g. Smith & Alloy, 
2009; Watkins et al., 2005). However, it has to be noted that this is a simplification; both 
processes contain both future- and past-related aspects (e.g. McLaughlin, Borkovec, & 
Sibrava, 2007). Furthermore, other differences between worry and rumination have also 
been reported (see Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008 for an overview). 
Research has shown that both worry and rumination scores are elevated across the 
emotional disorders (Chelminsky & Zimmerman; see Ehring & Watkins, 2008 for an 
overview regarding rumination) and that these scores are higher in individuals with 
multiple diagnoses than in individuals with a single diagnosis (McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, 
& Nathan, 2013). Although these findings are in line with a transdiagnostic account, the 
mere presence of these cognitive processes across disorders does not qualify them as 
causative factors, let alone causative of comorbidity. Evidence for their causal influence 
comes from experimental studies showing that RNT exacerbates depressed and anxious 
mood (e.g. McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007; Behar, Zuellig, & Borkovec, 2005) as 
well as from prospective and longitudinal studies supporting RNT’s involvement in the 
onset, maintenance and recurrence of both anxiety and depressive disorders (e.g. Just 
& Alloy, 1997, Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; see Watkins, 2008 for an overview). However if 
RNT truly contributes to the high comorbidity rates among emotional disorders it should 
also mediate the relationship between anxiety and depressive disorders and vice versa. 
McLaughlin and Nolen-Hoeksema (2011) indeed found that rumination mediated the 
concurrent relationship of depression with anxiety symptoms in two large samples of 
adults and adolescents. Moreover, baseline depressive symptoms predicted subsequent 
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increases in anxiety and rumination fully mediated this association. This innovative study 
has a few limitations. It investigated anxiety and depression symptoms, not clinical 
diagnoses; and it only examined rumination and did not include other types of RNT (such 
as worry).
  The aim of the present study is to test whether RNT also accounts for the comorbidity 
among emotional disorders, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. In other words, 
we carried out a conceptual replication of McLaughlin and Nolen-Hoeksema (2011), by 
focusing on clinical diagnoses instead of symptoms and by examining two types of RNT 
–worry and rumination. We expected that both rumination and worry would account for 
the cross-sectional overlap of emotional disorders at baseline and would mediate the 
prospective cross-disorder relations among emotional disorders. 
Methods
Participants and design
The Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA) is an ongoing cohort study 
designed to investigate determinants, course and consequences of depressive and 
anxiety disorders. A sample of 2981 persons aged 18 through 65 years, consisting of 
healthy controls, persons with a prior history of depressive and anxiety disorders, and 
persons with a current depressive and/or anxiety disorder were included in the study. 
Respondents were recruited in the general population, through a screening procedure in 
general practice, or when newly enrolled in specialized health care in order to represent 
different health care settings and different developmental stages of psychopathology. 
General exclusion criteria were a primary diagnosis of other severe psychiatric disorders 
(e.g. psychotic, obsessive compulsive, bipolar or severe addiction disorder) and not being 
fluent in Dutch. 
 A detailed description of the NESDA design and sampling procedures is given 
elsewhere (Penninx et al., 2008). The baseline assessment included assessment of 
demographic and personal characteristics, a standardized diagnostic psychiatric interview 
and a medical assessment. This study reports on the baseline and the 2-yr and 4-yr 
follow-up assessments. The research protocol was approved by the Ethical Committees of 
participating universities and all respondents provided written informed consent. 
Measures
Assessment of psychiatric diagnoses
The diagnostic status (6-month prevalence) of depressive [Major Depressive Disorder 
(MDD), Dysthymia (DYS)] or anxiety [Panic Disorder with or without Agoraphobia (PAN), 
Social Anxiety Disorder (SOC), Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), Agoraphobia without 
panic (AGO)] disorders was established at T0, T2 and T4 using the Composite Interview 
Diagnostic Instrument (CIDI-WHO lifetime version 2.1; Ter Smitten, Smeets, & Van den 
Brink, 1998). The CIDI classifies diagnoses according to DSM-IV criteria (APA, 1994). 
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Trained interviewers can reach high interrater reliability, high test-retest reliability (Wacker, 
Battegay, Mullejans, & Schlosser, 2006) and high validity for depressive and anxiety 
disorders (Wittchen, 1994). The CIDI was conducted by trained clinical research staff.
 
Questionnaires
Worry was measured with the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, et al., 1990). 
This questionnaire consists of 16 items rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘1 = 
not at all typical of me’ to ‘5 = very typical of me’. The PSWQ has been proven to be a valid 
measure of trait worrying unaffected by the content of the worry (Davey, 1993; Molina & 
Borkovec, 1994) with high internal consistency, good test-retest reliability and unaffected 
by social desirability (Meyer, et al., 1990).The PSWQ consists of two subscales: a ‘General 
worry’ subscale (11 items) and a ‘Not-worry’ subscale (5 items) (van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, 
& Vervaeke, 1999). The ‘General worry’ subscale is the strongest of the two (Meyer, et al., 
1990; van Rijsoort, et al., 1999) and only this subscale was administered in the NESDA 
study. Internal consistency in the present study was high, namely α = .96 at T0, T2 and T4.
  Rumination was assessed with the subscale Rumination on Sadness of the revised 
version of the Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity (LEIDS-R; Van der Does, 2002; 
Williams, et al., 2008). The LEIDS-R measures cognitive reactivity to sad mood and is a 
self-report instrument, which has been found to reliably discriminate between never-
depressed and recovered depressed groups (e.g., Moulds, et al., 2008; Van der Does, 
2002). The subscale Rumination on Sadness (RUM) consists of 6 items. Participants are 
asked to indicate whether and how their thinking patterns change when they experience 
mild dysphoria by scoring each item on a 5-point Likert-scale ranging from 0 ‘not at all’ 
to 4 ‘very strongly’ applicable to me. In the present sample the internal consistency of the 
RUM-scale was 0.82 at T0, 0.84 at T2 and 0.85 at T4. 
Statistical analyses
Differences in rumination (LEIDS-R) and worry (PSWQ) baseline scores between 
psychopathology groups were analyzed with separate ANOVA’s using five multiple imputed 
datasets to account for missing data on LEIDS-R and PSWQ. Significant main effects were 
followed-up by Bonferroni adjusted multiple comparisons. Next, structural equation 
models were fit using WLSMV parameter estimates in Mplus (version 7.0). Participants 
who did not participate in the 2-yr and/or 4-yr follow-up assessment were included in 
the analyses using all available pairwise present information. Standardized estimates, or 
path coefficients, with a theoretical range from zero (no effect) to + 1 (maximum positive 
or negative effect) are provided. Model fit was evaluated using the Tucker-Lewis Index 
(TLI), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA). For the TLI and CFI, values between 0.90 and 0.95 are considered acceptable, 
and ≥ 0.95 as good. For the RMSEA, acceptable models have values of ≤ 0.10, and good 
models of ≤ 0.05. 
  In accordance with previous studies (for a review of the literature see Beesdo-
Baum et al., 2009) and a previous confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the T0, T2 and T4 
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assessments of the six diagnostic variables (i.e., MDD, DYS, GAD, SAD, PAN, and AGO) as 
repeated measures in NESDA (Spinhoven et al., 2014), we choose the distress-fear model 
(Distress: MDD, DYS, GAD; Fear: PAN, SAD, AGO) to best represent the latent structure and 
stability of emotional disorders. Latent factor scores for distress and for fear disorders 
were used as dependent variables in further statistical analyses.
  Next, we determined the role of rumination and worry as putative mediators of the 
cross-sectional relations of distress with fear disorders. More specifically, we determined 
whether the association of distress with fear disorders was attenuated after including both 
rumination and worry as independent variables into the prediction model. 
  Finally, we examined two longitudinal mediation models: one examining the role 
of rumination as a putative mediator of the longitudinal association of distress with fear 
disorders (and vice versa) and one examining the role of worry in these longitudinal 
relations. More specifically, we determined: 1) the association of T0 distress with T4 fear 
disorders (and vice versa); 2) the association of T0 distress/fear with T2 rumination/worry, 
controlling for T0 rumination/worry; 3) the association of T2 rumination/worry with T4 
distress/fear, controlling for T0 distress/fear; and 4) the attenuation of the association 
of T0 distress with T4 fear after accounting for changes in rumination/worry from T0 
to T2 (and vice versa). In this way we could analyze whether baseline distress disorders 
predicted changes in rumination/worry and whether these changes predicted subsequent 
changes in fear disorders (and vice versa). The significance of the indirect effect of fear 
disorders on distress disorders through changes in rumination/worry (and vice versa) 




At baseline, we included 2,981 participants with a mean age of 41.9 years (SD = 13.1), 
a mean duration of education of 12.1 years (SD = 3.3); 66.4% was female. Face-to-face 
follow-up assessments were conducted with a response of 87.1% (n = 2,596) at 2-yr 
follow-up and 80.6% (n = 2,402) at 4-yr follow-up. At baseline, 1,701 participants had a 
current diagnosis: MDD = 37.4%, DYS = 10.2%, GAD = 15.6%, SAD = 22.3%, PAN = 22.5%, 
and AGO = 6.3%. As expected, comorbidity rates were high with 57.0% (n = 725) of the 
1,273 participants with a 6-month recency distress diagnosis (MDD, DYS, GAD) meeting 
criteria for a fear disorder (SAD, PAN, AGO) and 62.9% of the 1,153 participants with a fear 
disorder having a comorbid distress disorder. Comorbidity rates at T4 were as follows: 
43.6% (n = 225) of the 516 participants with a 6-month recency distress diagnosis fulfilled 
criteria for a fear disorder and 47.4% of the 475 participants with a fear disorder had a 
comorbid distress disorder. 
  We examined whether sample attrition had introduced response bias. Compared 
with completers, dropouts at 2-yr follow-up as well as at 4-yr follow-up were younger, less 
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educated, more often had an anxiety or depressive disorder at baseline, and also manifested 
higher levels of worry (PSWQ). There was no significant association of gender with attrition.
   Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on rumination and worry in participants with 
no 6-month recency diagnosis (n = 1280), one or more fear disorders (n = 428), one or 
more distress disorders (n = 548), and comorbid fear and distress disorders (n = 725). 
Separate ANOVA’s yielded a significant main effect for group on rumination (F(3, 2977) 
= 335.49, p < .001) and worry (F(3, 2977) = 527.33, p < .001). Subsequent Bonferroni 
adjusted comparisons showed that all groups differed significantly from each other (all p 
< .001) regards rumination and worry. In accordance with expectations the lowest scores 
were found in participants with no disorder and the highest scores in participants with 
comorbid disorders. Moreover, participants with distress disorders obtained higher scores 
than participants with fear disorders.
 Table 2 presents the zero-order correlations of rumination and worry scores with 
factor scores for distress and fear disorders (see below). As hypothesized both rumination 
and worry were positively associated with each other and with distress and fear disorders, 
which were also positively associated with each other (all p < .001). 
Measurement model
In line with expectations, CFA showed that a Distress-Fear (MDD, DYS, GAD vs. SAD, PAN, 
AGO) model — χ2 (110) = 201.1; TLI = .99; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .02 – showed a good fit to 
the data (see Table 3 for factor loadings on the latent variables). 
Mediation analysis
Cross-sectional analysis
T0 distress disorders were significantly associated with T0 fear disorders, ß = .84, p < .001. 
The association of distress with fear disorders was attenuated, ß = .70 p < .001, but 
remained significant after including T0 rumination and worry as predictors into the model 
(rumination: ß = .12 p < .001, and worry: ß = .14, p < .001).  
Longitudinal analysis
Next, we analyzed the associations between T0 distress disorders and T4 fear disorders 
while controlling for T0 fear disorders (and vice versa). T0 fear disorders significantly 
predicted T4 distress disorders, controlling for T0 distress disorders, ß = .21, p < .001. T0 
distress disorders were associated significantly with T4 fear disorders, controlling for T0 
fear disorders, ß = .07, p < .001.
  T0 fear was associated with T2 rumination, controlling for rumination at T0, ß = .15, 
p < .001. T2 rumination was associated with T4 distress, controlling for T0 distress, ß = .14, 
p < .001. In the final mediation model, T0 fear was no longer a significant predictor of T4 
distress, controlling for T0 distress and T0 rumination, when T2 rumination was added to 
the model, ß = .11, p = .22 (see Fig. 1). The covariance between T0 distress and fear and T0 
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indicated that the model showed an excellent fit to the data: χ2 (37) = 103.1; TLI =.99; 
CFI = .98; RMSEA = .02. Bootstrapping estimates showed that the indirect effect of fear 
through rumination on distress (ß = .03; 99% BCI = .01 - .06) was significant. Repeating 
this analysis in participants with complete CIDI and LEIDS data at T0 (n = 2618) gave 
similar results. 
 Subsequently, we analyzed worry as a putative mediator of the longitudinal fear – 
distress association in a similar way. T0 fear was associated with T2 worry, controlling for 
worry at T0, ß = .15, p < .001. T2 worry was associated with T4 distress, controlling for T0 
distress, ß = .17, p < .001. In the final mediation model, T0 fear was no longer a significant 
predictor of T4 distress, controlling for T0 distress and T0 worry, when T2 worry was added 
to the model, ß = .04, p = .70 (see Fig. 2). Fit indices indicated that the model showed an 
excellent fit to the data: χ2 (37) = 105.80; TLI = .99; CFI = .98; RMSEA = .02. Bootstrapping 
estimates showed that the indirect effect of fear through rumination on distress (ß = .06; 
99% BCI = .01 - .11) was significant. Repeating this analysis in participants with complete 
CIDI and PSWQ data across waves (n = 2613) gave similar results.
  Next, we examined rumination and worry as putative mediators of the longitudinal 
distress – fear association. These analyses showed that the very small direct standardized 
path coefficient (ß) of .07 became insignificant (ß = -.06, p = .62) after including T2 
Table 2:  Zero-order correlations between rumination, worry and distress and fear disor-
ders (n = 2981)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. LEIDS, Rumination T0 -
2. PSWQ, Worry T0 .63 -
3. CIDI, Distress T0 .63 .73 -
4. CIDI, Fear T0 .52 .68 .70 -
5. LEIDS, Rumination T2 .73 .54 .53 .46 -
6. PSWQ, Worry T2 .57 .75 .59 .58 .62 -
7. CIDI, Distress T2 .53 .57 .69 .48 .60 .67 -
8. CIDI, Fear T2 .50 .59 .59 .81 .54 .67 .76 -
9. LEIDS, Rumination T4 .65 .52 .53 .45 .70 .57 .56 .52 -
10. PSWQ, Worry T4 .51 .67 .54 .52 .54 .75 .56 .53 .66 -
11. CIDI, Distress T4 .46 .55 .61 .51 .52 .63 .76 .62 .59 .67 -
12. CIDI, Fear T4 .49 .56 .59 .80 .53 .64 .65 .86 .58 .68 .81
Note: LEIDS = Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity-Revised: Rumination subscale; PSWQ = Penn 
State Worry Questionnaire: General worry subscale; CIDI = Composite Interview Diagnostic Instru-
ment, version 2.1; Distress = combined factor scores for Dysthymia, Major Depression, Generalized 
Anxiety; Fear = combined factor scores for Social Anxiety, Panic, Agoraphobia; T0 = baseline; T2 = 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rumination or T2 worry (ß = -.06, p = .63) into the model (figures not shown). Subsequent 
bootstrapping indicated a significant indirect effect of distress at T0 through rumination 
at T2 on fear at T4 (ß indirect effect = .03; 99% BCI = .01 - .06). The indirect effect through 
worry at T2, however, was not significant (ß indirect effect = .03; 95% BCI = -.01 - .06). 
Discussion
Our findings indicate that 1) repetitive negative thinking in the form of rumination and 
worry partly accounts for the concurrence of distress and fear disorders; 2) baseline 
fear disorders predicted changes in distress disorders and vice versa; and 3) changes in 
rumination mediated these longitudinal associations, and changes in worry mediated the 
fear  distress association but not the distress  fear association. 
  Our baseline findings showed that worry and rumination scores were elevated 
in both the fear and distress group when compared to participants with no current 
emotional disorder. Moreover, participants with distress disorders obtained higher scores 
than participants with fear disorders. This is not surprising as the disorders typified by the 
presence of worry (GAD) and rumination (MDD) were both represented in the distress 
disorder group. Critically, worry and rumination levels were particularly high in those 
with comorbid fear and distress diagnoses. This finding is in line with results from the 
McEvoy et al. (2013) study and supports the transdiagnostic hypothesis, which assumes 
that higher levels of RNT are associated with higher levels of comorbidity. 
  An additional step in exploring whether worry and rumination are transdiagnostic 
factors was to determine whether both cognitive processes explained the cross-sectional 
and longitudinal associations between fear and distress disorders. Cross-sectional 
results revealed that worry and rumination partly mediated the co-occurrence of fear 
and distress disorders. Although promising, this does not shed light on the direction of 
the relationship and whether changes in worry or rumination mediate the longitudinal 
relationship between fear and distress disorders and vice versa. Our longitudinal data 
provided more insight into this question. Worry and rumination both significantly 
mediated the longitudinal association between baseline (T0) fear disorders and later (T4) 
distress disorders. Importantly, the three time-point set up of our study allowed for the 
mediator to reflect change in worry/rumination scores. So, fear disorders (T0) predicted 
change (T0-T2) in worry/rumination scores, and this change in worry/rumination 
scores subsequently predicted changes in distress disorders (T4). These mediation 
results suggest that the increased risk of a future distress disorder when suffering from 
a fear disorder is partly attributable to worry and rumination. Partly attributable, as 
the mediation effects are small. The same applies for the longitudinal distress (T0)  
fear (T4) association with the exception that only rumination significantly mediated this 
association and worry did not.
  The results from the present study suggest that RNT in the form of worry and 
rumination is indeed involved in the high comorbidity between fear and distress disorders. 
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This support for the transdiagnostic account suggests that transdiagnostic treatments 
could benefit from including interventions aimed at reducing RNT. With regards to 
treatments specifically targeting worry and rumination, several options are available. 
Worry has received most attention, probably because it is the key feature of GAD. The 
most well-known treatment targeting worry is metacognitive therapy (Wells, 1999), which 
has proven to be reasonably successful (e.g. Wells & King, 2006; Van der Heiden, Muris, 
Van der Molen, 2012). Rumination on the other hand has only recently started to receive 
attention as a specific element that needs to be targeted in therapy. Results from rumination 
focussed cognitive behavioural therapy (Watkins et al., 2007) are promising, and in line 
with the transdiagnostic hypothesis, also reduced the prevalence of comorbid disorders 
(Watkins et al., 2011). These positive therapeutic results combined with findings on the 
role of worry and ruminations in the onset, maintenance and recurrence of emotional 
disorders indicate that RNT is an important candidate transdiagnostic process, which 
should be seriously considered when developing transdiagnostic therapies for emotional 
disorders. As yet it is still unclear where transdiagnostic therapies fit within the present 
therapeutic landscape and how they relate to the popular evidence based disorder specific 
interventions. There are several options: they could (i) replace disorder specific therapies, 
(ii) be used as a pre-therapy preceding the ‘real’ disorder focussed therapy, or (iii) function 
as the main therapy followed by a few sessions targeting disorder specific elements. 
Currently, the overall consensus seems to be that they should be complementary as they 
are very unlikely to outperform disorder specific, tailored, interventions (Clark, 2009).
   The present study has several strengths. It has a longitudinal design and a 
representative sample of participants with depressive and ⁄ or anxiety disorder(s) from 
different recruitment settings. Furthermore, structured diagnostic interviews are used 
to assess presence of depressive and anxiety disorders instead of using only self-report 
measures of psychopathology.
  Our study also has a few limitations that should be kept in mind when interpreting 
the results. Most importantly, mediation effects are relatively small. This is in line with 
findings from the McLaughlin and Nolen-Hoeksema (2011) study where the indirect effect 
was of a comparable small magnitude. Thus although RNT seems to be a factor involved 
in explaining comorbidity, it only accounts for a part of it. These results therefore warrant 
the search for additional factors influencing the occurrence of comorbidity. Secondly, we 
used a fear-distress measurement model to categorize the disorders as this model showed 
the best fit to repeated CIDI diagnoses in NESDA, but a DSM-IV based anxiety-depression 
measurement model might have yielded different results due to the high comorbidity 
between GAD and MDD (now both subsumed under distress disorders). A third limitation 
concerns the limited number of clinical diagnoses included in the present study. Emotional 
disorders such as PTSD and OCD were not represented, neither were other disorders 
known for elevated levels of RNT among which pain disorders, eating disorders and 
hypochondria (for an overview of disorders with elevated RNT levels see Ehring & Watkins, 
2008). Finally, the present study did not include a generic RNT instrument. Therefore, our 
findings may not be representative of all types of repetitive negative thinking such as 
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post-event processing. Also, we did not measure other candidate transdiagnostic factors 
like perfectionism (for an overview see Egan, Wade, & Shafran, 2011) and intolerance of 
uncertainty (e.g. Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012).
 Overall, the findings from the present study suggest that repetitive negative thinking 
in the form of rumination or worry constitutes an important transdiagnostic factor 
responsible for the co-occurrence of emotional disorders. In transdiagnostic treatment 
interventions for emotional disorders it seems warranted to include interventions 
specifically targeting this transdiagnostic factor.
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Chapter 5
The influence of abstract/concrete thinking on social 








The reduced concreteness theory (Stöber, 1998) postulates that worry is characterized 
by an abstract, predominantly verbal, thinking style which interferes with successful 
emotional processing of threat-related material and impairs social problem solving (SPS). 
Experiment 1 investigated whether high trait worriers (N = 40) adopt a more abstract 
thinking style compared to low trait worriers (N = 40) during the phase of solution 
generation and whether concreteness training improves SPS. Experiment 2 was a 
replication of the first study (high trait worriers N = 49, low trait worriers N = 48) extended 
to examine other aspects of SPS related to worry: problem orientation, problem solving 
style and problem solving confidence. Results did not confirm the reduced concreteness 
hypothesis but did reveal differences in problem solving orientation, style, and confidence. 
These results, combined with results from previous studies showing reduced concreteness 
in the problem analysis phase, suggest that high trait worriers’ SPS skills are intact and 
that impairments lie within the early stages of SPS.
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Introduction
Worry, both pathological and non-pathological, has been subject to an extensive debate 
about its functions, dysfunctions, and underpinning mechanisms. One of the main 
theories in the field is the Avoidance Theory of worry (Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998). 
This theory postulates that worry is a form of cognitive avoidance, which operates via 
the reduction of aversive imagery with the purpose to avoid somatic anxiety reactions. 
This process of avoidance however interferes with successful emotional processing 
of threat related material (Foa & Kozak, 1986) and, thereby, inhibits closure on worry 
topics, maintaining anxiety/worry. The theory is based upon studies showing that 
worry is a predominantly verbal thought (rather than imagery-based) activity, and 
that the percentage of imagery is greatly reduced when engaging in worry instead 
of a relaxation condition (Borkovec & Inz, 1990; East & Watts, 1994; Freeston, Dugas, 
& Ladouceur, 1996). Moreover, individuals with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) 
report less imagery than non-psychiatric controls both during worry and relaxation 
(Borkovec & Inz, 1990). In turn, it has been found that verbal thought activity yields 
significantly less cardiovascular fear responses than imagery (Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 
1986) leading to the hypothesis that verbal worry might be an attempt to avoid the 
physiological sensations that accompany aversive imagery. 
  However, the avoidance theory does not address the question of how worrying 
leads to reduced imagery. A possible explanation comes from the Reduced 
Concreteness theory of worry (Stöber, 1998; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002). This theory 
posits that the mediator between worrying and reduced imagery is reduced concrete 
thinking (increased abstract thinking), which is presumed to be characteristic of 
worry. Concrete thinking is defined as “distinct, situationally specific, unequivocal, 
clear, singular” whereas abstract thinking is described as “indistinct, cross-situational, 
equivocal, unclear, aggregated” (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002, p. 92). Paivio and Marschark 
(1991) found that the concreteness of words and sentences is related to the quality 
of imagery and that abstract thinking not only evokes less imagery but also less vivid 
imagery. Hence, the Reduced Concreteness theory hypothesizes that it is the relatively 
abstract style of thinking during worry which is responsible for reduced aversive visual 
imagery, which in turn contributes to the maintenance of worry.
  Empirical evidence for a relatively abstract thinking style during worry comes 
from a series of experiments by Stöber et al. (1996; 2000). These studies revealed 
that problem elaborations of worry-topics were less concrete than those of non-worry 
topics and that concreteness showed an inverse linear relation with the level of worry 
(Stöber, et al., 2000). These findings in nonclinical student samples were extended to 
a clinical GAD sample. Pre-treatment problem descriptions of GAD patients were less 
concrete than those of normal controls (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002), consistent with the 
Reduced Concreteness theory. However, all of these studies focussed on concreteness 
of problem elaboration or brief worry descriptions during the problem analysis phase. 
Two recent studies by Goldwin and Behar (2012) and Behar et al. (2012) focussed 
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on concreteness of thought during periods of idiographic worry. Results were mixed. 
Although findings confirmed the assertion that worry is characterized by reduced 
concreteness, only one of the studies found that level of concreteness was related to 
imagery-based activity. 
  The focus on concreteness during problem solving is also consistent with another 
putative function of worry – as an attempted social problem solving (SPS) strategy 
(e.g. Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & Depree, 1983). In its pathological form, worry 
has been hypothesized to reflect thwarted problem solving (Davey, Hampton, Farrell, 
& Davidson, 1992; Davey, 1994). Successful problem solving is believed to require 
a number of elements including an accurate problem analysis, the generation, and 
then evaluation and implementation of accurate problem solving steps (D’Zurilla & 
Nezu, 1982). Concrete thinking is a prerequisite for these elements: Concrete problem 
definitions and well-tailored solutions are indispensable for problem solving success. 
Although the Reduced Concreteness theory was originally formulated in reference to 
worry, the considerable similarities and overlap between worry and rumination led 
Stöber and Borkovec (2002) to hypothesize that the theory also applied to depression. 
This view was shared by Watkins and Moulds (2005), who examined the effects of 
inducing abstract versus concrete ruminative thinking prior to solution generation 
in patients with depression versus never-depressed controls. Before the induction, 
depressed individuals provided more abstract and less effective solutions than never 
depressed individuals. Furthermore, relative to the abstract thinking style, the concrete 
thinking style enhanced problem solving in the depressed patients. 
  In light of the hypothesis that pathological worry is a thwarted problem solving 
attempt and the robust observation of reduced concreteness in the problem analysis 
phase in worriers (Stöber, 1996; Stöber et al., 2000; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002), a logical 
next step is to investigate the influence of reduced concreteness on the next phase 
within the problem solving process: i.e., the solution generation phase. Critically, 
although the reduced concreteness theory predicts that reduced concreteness of 
thinking during worry will impair problem-solving, this prediction has not yet been 
directly tested. To date, the only evidence that concreteness of thinking influences 
problem solving is in patients with depression (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins 
& Moulds, 2005). The current study will therefore provide the first test of this key 
prediction of the reduced concreteness theory in worry. The present study has two 
main aims. Firstly, to investigate whether high and low trait worriers differ in the 
thinking style they adopt during the problem solving phase of solution generation. 
Secondly, to examine whether inducing a concrete thinking style results in improved 
problem solving skills relative to an abstract thinking style. Following Watkins and 
Moulds (2005), we hypothesize that high trait worriers will adopt a relatively abstract 
thinking style during solution generation and will produce relatively abstract and less 
effective solutions compared to low trait worriers. Furthermore, we hypothesize that 
the concreteness training will improve problem solving in high trait worriers relative to 
abstract thinking.
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A total of 317 students were screened using the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; 
Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) and the depression subscale of the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). Those with a HADS-
depression score of 8 or higher and those using anti-depressant medication were excluded. 
In order to compare a control group with low levels of worry with a group of high levels 
of worry similar to GAD patients, only students scoring at one of the extreme ends of the 
PSWQ (bottom/top quartiles) were invited to participate. In total 80 participants were 
included, 40 in each group. They were randomly allocated to one of the manipulation 
conditions (abstract versus concrete conditions), resulting in a 2 × 2 factorial between-




The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, et al., 1990) is a commonly used 
measure of trait worry consisting of 16-items rated on a 5 point Likert scale (1 = not at all 
typical of me, to 5 = very typical of me). The PSWQ has been proven to be a valid measure 
of trait worry unaffected by the content of the worry (Davey, 1993; Molina & Borkovec, 
1994) with high internal consistency, good test-retest reliability, and unaffected by social 
desirability (Meyer, et al., 1990). Internal consistency in the present study was high, namely 
α = .96 in the total sample.
 
HADS
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is a 14-item 
self-report questionnaire consisting of two subscales measuring anxiety (7-items) and 
depression (7-items). Internal consistency, discriminant and concurrent validity, and test-
retest reliability are satisfactory (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & Neckelmann, 2002; Spinhoven, et 
al., 1997). In the present study internal consistency (total sample) of HADS-A was α = .70 
and of HADS-D α = .69. 
Thinking style measures (VAS)
Visual Analogue Scales (VAS, 100 mm) were used to assess abstractness of thinking style 
before and after the experimental task (cp Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). One scale measured 
the proportion of thoughts concerned with trying to understand, explain, or make sense of 
things (not at all – extremely) and the other measured to what extent thoughts were of 
a verbal form as opposed to visual images (completely verbal/not at all visual – not at all 
verbal/completely visual). Assessment prior to the experimental task referred to thinking 




Unlike Watkins and Moulds (2005) who applied a depression-relevant manipulation 
that induced abstract/concrete ruminative thinking, the present study used a previously 
validated manipulation to induce an abstract/concrete thinking style (Watkins, Moberly, 
& Moulds, 2008). Training material consisted of 15 positive and 15 negatively valenced 
scenarios; each approximately three sentences in length. Scenarios were balanced for 
valence to ensure that the training condition was not a mood induction and more 
importantly, to train participants in applying the thinking style method in both positive 
and negative situations. Participants were instructed to spend one minute concentrating 
on each event. In line with Watkins et al. (2008), the order of the written scenarios was 
randomized with the constraint that there were no more than three scenarios of the 
same valence presented consecutively.
  Participants in the abstract condition were instructed as follows for each scenario: 
“I would like you to think about why it happened, and to analyze the causes, meanings, 
and implications of this event.” In the concrete condition, participants received the 
following instruction for each scenario: “I would like you to focus on how it happened, 
and to imagine in your mind as vividly and concretely as possible a ‘movie’ of how this 
event unfolded.” Training conditions were not expected to differ in their influence on 
self-focus as conditions were matched for degree of self-reference.
  The main training was preceded by a practice phase during which participants 
applied their assigned thinking style on the same (negative) practice scenario and 
described what they were thinking. Where necessary, further feedback and practice 
were given before the main training started.
Worry Domain – Means-Ends Problem Solving task (WD-MEPS)
The Means Ends Problem Solving task (MEPS) examines social problem solving skills by 
measuring the ability to conceptualize step-by-step means (strategies) when attempting 
to achieve a given goal. Participants are presented with a problem situation and asked 
to find the ideal strategy for overcoming the problem situation and thereby reach a 
given ending (Marx, Williams, & Claridge, 1992). The MEPS has shown satisfactory 
internal consistency (from .80 to .84) and construct validity (e.g. Platt & Spivack, 1972, 
1975).
  In the present study a modified version was used; the Worry Domain-MEPS 
(WD-MEPS). It is based on four worry domains common in GAD patients: rejection, 
responsibility, confrontation and relationships. The structure of the scenarios was kept 
as similar as possible to the original version. A pilot study showed that when conducted 
in a random student sample (N = 20) scores on the original MEPS and WD-MEPS did 
not differ significantly. To ensure personal relevance which is important for worry in 
GAD (Stöber, et al., 2000), each individual rated themes of twelve different scenarios 
(three in each domain) on relevance to their personal situation. The 7 point Likert rating 
scale ranged from 1 completely irrelevant to 7 completely relevant. The four scenarios 
with the highest scores were then selected for the experiment. An example scenario is: 
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“One day at work your boss announces that pretty soon you are going to take on 
a quite innovative project. You feel that this will be a rather challenging experience 
for you, as it concerns a field you are not familiar with. Furthermore, you will 
be in charge of a sizeable group of colleagues. The story ends with your boss 
being satisfied with your work. Begin the story after the announcement of the new 
project.”
The experimental phase was preceded by a practice phase to ensure understanding of 
the task. Instructions and scenarios were presented in written format and participants 
were requested to provide written answers. These were scored for the number of 
discrete steps that are effective in enabling them to reach the goal and for effectiveness 
of the strategy. Effectiveness was rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(not at all effective) to 7 (extremely effective (e.g. Marx, et al., 1992). A solution was 
considered effective if it maximized positive and minimized negative short- and long-
term consequences, both personally and socially (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971). In order 
to assess the thinking style applied during the task, answers were also rated for how 
abstract/concrete they were. This was rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(abstract) to 5 (concrete) (Stöber, et al., 2000). There was moderate to good inter-rater 
reliability with an independent second judge, both unaware of group or condition (ICC 
means: .902, ICC effectiveness: .830 and for abstract/concrete ratings the ICC was .687, 
based on agreement on a random selection of 10% of responses). 
Procedure
Participants signed an informed consent and completed the HADS anxiety and 
depression scale. A practice item and two of the selected WD-MEPS-stories were 
completed at pre-manipulation followed by VASs measuring thinking style. Participants 
then received a practice phase of the manipulation task. Once an adequate level 
of understanding had been reached they worked through either the abstract or 
concrete thinking style manipulation (their allocated thinking style manipulation). 
Post- manipulation participants were again presented with VASs measuring thinking 
style followed by the two remaining WD-MEPS scenarios. The order of the WD-MEPS 
scenarios presented at pre and post manipulation was pseudo-random with the two 
most relevant scenarios always divided over pre and post. Participants were debriefed, 
thanked for their participation and received either course credits or a small payment.
Statistical Analyses 
The main hypotheses were tested using: (1) ANCOVA to compare baseline abstract/
concreteness scores between high and low worriers; (2) repeated measures ANOVAs 
investigating if alterations to the thinking style generated the expected changes in 
problem solving skills. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests and all 
analyses were corrected for gender differences (see below). Analyses were conducted 
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Results
Sample Description
The 80 participants selected for participation (see above) consisted of 40 high (PSWQ: 
M = 62.92, SD = 4.10) and 40 low (PSWQ: M = 30.86, SD = 4.80) trait worriers. The 
scores of the high trait worriers are similar to those reported in clinical samples (e.g. 
Meyer, et al., 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994). As expected, the high trait worry group 
was characterized by higher scores on the HADS-anxiety, t(78) = -9.33, p < .001, d = 2.11, 
and HADS-depression scale t(78) = -3.38, p < .01, d = .77. The average age of the sample 
was 21.2 years (SD = 3.4) and 67.5 % was female. The high worry group contained more 
females than the low worry group (χ2(1) = 5.70, p = .02). No differences in age were found.
Thinking Style Differences Between High versus Low Worriers at Baseline 
ANCOVA analyses revealed no significant differences between high and low trait worriers 
on the VASs “trying to understand, explain, or make sense of things” F(1, 77) = .48, p = .49 
and “imagery vs verbal thinking” F(1, 77) = .07, p = .80. The WD-MEPS abstract-concrete 
ratings showed a similar pattern F(1, 77) = .001, p = .97. There were also no significant 
effects for Manipulation or the Manipulation × Worry Group interaction.
Problem Solving Skills at Baseline
Contrary to expectations, the WD-MEPS ratings revealed no significant differences for 
number of means (low: 3.86±1.28, high: 3.59±1.07) F(1, 77) = 1.86, p = .177, nor for 
effectiveness (low: 4.36 ± 1.07, high: 4.25 ± 0.82) F(1, 77) = .84, p = .364. There were also 
no significant effects for Manipulation or the Manipulation × Worry Group interaction.
Manipulation Checks
Repeated measures ANOVAs showed a main effect for manipulation regards VAS 1 
(imagery/verbal thinking: F(1, 75) = 5.38, p = .023, d = 0.53; VAS 2 (trying to understand, 
explain or make sense of things: F(1, 75) = 16.13, p < .001, d = .91; and WD-MEPS abstract/
concrete: F(1, 75) = 4.01, p = .049, d = 0.45) with the group receiving the concrete training 
reporting more concrete thoughts than the group receiving the abstract training. In 
addition significant Time × Manipulation interaction effects were found for VAS1: F(1, 
75) = 10.01, p = .002 and for VAS 2: F(1, 75) = 16.76, p < .001. These interactions reflect 
increases in ratings for the abstract manipulation relative to the concrete manipulation 
(see Table 1 for details). This interaction effect was however, not found for the WD-
MEPS abstract/concrete measure (p = .652). Closer inspection of the two manipulation 
groups using ANCOVA analyses revealed that pre-manipulation the abstract and concrete 
condition did not differ significantly F(1, 77) = 1.95, p = .167, whilst there was a trend in 
the expected direction for the post-manipulation F(1, 77) = 3.85, p = .053, d = 0.45. 
Effects of Manipulation on Problem Solving Skills (WD-MEPS) 
Repeated measures ANOVAs revealed significant main effects of Time for Number 
of Means F(1, 75) = 7.94, p = .006, d = 0.76 and for Effectiveness of generated problem 
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solutions F(1, 75) = 7.91, p = .006, d = 0.72, reflecting decreases on both measures. No 
other significant main effects or interaction effects were found for number of means (all 
p’s > .08) or effectiveness (all p’s > .311). 
Discussion
The main focus of the first experiment was to examine the effect of thinking style on 
problem solving skills. Based on research conducted in the area of depression (Watkins & 
Moulds, 2005), combined with the predictions of the reduced concreteness theory of worry 
(e.g. Stöber & Borkovec, 2002), it was predicted that high trait worriers would display worse 
problem solving skills compared to low trait worriers as a result of their relatively abstract 
thinking style. Hence, one would expect that making the thinking style of high worriers 
more concrete would result in enhanced problem solving skills. 
  Contrary to expectations, baseline scores showed no differences in thinking style 
between high and low trait worriers. This is surprising considering previous studies revealed 
differences in thinking style between high-low worriers during the problem analysis phase 
(Stöber & Borkovec, 2002) and between previously-never depressed groups (Watkins & 
Moulds, 2005). Results are therefore in need of replication. Baseline problem solving skills 
did not differ between worry groups either. This would be in line with expectations assuming 
that the notion of abstract/concrete thinking influencing problem solving is correct. 
However, an alternative explanation could be that worriers do possess the skills to solve 
problems but are hindered in other ways such as through their lack of confidence in their 
own problem solving abilities. Although theoretically it is expected that high trait worriers/
persons with GAD possess poorer problem solving skills, actual evidence to support this is 
limited. Based on his findings, Davey (1994) hinted that the problem solving skills in high 
worriers appeared to be intact and that lack of confidence seemed to be a bigger problem. 
However, this was not followed by more elaborate studies confirming this view. 
  In addition to the non-significant baseline results on problem solving skills, altering the 
thinking style did not result in the predicted changes in problem solving. Closer examination 
of the manipulation showed that the effect of the induction was more pronounced in the 
explicit self-report measures (VASs) than the abstract/concrete ratings of the WD-MEPS 
task. Considering the latter is a more direct measure of concreteness, the success of the 
manipulation has to be questioned. The mixed results could be due to social desirability 
bias on the VASs or could mean that the induction was not strong enough to generate 
an effect on the WD-MEPS. The manipulation task was identical to the version which was 
successfully applied in participants with a depressive disorder by Watkins et al. (2008) and 
thus was a logical choice. However, scenarios referred to loss/reward as opposed to threat/
safety themes which are characteristic of anxiety. In addition the WD-MEPS was conducted 
in a written as opposed to verbal format and this may have resulted in suboptimal task 
engagement. Furthermore, previous successful manipulations of social problem-solving in 
depression manipulated thinking style in the context of ruminative self-focus. The cumulative 
effect of these aspects might have contributed to the lack of results in the problem solving 
skills measures. Findings should therefore be interpreted with caution.
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Experiment 2
Building on the results of the first experiment, the WD-MEPS task was adjusted from 
a written to a spoken format (in line with the original MEPS) to accommodate easier 
assessment for the participant. Furthermore the manipulation task which was originally 
geared towards depression was modified for anxiety themes and strengthened by 
intensifying the application of the task (see below). Using a similar design as in Experiment 1 
we tried to replicate the results of the first experiment.
  In addition, the second study expanded the focus from merely problem solving skills 
to other aspects involved in successful problem solving. More emphasis was put on three 
aspects which could influence successful problem solving and could be impaired by worry: 
problem orientation, problem solving confidence, and problem solving style. Problem 
orientation and problem solving style were measured by means of a questionnaire. 
Problem solving confidence was assessed using VASs at both pre and post manipulation 
allowing for insight into possible effects of the manipulation on confidence. We expected 
a positive association of worry with dysfunctional problem solving related measures (e.g., 
negative problem orientation and problem solving confidence). We further speculated 
that a concrete thinking style helping participants to clearly envision problem solutions 
would also make them more confident in the solutions generated. 
Method
Participants
Selection criteria were the same as in experiment 1. A total of 400 students were screened. 
After applying exclusion criteria, the bottom and top quartiles were invited to participate, 
of which 100 participated: 50 high and 50 low trait worriers. They were randomly allocated 
to one of the manipulation conditions, resulting in a 2 × 2 factorial between subject design 




For descriptions see experiment 1. 
SPSI-R
The Social Problem-Solving Inventory – Revised (SPSI-R; D’Zurilla, Nezu, & Maydeu-
Olivares, 2002) assesses individual’s strengths and weaknesses in their problem-solving 
abilities. It is a self-report measure consisting of 52 self-statements reflecting either a 
positive (facilitative) or negative (dysfunctional) cognitive, affective, or behavioural 
response to real-life problem solving situations. Each item is scored on a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from ‘not at all true of me’ to ‘extremely true of me’. The SPSI-R contains 
five subscales: Positive Problem Orientation (PPO), Negative Problem Orientation (NPO), 
Rational Problem Solving (RPS), Impulsivity/Carelessness Style (IMP) and Avoidance Style 
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(AVO). Internal consistency in the present study was adequate: PPO α = .67, NPO α = .93, 
RPS α = .87, IMP α = .83, AVO α = .89. Further evidence supporting the reliability and 
validity of the SPSI-R is reported in D’Zurilla, et al., (2002).
Problem solving confidence (VAS)
Each time after reading a WD-MEPS problem scenario (without end goal), participants were 
asked how confident they were that they could solve the situation (1), once completed 
they were asked how confident they were about their provided solution (2) and at the 
end of the pre and post WD-MEPS assessment their confidence concerning solving future 
problems (3) was measured. All ratings were done using 100mm VASs (not at all certain – 
very certain) and repeated before and after the manipulation task.
Experimental Task/Manipulation
Paralleling Experiment 1, the manipulation task by Watkins et al. (2008) was used. However, 
some alterations in the content and procedure were made to optimize its effect. Themes 
of the scenarios were modified from reward/loss to safety/threat. In addition, the practice 
phase was intensified and participants were asked to think out loud during the practice 
scenarios as well as during scenarios 1, 2, 15, 16, 29 and 30 of the manipulation task in 
order to check whether the thinking style was applied correctly.
Worry Domain – Means-Ends Problem Solving task (WD-MEPS)
Interrater reliability with an independent second judge was fair to good: ICC means: 
.705, ICC effectiveness: .794 and for abstract/concrete ratings the ICC was .470, based on 
agreement on a random selection of 10% of responses. 
Procedure
After signing an informed consent participants completed the MCQ and SPSI-R. This was 
followed by the same procedure as in Experiment 1 with two exceptions: the HADS was 
now completed at the end of the experiment and problem solving confidence (VASs) 
was assessed both at the pre and post WD-MEPS task instead of once at the end of the 
experiment. 
Statistical Analyses
Data analyses were similar to Experiment 1, including the application of a .05 alpha level 
for statistical significance and corrections for gender (see below).
Results
Sample Description
Following the screening of 400 students, 100 of them were selected and tested. Three 
of the participants were later excluded based on insufficient compliance with the 
manipulation task. Thus, the final sample consisted of 97 participants: 48 low (PSWQ: 
M = 31.65, SD = 3.75) and 49 high trait worriers (PSWQ: M = 63.61, SD = 4.77). Note 
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that scores of the high trait worriers are similar to those reported in clinical samples 
(e.g. Meyer, et al., 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994). The average age of the sample was 
20.4 years (SD = 2.6) and 71.1 % was female. The high worry group contained more 
females than the low worry group (χ2(1) = 24.95, p < .001). As expected the high trait 
worry group was characterized by higher scores on the HADS-anxiety, t(95) = -9.02, 
p < .001, d = 1.85, and HADS-depression scale t( 94) = -2.14, p = .035, d = .44. 
Problem Solving Orientation and Style
Results of the ANCOVA analyses reveal an overall less positive attitude towards problems 
and the application of a more avoidant problem solving style in high compared to low 
trait worriers (see Table 2 for details).
Problem Solving Confidence at Baseline (VAS)
Confidence levels just prior to completing the WD-MEPS scenarios showed a trend for 
a main effect of Group indicating higher confidence levels in low worriers relative to 
high worriers, F(1, 94) = 3.31, p = .072. No significant differences in confidence about 
provided solutions were found after completion of WD-MEPS scenarios, F(1, 94) = .13, 
p = .720. However when asked at the end of the task to rate their confidence levels 
concerning their ability to solve future problems, high worriers were significantly less 
confident than low worriers, F(1, 94) = 10.10, p < .05. It has to be noted that there was 
a significant effect (p = .005) of manipulation for ‘confidence about provided solutions’ 
indicating that the random allocation to the abstract-concrete training condition did 
Table 2:  Experiment 2 – Differences between high and low trait worriers in problem 













PPO 10.6 (3.1) 13.5 (2.2) 22.497 *** 1.04
NPO 21.6 (7.3)  9.1 (4.9) 62.123 *** 1.73
RPS 44.8 (9.5) 43.9 (10.3)  .304 .583
IMP 14.6 (6.3) 15.7 (6.0)  .650 .422
AVO 12.1 (6.0)  9.8 (4.8)  3.815 .054 0.43
ANCOVA’s corrected for gender * p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Social Problem-Solving Inventory - Revised (SPSI-R) PPO: Positive Problem Orientation, NPO: Negative 
Problem Orientation, RPS: Rational Problem Solving, IMP: Impulsivity/Carelessness Style, AVO: 
Avoidance Style
a unadjusted scores
b based on EMM + SE
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not result in comparable groups on this variable. Participants in the abstract condition 
had higher scores than those allocated to the concrete condition. There were no other 
significant effects for Manipulation or the Manipulation × Worry Group interaction. 
Thinking Style Differences Between High versus Low Worriers at Baseline 
Pre-manipulation WD-MEPS stories were rated on abstractness-concreteness to 
establish thinking style at baseline. As in experiment 1, ANCOVA analyses revealed no 
significant differences between high and low trait worriers, F(1, 94) = .01, p = .92. There 
were also no significant effects for Manipulation or the Manipulation × Worry Group 
interaction.
Problem Solving Skills at Baseline
Problem solving skills at baseline were examined using ANCOVA analyses. Similar to 
Experiment 1, the WD-MEPS ratings revealed no significant differences between high 
and low trait worriers for number of means, F(1, 94) = .57, p = .452, nor for effectiveness 
F(1, 94) = .53, p = .467. There were also no significant effects for Manipulation or the 
Manipulation × Worry Group interaction.
Manipulation Checks
Repeated measures ANOVAs of scores for thinking style (abstract-concrete WD-MEPS 
scores) revealed a main effect for manipulation, F(1, 92) = 9.12, p = .003, d = 0.63 
with the group receiving the concrete training reporting more concrete thoughts than 
the group receiving the abstract training. In addition there was a significant Time × 
Manipulation interaction, F(1, 92) = 8.13, p = .005 (see Figure 1). Closer inspection of 
Figure 1:  Experiment 2- Manipulation check based on the WD-MEPS abstract/concrete 
rating
Note: Scores are based on EMM
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the two manipulation groups using ANCOVA analyses revealed that pre-manipulation 
the abstract and concrete condition did not differ significantly, F(1, 94) = .11, p = .746, 
whilst post-manipulation there was a significant difference with the concrete group 
scoring higher on concreteness relative to the group receiving the abstract training, 
F(1, 94) = 11.86, p < .001, d = 0.71. These results indicate that the manipulation yielded 
the intended effect. See Table 3 for an overview of the abstract/concreteness rating 
scores.
Effects of Manipulation on Problem Solving Skills (WD-MEPS) 
Repeated measures ANOVAs of scores for number of means revealed a significant 
main effect of Time F(1, 92) = 5.70, p = .019, d = 0.39, reflecting an overall decrease 
between pre and post manipulation. Further, a marginally significant Time × 
Manipulation interaction was found, F(1, 92) = 3.82, p = .054. Closer inspection of the 
two manipulation groups using ANCOVA analyses revealed that pre-manipulation the 
abstract and concrete condition did not differ significantly, F(1, 94) = .00, p = .987. 
Across time there was a general reduction in problem solving –possibly reflecting 
boredom or fatigue- which was mitigated by processing style. Post manipulation scores 
revealed that more means were generated in the concrete versus abstract condition, 
F(1, 94) = 4.47, p < .05, d = 0.44.
  For effectiveness of generated problem solutions there was a main effect of Time F(1, 
92) = 4.52, p = .036, d = 0.28, and a marginally significant main effect for worry Group, 
F(1, 92) = 3.84, p = .053, d = 0.43. Contrary to our expectations, high worriers provided 
more effective solutions than low worriers. 
  No other significant main or interaction effects were found for number of means 
(all p’s > .16) or effectiveness (all p’s > .13).
Problem Solving Confidence (VAS)
Repeated measures ANOVAs showed that ratings for confidence to solve the presented 
problem scenario showed a main effect for Worry Group: low trait worriers were more 
certain than high trait worriers, F(1, 92) = 4.51, p = .036, d = 0.47. Confidence ratings 
regarding their provided solutions revealed a main effect for Manipulation with higher 
confidence levels in the abstract condition relative to the concrete condition, (F(1, 92) 
= 10.66, p = .002, d = 0.68. However this effect was no longer significant (p = .12) when 
analyzing post measurement confidence ratings with baseline scores as a covariate. No 
main effect of Worry Group was found F(1, 92) = 0.16, p = .692. Confidence concerning 
ability to solve future problems demonstrated main effects of Time, F(1, 92) = 13.883, 
p < .01, d = 0.35, reflecting an increase in confidence over time and of Worry Group, F(1, 
92) = 4.67, p = .033, d = 0.48, with low trait worriers being more confident than high trait 
worriers. These main effects were secondary to a Time × Worry Group interaction, F(1, 
92) = 4.88, p = .030 , which reflected confidence levels for low worriers staying stable 
over time, but confidence increasing over time in the high worry group. See Table 3 for 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The influence of abstract/concrete thinking on social problem solving in high and low worriers
Discussion
In line with the first experiment, we predicted that (1) high trait worriers would display 
worse problem solving skills compared to low trait worriers as a result of their relatively 
abstract thinking style and (2) that making the thinking style of high worriers more 
concrete would result in enhanced problem solving skills. In addition to examining 
problem solving skills the second experiment also focussed on other aspects of successful 
problem solving: problem orientation, problem solving confidence, and problem solving 
style. 
  Similar to the first experiment and in contrast with our predictions, there were no 
differences in thinking style or problem solving skills between high and low trait worriers 
at baseline. The thinking style manipulation was however successful this time as reflected 
in the manipulation check. Whilst in the first experiment, changes in thinking style were 
only evident on self-report measures, the current paradigm was able to transfer the effect 
onto a more objective measure, namely, the WD-MEPS abstract-concreteness ratings. As 
expected, the concreteness training had a positive effect on problem solving (number of 
means) relative to the abstract training, supporting the claim that level of concreteness 
has a causal effect on problem solving. Effectiveness scores showed a similar pattern but 
this did not reach significance. 
 Problem solving confidence baseline scores revealed a general tendency for 
high trait worriers to be less confident when anticipating problem solving situations. 
Interestingly, this difference was not observed immediately after completion of 
the problem solving task. This could imply that low problem solving confidence is a 
hindrance mainly prior to the generation of a problem solving strategy perhaps resulting 
in avoidance or termination of dealing with the situation. Once solutions are completed 
however, their ‘normal’ confidence levels suggest that they do not dwell on the solutions 
provided. Whether these confidence levels drop again over time causing high trait 
worriers to revisit their solutions or reactivate their worry strategy remains to be seen. 
In general it seems that problem solving skills of high trait worriers are not impaired but 
that they have other problem solving related aspects which are suboptimal. Besides low 
problem solving confidence, high worriers possess an overall avoidant problem solving 
style characterized by passivity and inaction as reflected in their scores on the Avoidance 
Style subscale of the SPSI-R. 
 An even more pronounced obstacle to successful problem solving is the dysfunctional 
problem orientation deployed by high trait worriers. Their relatively low positive problem 
orientation (PPO) and, in particular, their high negative problem orientation (NPO) 
scores indicate an overall tendency to appraise problems as threatening as opposed to 
challenging. This perception of problems might affect problem solving in different ways, 
such as discouraging the initiation of problem-solving attempts or by increasing anxiety 




These two experiments were designed to address the question of whether thinking style 
(abstract-concrete) influences problem solving skills in high trait worriers. In line with the 
reduced concreteness theory (Stöber, 1998; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002), problem solving 
skills were expected to be impaired in the high trait worry group relative to the low trait 
worry group, due to the deployment of a relatively abstract thinking style. Amelioration 
of the latter would therefore logically, and in accordance with results from Watkins and 
Moulds (2005) in depression, improve problem solving success. Results partially confirmed 
these expectations. 
 High trait worriers did not report a more abstract thinking style than low trait 
worriers nor poorer problem solving skills. These findings were replicated in the second 
experiment. Hence, both studies failed to replicate Stöber’s findings of a more abstract 
thinking style in high trait worriers compared to low trait worriers (Stöber & Borkovec, 
2002). Abstract-concreteness was rated using the same criteria and scale as applied 
by Stöber and colleagues (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002; Stöber, et al., 2000). The focus lay 
however on different phases of the problem solving process. Stöber focussed in his series 
of experiments on the phase of problem analysis. In contrast to Stöber’s experiments, 
the present studies focussed on the step following problem analysis: the generation of 
solutions. Hence, the conflicting results could be explained by the positioning within 
the problem solving process. It is possible that worriers adopt a more abstract style of 
thinking when assessing a problem situation but that they possess the mental flexibility 
to shift to a more concrete level when explicitly instructed to actively address the problem 
at hand. Although a plausible option we cannot disregard the possibility that the different 
results could also be related to the fact that we used different problem scenarios and had 
a non-clinical sample.
 The current results on thinking style and problem solving skills are in contrast with 
findings in depressed subjects who showed both a more abstract thinking style and 
poorer problem solving skills than a never-depressed group (Watkins & Moulds, 2005). 
When comparing the results in depressed subjects to the present findings it appears 
that the process of abstract ruminative thinking in depression might interfere more 
with the generation of solutions than inducing an abstract thinking style in anxiety. This 
methodological difference between inducing a processing style versus manipulating 
processing style during self-focused rumination may be important in influencing the 
distinct findings. An alternative explanation could be that depressive rumination interferes 
more with laboratory studies than does worry. Andrews and Thomson (2009) claim that 
during laboratory tasks depressive rumination on issues other than those central to the 
particular study interfere with the ability to perform well on the task at hand. This could 
lead to the possible premature conclusion that depressed subjects lack problem solving 
skills. Considering that problem solving skills in high trait worriers seem to be intact this 
interference does not seem to occur in the present sample. 
 Our study is not the first to find worriers’ problem solving skills to be intact (e.g. 
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Davey, 1994; Ladouceur, Blais, Freeston, & Dugas, 1998; Marx, et al., 1992). Marx et al. 
(1992) reported that patients with anxiety disorders were able to produce problem solving 
strategies which were equally effective as those produced by non-clinical subjects. This 
idea was further explored in relation to worry by Davey (1994) who, in an analogue 
student sample, found no relationship between worrying and problem solving ability 
as assessed on a standard MEPS task. However, although worry level was taken into 
account, GAD symptomatology was not. Ladouceur et al. (1998) addressed this issue in 
a questionnaire based assessment revealing that self reported problem solving skills did 
not vary with either level of GAD symptoms or clinical status. These studies however, 
used either self-report measures of problem solving ability (questionnaires) or a standard/
uniform problem solving task (MEPS) even though personal relevance is believed to be of 
particular importance in worriers/GAD (Stöber, et al., 2000). The present findings confirm 
and extend the previous findings by showing that problem solving skills did not differ 
between high and low trait worriers even when the problem-solving task contained 
personally relevant topics. Considering these results it is no surprise that the concreteness 
training task –although successful- did not result in the hypothesized Time × Group × 
Manipulation interaction. 
 On the other hand, the second prediction of the current studies –that concreteness 
training would positively affect problem solving- can largely be confirmed. The 
concreteness training had a positive effect on problem solving (number of means) relative 
to the abstract training. This supports the idea that level of concreteness has a causal 
effect on problem solving. Ratings of effectiveness showed a similar pattern but this 
did not reach significance. Overall the scores on means and effectiveness as well as the 
general tendency for scores to drop over time appear to best resemble the pattern found 
by Watkins and Moulds (2005) in never depressed individuals. With problem solving skills 
seemingly intact it seems only logical to move away from attempts to further improve 
these skills and to shift attention to other more promising avenues to improve problem 
solving success rates. 
 The second study additionally focused on problem solving confidence, problem 
solving style and problem orientation. Results showed that high trait worriers tend to 
appraise problems as threatening as opposed to challenging as reflected in the large 
effect sizes for differences on both PPO and NPO between groups. These results are 
in line with previous research on problem orientation in non-clinical populations (e.g. 
Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997; Dugas, Letarte, Rheaume, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 
1995) and in a clinical GAD sample (Ladouceur, et al., 1998). Besides a poor problem 
orientation compared to low trait worriers, high trait worriers also deploy a dysfunctional 
problem solving style as indicated by the (near) significant (p = 0.54, d = .43) differences 
on the SPSI-R-avoidance subscale. This style is characterized by passivity (waiting for 
problems to resolve by themselves), procrastination (putting off dealing with problems) 
and dependency (attempting to shift responsibility for problem-solving to others). Lack 
of problem solving confidence is an aspect related to poor problem orientation. In 
the second experiment extra attention was given to this aspect by directly measuring 
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confidence levels (as opposed to general attitude) at different stages during the problem 
solving task. The results confirmed a lack of problem solving confidence in high worriers 
at the time of confrontation with a problem. This is in line with previous studies showing 
lower problem solving confidence (e.g. Davey, 1994) and poorer problem orientation in 
high compared to low worriers. Surprisingly, confidence levels normalized straight after 
the generation of solutions, suggesting it is mainly the phase of anticipation hindering 
problem solving success. Once participants do overcome the obstacle of perceived threat 
and low confidence in their own abilities, a subsequent successful problem solving attempt 
still does not lead to ‘normal’ confidence levels with regard to solving future problems. 
The latter suggests that their confidence does not generalize easily. 
 These results are in need of replication. Future research should focus on how 
confidence levels change, or do not change, in the aftermath of solving a problem: do 
confidence levels remain similar to those of low trait worriers enabling participants to 
move on, or do confidence levels drop again possibly motivating participants to revisit the 
problem and question the solutions they previously provided? Another aspect of social 
problem solving not addressed by this study is whether worriers experience difficulties 
at the implementation phase. It is one thing generating solutions but another to actually 
execute them. In addition to the possible rising anxiety levels during the implementation 
phase, it also remains to be seen whether high trait worriers are successful executers: Can 
they transfer their ideas into actions?
 The present studies have several limitations. Firstly, these studies are conducted using 
non- clinical samples. Although PSWQ scores were in the clinical range, it is possible that a 
clinical GAD status is accompanied by characteristics which are not captured when merely 
measuring worry levels. On the other hand, as mentioned above, previous research has 
shown that knowledge of problem solving skills does not vary with GAD symptomatology 
and clinical GAD status (Ladouceur, et al., 1998). Although this research was questionnaire 
based, it gives grounds to believe that the current research based on worry levels does 
resemble results in clinical GAD populations.
 Secondly, although scenario selection for the WD-MEPS was based on personal 
relevance to the participant, they were still hypothetical situations. It is possible that 
worriers adopt their more abstract way of thinking only when in the midst of an actual 
real-life personally relevant situation, leaving impaired problem solving undetected 
in laboratory studies. Inconsistent with this idea are results from a study by Anderson 
et al. (2009). They found differences between real-life problem solving behaviour and 
hypothetical MEPS situations to be specific to depressed but not anxious individuals.
 Finally, it needs to be noted that inter-rater agreement (ICC) on the abstract/concrete 
WD-MEPS ratings was moderate especially in the second study. However, there was little 
variation between the scores of both raters and 2-point differences on the 5-point Likert 
scale of thinking style were rare (3.1% experiment 1; 2.5% experiment 2).
 Overall the results of the present studies were partly in line with the reduced 
concreteness hypothesis of worry. High trait worriers did not possess more abstract 
thinking styles when generating solutions; however, increasing levels of concreteness did 
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improve problem solving. Moreover from the perspective of the impaired social problem 
solving account of worry results were mixed. Problem solving skills were intact, however 
problem solving confidence, style and orientation revealed patterns characteristic of high 
trait worriers which could affect the problem solving process. These obstacles appear to 
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Background: It has been proposed that worry in individuals with Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder may be reinforced by a positive effect of worry on decision making, as reflected 
by a steeper learning curve on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). We hypothesized that this 
apparent positive effect of worry is dependent on the IGT parameters, in particular the 
absence of an opportunity to avoid decisions. 
Objective: (1) To replicate previous findings on the effect of worry on IGT performance. 
(2) To examine the influence of avoidance opportunity on IGT performance. We 
hypothesized that the positive effect of worry on learning would be abolished or reversed 
by the opportunity to avoid.
Method: A standard IGT and a new IGT version that includes a pass (avoidance) option 
was completed by 78 and 79 participants, respectively. 
Results: A beneficial effect of worry on learning in the standard version of the IGT was 
not observed. In the pass version of the IGT, worry status and avoidance were negatively 
associated with performance. Worry was not related, however, to pass usage. The 
hypothesized mediating effect of avoidance was non-significant.
Limitations: It is unclear to what extent these findings generalize to real-life decision 
making and how clinical status affects results.
Conclusion: The possibility to avoid a decision results in poorer IGT performance in high 
relative to low trait worriers. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed.
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Introduction
Within its ‘normal’ range, worrying is considered an ordinary and adaptive process 
containing positive and constructive aspects (e.g. Davey et al., 1992; Borkovec & Roemer, 
1995). Yet in its pathological form the downsides overshadow or undermine these benefits 
and cause severe impairment (e.g. Wittchen et al., 2000). Patients with generalized anxiety 
disorder (GAD) engage in this type of perseverative thinking despite its negative effects. 
There appear to be two possible reasons for continued worrying: (1) patients do not 
experience benefits (anymore) but simply do not know how to terminate this type of 
thinking even if they want to; and/or (2) there is a certain payoff (although maybe not 
recognized by the individual) like the reduction of anxiety due to the belief that one 
should prepare for every possible scenario.
  It has even been suggested that worrying leads to improved decision making 
(Mueller et al., 2010) on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). In the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994), 
four decks of cards are simultaneously presented to the participant. Each selection of a 
card leads to either an addition or subtraction of points (money). The task is designed in 
such a way that repeated selection of card decks A and B leads to long term net loss and 
repeated play of decks C and D leads to long term net gain. Participants are instructed to 
maximize their winnings. The reinforcement schedule is too complicated for participants 
to figure it out but they typically develop an intuitive preference for decks C and D. 
  People with GAD are hypervigilant and highly aware of any cues signalling 
potential danger (Mathews & MacLeod, 1986). It seems logical that these future oriented 
characteristics can have a beneficial effect on IGT performance. According to the Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis (SMH; Damasio, 1994, 1996), emotions and their accompanying bodily 
signals leave a trace in memory which directs our learning even before certain knowledge 
or patterns enter consciousness. Reactivation of this memory trace occurs when one 
is faced with a similar situation. This is hypothesized to influence decision making by 
encouraging advantageous and discouraging disadvantageous choices. From a SMH 
perspective one could argue that higher levels of (anticipatory) anxiety will install stronger 
somatic markers and therefore more quickly lead to successful performance on the IGT 
(Damasio 1994, 1996; see also Werner et al., 2009, p. 263). 
 So far, studies concerning anxiety have shown mixed results. Miu et al. (2008) 
compared high and low trait anxious individuals and concluded that despite the fact that 
some of the anticipatory physical reactions were stronger in high trait anxious individuals, 
the low trait anxious group outperformed the high trait anxious group on the IGT. Werner 
et al. (2009), however, found that higher trait anxiety levels are associated with better IGT 
performance. These two studies measured trait anxiety, which overlaps with worry, but is 
not the same.  
 In the domain of worry/GAD two recent studies stand out. Pajkossy et al. (2009) 
targeted the influence of state anxiety, trait anxiety and worry on IGT performance in a 
student sample (N = 50). For each construct of interest low, medium, and high groups 
were formed. The authors concluded that state anxiety and worry had a positive effect on 
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IGT performance whereas trait anxiety had a negative influence. This pattern is difficult to 
understand and may be a chance effect in a relatively small sample in which post hoc tests 
did not reveal significant differences unless Bonferroni corrections were ignored. Mueller et 
al. (2010) selected 27 participants meeting GAD criteria (assessed through questionnaire) 
and compared their IGT performance to that of a control group (n = 20). The GAD group 
learned to choose the advantageous decks (C and D) over the disadvantageous decks (A 
and B) significantly faster than the control group. GAD patients therefore seem to benefit 
from their future-oriented hypervigilant characteristics in this form of decision making. 
This could constitute a potential mechanism underpinning the recurrent engagement in 
worry by positively reinforcing worry as a constructive strategy. 
 If this effect is replicable, the question remains to what extent this is relevant for 
real-life decision making. Studies have shown, for instance, that high trait worriers possess 
the ability to successfully solve problem solving tasks when forced to do so, but they 
seem to never arrive at this stage of problem solving in real life, because worrying and 
avoidance undermine the preceding stages of problem solving. High worriers have a 
negative problem orientation, tend to avoid problems and lack confidence in their own 
problem solving abilities (e.g. Davey, 1994; Drost et al., submitted).
 The IGT in its standard form is one of a somewhat artificial nature and does not 
involve decision in a social context. In particular, the IGT represents a forced-choice 
decision making process. The lack of option to not make a decision makes it less suitable 
for studying disorders in which avoidance is a main mechanism of maintenance. The 
mental procrastination and dwelling on certain issues that is characteristic of worriers 
may lead them to avoid making decisions. In order to examine the role of such avoidance 
behaviour in decision making, the current study used both the standard IGT and a newly 
developed adaptation of the IGT that included a pass option (IGT-P).
  The aim of the present study was to investigate whether worriers will engage in 
passing on the IGT-P and how this influences their performance. In the standard IGT 
condition we expected to replicate Mueller et al.’s (2010) findings of high worriers learning 
significantly faster than controls to choose the advantageous decks. For the IGT-P, we 
hypothesized that worriers out of uncertainty will choose the pass (i.e. avoid) option more 
often than low-worriers and that this will negatively influence their learning process. 




Inclusion criteria were an age of between 17-35 years, good command of the Dutch 
language and being from Middle or North-West European descent (because of 
genetic analyses that will be reported elsewhere). Participants were recruited through 
advertisements at the university.
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Materials
Questionnaires
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, et al., 1990) consists of 16 items rated 
on a 5-point Likert scale and measures trait worry independently from the content of the 
worry (Davey, 1993; Molina & Borkovec, 1994). It has high internal consistency, good test-retest 
reliability and is unaffected by social desirability (Meyer, et al., 1990). Internal consistency in the 
present study was high, namely α = .92 in the total sample. The Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is a 14-item self-report questionnaire consisting of 
two subscales measuring anxiety (7-items) and depression (7-items) symptoms during the last 
week. Internal consistency, discriminant and concurrent validity, and test-retest reliability are 
satisfactory (Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & Neckelmann, 2002; Spinhoven, et al., 1997). In the present 
study internal consistency (total sample) of HADS-A was α = 0.74 and of HADS-D α = 0.77.
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)
The standard IGT as proposed by Bechara et al. (1994) consisted of 100 trials divided over 
5 blocks (20 trials each). Each trial started with a display of 4 decks of cards (A,B,C,D) on a 
computer screen of which participants selected a card by clicking the cursor on the deck of 
interest. Once a card was selected feedback was given on the amount won and lost in that trial 
and the total amount left was shown. Each card simultaneously consisted of a gain and a loss. 
Decks A and B had a fixed gain of 100 as opposed to 50 in decks C and D. The amount that was 
lost varied across decks and was non-systematic (A: either 0 or between 150-350, B: 0 or 1250, 
C: 0 or between 25-50, D: 0 or 250). Choosing exclusively from decks A or B led to a net loss of 
250 over 10 card selections and was therefore disadvantageous. Decks C and D resulted in a net 
gain of 250 when selected exclusively during 10 trials. The IGT-P (pass version) had exactly the 
same setup, but each trial also included a pass button. The pass choice was visualized on the 
screen by the top 4 cards being removed without revealing their value. In reality no “pass” took 
place and the cards/decks were merely put on hold. The total number of trials remained 100. 
Procedure
Participants were tested in a laboratory setting. They signed an informed consent form 
before the data collection started. The PSWQ, HADS and IGT were all completed on a 
computer. Participants were assigned to either the standard IGT or the IGT-P based on 
their participant number, which was assigned in order of testing. Overall time spent on the 
data collection (including the data for the other experiments) was up to 90 minutes per 
person. Participants could choose to receive course credits or a small payment for their 
participation. In addition, participants also received their possible gains (but not losses) on 
the IGT at a rate of 1 eurocent per 10 points gained.
Statistical analyses
Two-level multilevel random slope models were used to test the main hypotheses. 
Parameters were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation; variance structure 
was set to identity. Time was set as the logarithm of the block number to allow for a 
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linear model (see Lutz, Martinovich, & Howard, 1999) and PSWQ-scores were grand 
mean centered. Data screening further revealed that the number of passes was skewed 
and therefore was log-transformed as well. All analyses were controlled for gender as a 
previous study (Mueller et al., 2010) had shown an effect of this variable.
 Analyses consisted of several phases. Firstly, the overall sample was examined for 
an effect of condition on percentage of advantageous choices (dependent variable). 
An unconditional growth model was built followed by an extended model containing 
the additional main effects ‘Condition’, Worry and a Condition*Worry interaction 
term. Secondly, separate analyses in the no-pass and pass condition subsamples were 
conducted. In both subsamples unconditional growth models were established which 
were thereafter extended by adding Worry (no-pass condition), and Worry and Pass usage 
(pass condition). Finally, to allow for further exploration of the mediating role of Pass, the 
effect of Worry on Pass use (dependent variable) was examined with two-level random 
intercept, random slope multilevel models. 
 The best model is the one that provides an adequate account of the data while using 
a minimum number of parameters. We used the Akaike information criterion (AIC; see 
Akaike, 1981) to choose the best model in terms of descriptive accuracy and parsimony. 
More specifically, we calculated Akaike weights (Burnham, & Anderson, 2002), which can 
be interpreted as conditional probabilities for competing nonnested models as well as 
evidence ratio’s (Weight of evidence of full model (WF) / Weight of evidence reduced 
model (WR) (Long, 2012). In this way we could directly evaluate whether models involving 
Worry as an additional main effect or interaction effect are better in terms of descriptive 
accuracy and parsimony than models which do not include this variable of crucial interest 
for the present study. 
 Finally, an additional two-level multilevel random slope model with a fixed intercept 
for percentage of advantageous choices and a random intercept for Pass usage was 
performed to directly test the presupposed indirect effect (Passing mediating the relation 
between worry and IGT learning curve). Parameters were estimated using maximum 
likelihood estimation and bootstrapping was set to 10.000.
  Linear Mixed Modelling was favoured over repeated measures ANOVA as it allows 
for time-varying continuous covariates (West, 2009). In our study the ‘pass’ variable was 
such a time-varying predictor and a crucial part in testing our hypotheses. All analyses 
were performed using PASW version 18 for Windows except for the direct testing of 
mediation using Mplus version 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012).
Results
Sample description
One hundred and sixty participants signed up. Three participants were excluded: one did not 
meet inclusion criteria, one was excluded due to a technical problem and another participant 
used the “pass” option more than 50% within one block, exceeding the average by over six 
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times the SD. The final sample (N = 157) consisted of 23 men (14.6%). The average age 
was 20.2 years (SD = 2.9) and PSWQ scores ranged from 20 to 74 with an average of 50.1 
(SD = 12.6). The standard no-pass IGT (N = 78; 70 women, 8 men) and the adjusted IGT-P 
condition (N = 79; 64 women, 15 men) did not significantly differ regarding their male-
female ratio (χ2(1) = 2.39, p = .12), age (t(155) = -.38, p = .70) or PSWQ scores (t(155) = 
-1.30, p = .20). To rule out a priori IGT performance differences between conditions, baseline 
score (block 1, % advantageous) comparisons were made and no significant differences 
were found (t(155) = -.05, p = .96). The other independent variable of interest (PSWQ) was 
checked for a priori associations with IGT scores as well. Correlations between baseline IGT 
scores (block 1) and PSWQ scores were non-significant (r = -.08, p = .33). 
Anxiety and IGT performance: exploratory analyses
We conducted some exploratory analyses to examine the influence of anxiety symptoms 
on the IGT learning curve. HADS-A scores did not differ between the IGT conditions 
(HADS-A t(155) = -.11, p = .29). Correlations between HADS-A and overall IGT
Table 1:  Predicting the rate of change of % of advantageous choices over Time in the 
overall sample: investigating the effect of Condition
Overall sample Unconditional Growth 
Model
Final Model
Parameter Estimate (SE) p Estimate (SE) p
Fixed effects
Initial status Intercept 37.56 (1.22) < 0.001 37.56 (1.22) < 0.001
Rate of change Time 14.63 (1.32) < 0.001 13.09 (2.94) < 0.001
Gender  1.04 (2.71)   0.703
Condition  1.64 (1.85)   0.376
Worry  0.03 (0.12) 0.815
Worry*Condition  -0.26 (0.15) 0.075
Variance components
Level 1 Within subject 302.65 (17.08) < 0.001 302.65 (17.08) < 0.001
Level 2 Slope  85.78 (15.44) < 0.001  80.97 (14.91) < 0.001
Goodness of fit Deviance 6871 6866
AIC 6879 6882
N of estimated 
parameters
4 8
Condition was coded as a dummy variable (0 = no-pass, 1 = pass)
Variance structure was set to identity and Time was set as the logarithm of the block number to allow 
for a linear model.
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performance (% advantageous) were not significant in the no-pass (HADS-A r = -.19, 
p = .10) and pass (HADS-A r = -.09, p = .45) condition. In addition, conducting the Linear 
Mixed Modelling (LMM) analyses with HADS-A as the main predictor of interest did 
not result in any significant main or interaction effects of anxiety symptoms (data not 
shown). Subsequently, anxiety was not controlled for in the final LMM analyses reported 
below.
Trait worry and IGT performance: linear growth models
Overall sample: effect of condition on IGT learning effect 
In the overall sample there was a significant effect of Time, representing an increase 
in the percentage of advantageous choices as the experimental task progressed. No 
significant effect of Condition or Worry on the rate of change was found. Inclusion of 
the main effect of Worry and the interaction of Worry*Condition into the final model 
resulted in a ∆AIC of 1.23. The probability that the full model was the best model was 
.65 and the probability that the reduced model was the best model was .35 (evidence 
ratio = 1.85). Based on these AIC results we further explored ‘change over time’ in the 
separate IGT conditions, although note that the negative effect of Worry in the IGT–P 
(Table 1, final model) was not significant (p = .075). 
Table 2:  Predicting the rate of change of % of advantageous choices over Time in the 
standard (no-pass) IGT condition
No-pass condition Unconditional Growth 
Model
Final Model
Parameter Estimate (SE) p Estimate (SE) p
Fixed effects
Initial status Intercept 37.28 (1.67) < 0.001 37.28 (1.67) < 0.001
Rate of change Time 14.20 (1.79) < 0.001 17.00 (4.29) <0.001
Gender  -3.03 (4.29)   0.482
Worry  0.06 (0.11)   0.590
Variance components
Level 1 Within subject 281.76 (22.56) < 0.001 281.76 (22.56) < 0.001
Level 2 Slope  74.15 (19.49) < 0.001  73.23 (19.35) < 0.001
Goodness of fit Deviance 3382 3382
AIC 3390 3394
N of estimated 
parameters
4 6
Variance structure was set to identity and Time was set as the logarithm of the block number to allow 
for a linear model.
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Table 3:  Predicting the rate of change of both % of advantageous choices and pass usage 
over Time in the modified (pass) IGT-P condition 




% advantageous Parameter Estimate (SE) p Estimate (SE) p
Fixed effects
Initial status Intercept 37.83 (1.77) < 0.001 37.36 (1.75) < 0.001
Rate of change Time 15.05 (1.94) < 0.001 12.56 (3.26) < 0.001
Gender  3.06 (3.36)  0.365
Worry -0.22 (0.10)  0.035
Pass -5.69 (1.37) < 0.001
Variance components
Level 1 Within subject 323.22 (25.71) < 0.001 313.58 (24.95) < 0.001
Level 2 Slope  96.45 (24.00) < 0.001  75.92 (20.53) < 0.001
Goodness of fit Deviance 3486 3464
AIC 3494 3478






Dependent: pass a Parameter Estimate (SE) p Estimate (SE) p
Fixed effects
Initial status Intercept -0.61 (0.07) < 0.001  -0.61 (0.07) < 0.001
Rate of change Time  0.12 (0.02) < 0.001  0.12 (0.04)  0.005
Gender  -0.003 (0.05)  0.941
Worry  0.001 (0.001)  0.398
Variance components
Level 1 Within subject  0.22 (0.02) < 0.001  0.22 (.02) < 0.001
Level 2 Intercept  0.17 (0.07)  0.013  0.17 (.07)  0.013
Slope -0.01 (0.02)  0.468  -0.01 (.02)  0.451
Covariance  0.02 (0.01)  0.011  0.02 (.01)  0.012
Goodness of fit Deviance 706 705
AIC 718 721
N of estimated 
parameters
6 8
a Note that an unstructured variance structure was used and that Time was not transformed as growth 
model testing yielded this not necessary.
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Figure 1: Learning curves on the IGT-P for high and low worriers
Note: This figure is for illustrative purposes. Depicted are the percentage of cards selected from 
advantageous decks (C and D) in each block of 20 cards. Scores reflect EMM’s based on raw data 
corrected for gender. 
No-pass (standard) IGT condition: effect of worry on IGT performance 
In line with the overall sample there was a significant effect of Time reflecting an increase 
in the advantageous choices during the IGT. No significant effect of Worry1 on the rate of 
change was found (Table 2, final model). Inclusion of Worry into the model resulted in a 
higher AIC (∆ AIC = - 1.71; evidence ratio = .30) indicating that a model with only Time as 
main effect probably constitutes the best approximating model.
Pass condition: worry, pass and IGT performance
Besides the expected effect of Time, there was a significant negative effect of Pass, 
indicating that higher pass usage during the IGT negatively influenced the rate of change 
(Table 3, Final model). In addition a significant negative effect of Worry was found: a 
higher PSWQ score predicted a slower rate of change on IGT performance (see Figure 1 
for an illustration of the learning curves). A lower AIC (∆ AIC = 2.46; evidence ratio = 3.42) 
for the model including Worry also suggests that inclusion of Worry in the final model 
results in a better model than a model with only Time and Pass as main effects. 
 This result was further explored in subsequent analyses investigating the effect 
of Worry on the rate of change in pass usage. The pass option was used by 62% of 
the participants: ranging from 1 to 32 times (M = 4.9, SD = 5.5). A significant effect of 
time revealed that pass usage increased as the experimental task progressed. However, 
1   Similar results were found when analyses were conducted with rmANOVA. Whether high and low worry groups 
were defined by median split or whether only scores at the extreme ends of the spectrum were compared did 
not affect results; no differences in IGT performance were found.
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there was no significant effect of Worry (Table 3, Final model). This was corroborated by 
a higher AIC of the final model also including Worry (∆AIC = - 1.288; evidence ratio = .53) 
compared to a model with only Time as main effect.
 Overall, results show that both Worry and Pass negatively influence IGT performance 
but that Worry is not significantly related to Pass usage. These results suggest that Pass 
usage is unlikely to mediate the relationship between Worry and IGT performance. This 
was confirmed in additional LMM analyses conducted in Mplus which had an acceptable 
model fit (RMSEA = 0.089 and CFI/TLI = 0.823) and showed that the indirect effect was 
non-significant (Estimate (SE) = -0.03 (0.07), p = .68, 95% CI: -0.16 – 0.10). 
Post hoc analyses pass usage 
Because contrary to expectations we did not find evidence for pass usage as a variable 
mediating the association of PSWQ with IGT performance, we performed some post hoc 
analyses in which we specified pass usage on the basis of net loss in the preceding trial 
and net loss over all preceding trials. We choose these operationalizations because we 
expected persons with higher levels of worry to be more inclined to pass in a situation 
of threat and loss. In total participants used the pass button 239 times. In 44 of these 
instances pass was preceded by a card with a net loss whilst over half (124) of the selections 
of the pass button occurred when the total score reflected a loss (i.e. below 2000 points). 
Mediation analyses showed that the indirect effect of Worry on IGT performance via pass 
usage following a card with a net loss was not significant (Estimate (SE) = -0.02 (0.04), 
p = .65, 95% CI: -0.10 – 0.06. Model fit RMSEA = 0.088, CFA/TLI = 0.667). Also, the indirect 
effect of Worry on IGT performance via pass usage at a time point when the net total score 
represented a loss i.e. below 2000 points was not significant (Estimate (SE) = -0.10 (0.07), 
p = .14, 95% CI: -0.23 – 0.03. Model fit RMSEA = 0.091, CFA/TLI = 0.778).
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether worriers will engage in avoidance 
behaviour (i.e. pass) on the IGT-P and how this influences their performance. For the 
standard IGT condition we hypothesized that worry would have a positive effect on IGT 
performance and we would thus replicate Mueller et al.’s (2010) findings. For the IGT-P, 
we hypothesized that high worriers would choose the pass option (i.e. avoid) option more 
often than low worriers and that as a result the positive effect of worry on learning would 
be abolished or reversed. Results were mixed. The previously reported beneficial effects 
of worry in the standard IGT (Mueller et al., 2010) were not observed in the present study. 
However, in the adjusted IGT condition we found a negative effect of both worry and of 
avoidance behaviour (pass) on IGT performance. Contrary to expectations, the relationship 
between worry and performance on the IGT was not mediated by avoidance behaviour.
  The non-significant findings concerning worry in the standard IGT were unexpected. 
Not only was no effect found in the LMM analyses but also not when using repeated 
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measures ANOVA in groups with extreme PSWQ scores of which the higher end resembled 
scores found in GAD patients. Based on previous findings as well as on theory (Damasio 
1994, 1996), beneficial effects of worriers’ hypervigilant and future-oriented characteristics 
were expected to enhance the learning curve. The current findings may be explained 
by another influential theory within worry/GAD research, the cognitive avoidance theory 
(Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998). This theory postulates that worry is a form of cognitive 
avoidance which operates via the reduction of aversive imagery with the purpose to avoid 
somatic anxiety reactions. Studies have indeed shown that worry is a predominantly verbal 
thought activity (as opposed to imagery-based) and that the percentage of imagery is 
greatly reduced when engaging in worry instead of relaxation (Borkovec & Inz, 1990; 
East & Watts, 1994; Freeston, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1996). It has also been demonstrated 
that verbal thought activity is associated with significantly less intense cardiovascular fear 
responses than imagery (Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986). So, whereas anxiety with its 
increased physiological activity may lead to stronger somatic markers, worry does the 
opposite by attenuating but also prolonging physiological sensations and hence may 
lead to relatively weaker somatic markers. This counterbalancing effect of worry may have 
been more pronounced in the present study than in Mueller et al.’s (2010) contributing to 
the non-replication. Both studies applied different inclusion criteria. Mueller et al. (2010) 
selected participants meeting GAD criteria of which anxiety and arousal are components. 
Anxiety levels might therefore have been too high to be compensated by worry. The 
present study did not have anxiety-based in- or exclusion criteria. Note that the pass-
button does not represent cognitive avoidance but a different type of behavioural 
avoidance typical for GAD and described as ‘inaction’ by Roemer & Orsillo (2002). These 
two types of avoidance are not mutually exclusive and are likely to co-occur.
 Another possible explanation for our non-significant findings on the standard IGT 
comes from Miu et al. (2008) who pointed out that distraction by emotions unrelated 
to the task might influence IGT performance. Even if worriers have stronger somatic 
markers there may be other processes (cognitive, emotional) at play which influence 
decision making. Previous research has for example shown that anticipatory stress –which 
is by definition closely linked to worry-, impairs IGT performance (Preston et al., 2007). 
Considering that worriers typically occupy themselves with numerous major and minor 
topics (Roemer, Molina, & Borkovec, 1997), it is very well conceivable that during the IGT 
such involvement with other stressors unrelated to the task resulted in the non-significant 
effect of worry as found in the present study.  
 The adjusted condition of the IGT, which included a pass option in each trial, 
revealed –as expected- that worry was related to a poorer learning curve on the IGT. 
Interestingly, anxiety symptoms were not related to poorer IGT performance suggesting 
that the effect of worry is specific. Pass usage also showed a negative relationship with IGT 
advantageous choices. In contrast with expectations however, worry was not significantly 
related to pass usage (i.e. avoidance behaviour) and the hypothesized mediating effect of 
pass was also non-significant. Additional post hoc analyses also showed that the negative 
effect of worry on IGT performance was unrelated to a presumed higher inclination of 
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high worriers to use the pass button in a situation of threat and uncertainty after net loss 
in the preceding trial or net loss over all preceding trials. It appears that having the option 
to pass does (negatively) influence learning but that for high worriers this influence is not 
entirely captured in the number of times or the particular situation in which one avoids a 
decision. 
 The obvious question is of course, what does cause this different reaction between 
high and low worriers to the possibility to avoid giving a response? The data do not provide 
a clear-cut answer, but we will discuss a few potential explanations. Firstly, it is possible 
that the added choice option exerts cognitive resources -especially in high worriers- 
and subsequently interferes with their learning process. Worriers are characterized by 
the tendency to prepare for the worst and to anticipate any impending danger. They 
carefully weigh up all possibilities, which in the instance of the IGT-P implies that the 
added choice option means more worry (more cognitive activity). A concept related to 
worry is Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU; Buhr & Dugas, 2006). IU has been defined as ‘a 
dispositional characteristic that results from a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty 
and its implications’ (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007, p.24). The added complexity of the task 
will increase uncertainty directly as there is an extra option to consider and indirectly 
through the absence of feedback after using the pass button. Moreover, research has 
shown that pathological worry and clinical GAD status are linked to increased error-related 
brain activity (Hajcak et al., 2003; Weinberg et al., 2010). This exaggerated processing of 
errors does however not per se lead to adequate behavioural changes (Hajcak et al., 2003; 
Weinberg et al., 2010). We expect that negative feedback in the IGT-P will have resulted 
in higher levels of error-related brain activity than in the standard IGT due to the fact 
that loss could have been averted if only the pass option had been used. In sum, we 
hypothesize that it is the added complexity of the task which increases uncertainty and is 
therefore more likely to negatively impact the high worriers.
 Reversely, it could also be that low worriers benefit from the pass-option. The 
opportunity to pass might have increased their sense of control and heightened their 
task engagement. Or alternatively the added dimension might have made the task more 
interesting therefore increasing the attention given to the feedback provided during the 
task. Whether low worriers profit or high worriers are impaired by the possibility to engage 
in avoidance behaviour, the results clearly imply that they are affected by it in different ways. 
  Besides the apparent effect of merely having the option to refrain from making a 
decision, results also revealed a negative effect of actual ‘pass’ usage on IGT performance. 
Effectively, pass delays the information participants receive consequently delaying the 
learning process. Participants were led to believe, however, that pressing the pass button 
led to the removal of the next set of cards, while in reality the sequence was merely 
put on hold. So, the consequence of passing was that the same information would 
reach participants later – however, participants thought that by the ‘removal’ of the 
top four cards they had also missed out on information that could tell them whether 
the decks were advantageous or disadvantageous. This perceived loss of information 
and introduced uncertainty may have negatively influenced performance. Another 
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explanation for the negative effect of pass usage is that participants with poor IGT 
results retreat to the pass option in an attempt to shift from a losing situation to one in 
which they are winning. 
 The present study has a few limitations which should be kept in mind when 
interpreting the results. First of all a non-clinical sample was used. Conducting the 
experiment in a clinical, help-seeking, sample may yield different results. The range of 
PSWQ scores included quite a few participants (23%) with scores that are typically found 
in GAD patients (PSWQ > 60), however. Moreover, in the standard IGT condition rmANOVA 
analyses using only participants with PSWQ scores from both extreme ends of the scale 
did not change results. Secondly, the effect of the interaction of worry with condition on 
decision making did not reach conventional significance levels. However, we feel that the 
novelty of our findings and more importantly the fact that based on Akaike information 
criterion the full model including worry was determined to be the best approximating 
model sufficiently support our decision to execute additional analyses of worry in both 
conditions separately. A third limitation concerns the pass-button. Although designed 
to provide room for avoidance behaviour common in anxiety disorders (Barlow, 2004), 
we cannot exclude the possibility that participants turned to this option for different 
reasons (e.g. not out of uncertainty but as a deliberate strategy to avoid cards that they 
believe to contain high penalty losses). What pass usage exactly represents and how it 
establishes its negative effect needs to be further unravelled in future studies. Fourthly, 
worry research has shown that personal relevance is important in order to activate worry 
(Stöber, 2000). Hence it is possible that more pronounced effects would emerge when 
a more idiosyncratic decision making task would be used. Finally, due to the between-
subject design it was not possible to establish whether the effect of worry found in the 
pass condition was due to the high worriers performing worse compared to the no-pass 
condition or that the low worriers somehow benefitted from the possibility to refrain from 
making a decision.
  Overall, results from the present study do not support the notion of improved 
decision making in high worriers and therefore also do not provide evidence for the 
accompanying positive reinforcement hypothesis. On the contrary, when equipping the 
IGT with an option to avoid decision making and thus to more closely resemble real-life, 
performance is even worse in high compared to low worriers.
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The main aim of this thesis was to clarify some of the pending issues surrounding the 
transdiagnostic nature of worry and rumination as well as whether they share the same 
underlying processes and functions. In accordance with this aim several studies were 
designed covering two lines of research; i) epidemiological studies comparing worry 
and rumination in their relationship with each other and with emotional disorders; ii) 
experimental studies examining worry at a more functional/process level.
 In this general discussion I will once more highlight the criteria for a transdiagnostic 
process as well as those for a shared underlying process with reference to the previous 
chapters in which these criteria were addressed. A brief summary of the main findings 
of each chapter will be provided and discussed with respect to their contribution to 
the ongoing worry-rumination debate. This is followed by a discussion of more general 
theoretical and clinical implications of the findings reported in this thesis including the 
advantages and disadvantages of adopting a transdiagnostic approach and suggestions 
for future directions of research. Finally, limitations of the present thesis will be addressed 
followed by an overall conclusion.
Criteria transdiagnostic process
As stated in the introduction a transdiagnostic process should meet several criteria:
1)  to be present across multiple disorders but not due to comorbidity with one specific 
disorder (chapter 2 & 3);
2) exhibit similar process characteristics across these disorders (chapter 5); and
3)  contribute to the onset, maintenance and/or recurrence of psychopathology across 
disorders (chapter 4).
Criteria shared underlying process
Even if worry and rumination are indeed established to be transdiagnostic processes 
this does not necessarily mean that they share the same underlying process. In case of a 
shared underlying process between worry and rumination, it is to be expected that they
1) are present in the same disorders (chapters 2 & 3);
2) have the same causal status regarding these (emotional) disorders (chapter 4);
3) share the same process characteristics (chapters 5 & 6); and 
4) are highly interrelated (chapter 3).
Overview of results
Part A: Worry & rumination: relations with emotional disorders
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 three studies are presented investigating the first main aim of this 
thesis (i.e., comparing worry and rumination in their relationship with each other and with 
emotional disorders). All three studies are conducted using epidemiological data from 
130
Chapter 7
the Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA). This ongoing longitudinal 
cohort study includes 2981 participants who are followed for many years. The study has 
several important strengths among which a large sample size, prospective design and the 
inclusion of multiple waves.
Chapter 2 describes a study with a cross-sectional design examining the predictive 
utility of both worry and rumination. Specifically, it investigated whether worry and 
rumination have incremental validity in predicting the presence of a history or current 
occurrence of emotional disorders over and above more general personality traits while 
taking comorbidity into account. This was tested within the theoretical framework of 
the Integrative Hierarchical Model (Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998) which proposes that 
each of the emotional disorders contains general (common to all), specific (common to 
some) and unique components. To our knowledge, both worry and rumination have thus 
far not been tested as predictors in a hierarchical model. In the present study their role 
was investigated both in disordered patients (n = 1111) and in participants who were in 
remission (n = 834), hence exploring whether elevated scores on cognitive constructs 
merely reflect an epiphenomenon of current psychopathology or not. The sample 
consisted of participants taking part in the baseline assessment of NESDA. Disorders 
of interest were generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), panic disorder (PD), social anxiety 
disorder (SAD), major depressive disorder (MDD) and dysthymia (DYS) according to DSM-
IV criteria as assessed with the CIDI. The study includes several cognitive measures: anxiety 
sensitivity, pathological worry and cognitive reactivity (including a subscale on rumination 
on sadness). In line with the aim of this thesis we will focus the discussion of the results on 
those concerning worry and rumination in particular. 
  Participants with a current disorder scored higher on worry and rumination than 
participants not currently meeting diagnostic criteria. Scores were elevated across all 
disorders. The same pattern of results was found when comparing participants in remission 
to a group with no history of psychopathology. Subsequently, hierarchical regression 
analyses were performed using a built in psychiatric control group. In the current 
disorder sample worry had additional predictive value over and above personality traits 
and the other cognitive constructs in predicting GAD. The same was true for rumination 
in predicting MDD. So, even though worry and rumination levels were elevated across 
emotional disorders worry had a more defining role in GAD and rumination in MDD. In 
the remission sample rumination had once again added predictive value for MDD. Worry 
on the other hand did not predict remitted GAD and was overruled by the influence of 
neuroticism. Results were replicated in analyses correcting for comorbidity.
  These results suggest that worry and rumination are elevated across disorders 
(transdiagnostic criterion) both in the acute phase and once remitted. The data do not 
disclose whether elevated levels constitute a vulnerability factor or are for instance the 
result of scarring. Besides being present across disorders elevated scores are also present 
in the same disorders (precondition shared process). Results of the hierarchical regression 
analyses however, ascribe a more prominent role for worry in predicting GAD (acute 
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phase) and for rumination in predicting MDD (acute and remitted phase). Note that these 
predictive roles are relative and not absolute. Overall, our findings reveal that cognitive 
constructs have additional value in understanding anxiety and depressive disorders over 
and above personality traits. Moreover, they prove to be more than mere epiphenomena 
of current disorders.  . 
Chapter 3 describes a study with a longitudinal design including three-waves and 
focusses on the stability of worry, rumination and psychopathology over time as well 
as the reciprocal relationships among these three phenomena. So far most studies have 
focused on cross-sectional or uni-directional relationships of worry and rumination with 
each other and with particular emotional disorders, and did not examine reciprocal effects 
nor the temporal character of the effects. The present study overcomes this gap in the 
literature and contributes directly to the ongoing debate regarding the question whether 
worry and rumination are conceptualizations of the same underlying process and whether 
they are transdiagnostic or not.
  In this study we used the entire NESDA sample consisting of 2981 participants. 
Participants were tested over two year time-intervals with T2 including 87.1% and T3 80.6% 
of the original sample. Confirmatory factor analyses revealed that the latent structure and 
stability of emotional disorders was best represented by the distress (GAD, MDD, DYS) 
- fear (SOC, PD, AGO) model which is in line with recent measurement model studies of 
psychopathology (for an overview see Beesdo-Baum et al., 2009). This division allowed 
us to study the relationships between worry/rumination and emotional disorders while 
taking comorbidity into account.
  Using structural equation modelling trait-state models were fitted for worry, 
rumination, distress disorders and fear disorders. Results showed that both worry and 
rumination contain stable underlying trait components. So far test-retest periods were 
usually quite short and this study is the first to reveal that stability is present over longer 
periods of time. Moreover, results also showed that the stable components of worry and 
rumination were highly correlated (.76) which supports the notion of a solid, shared, base 
and thus provides the preconditions for a shared process. Also in line with the proposition 
of a shared process was the finding that worry and rumination show similar relationships 
with both fear and distress disorders; in other words, they are present in the same disorders 
and relate to them in the same way. Besides being present in the same disorders they were 
also present across both fear and distress disorders, although associations with the distress 
disorders were slightly stronger than with the fear disorders. This was expected as GAD and 
depression -typically linked to worry and rumination respectively- were both placed in the 
distress disorder category. However, differences were modest and correlations between 
the trait components of worry/rumination and psychopathology were strong in all four 
trait-state models investigated. This underlines worry/rumination’s involvement across 
emotional disorders and is in line with criteria for a transdiagnostic process.
  Another aspect examined in this study was whether worry/rumination and emotional 
disorders were mutually reinforcing each other over time resulting in a downward spiral. 
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Results did however not confirm this hypothesis. Changes in worry and rumination were 
not predictive of changes in fear or distress levels two years later. However the opposite 
effects –change in psychopathology on change in repetitive negative thinking- were 
significant albeit small to medium in strength.
  Overall, the findings from this study highlight the similarities between worry and 
rumination and support their conceptualization as transdiagnostic processes. The fact 
that state changes in psychopathology are not preceded by state changes in worry/
rumination but vice versa suggests that fluctuations in worry/rumination may merely 
be epiphenomena of emotional disorders. From a clinical perspective it therefore seems 
more pertinent to modify the underlying trait component(s) of worry and rumination in 
order to obtain endurable therapeutic benefits.
Chapter 4 describes a study in which both cross-sectional data and longitudinal data 
(three-waves) are used to examine the role of worry and rumination in the occurrence 
of comorbidity among emotional disorders. A prerequisite for a cognitive process to 
be considered a transdiagnostic factor is its presence among multiple disorders. It is 
generally assumed that such transdiagnostic factors not only contribute to the occurrence 
of a specific disorder but are also (in part) responsible for comorbidity among these 
disorders. Worry and rumination (also referred to by the overarching term repetitive 
negative thinking (RNT)) are such candidate transdiagnostic factors. However, if RNT truly 
contributes to the high comorbidity rates among emotional disorders it should not only 
cross-sectionally relate to comorbidity but also mediate the relationship between anxiety 
and depressive disorders and vice versa. McLaughlin and Nolen-Hoeksema (2011) found 
support for the involvement of rumination in the co-occurrence of anxiety and depressive 
symptoms. However, this study only examined symptoms, not clinical diagnoses; and 
furthermore, it only examined rumination and did not include other types of RNT (such as 
worry). The aim of this study was to test whether RNT also accounts for the comorbidity 
among emotional disorders, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. In other words, this 
study is a conceptual replication of McLaughlin and Nolen-Hoeksema (2011), focusing 
on clinical diagnoses instead of symptoms and examining two types of RNT –worry and 
rumination. We expected that both rumination and worry would account for the cross-
sectional overlap of emotional disorders at baseline and would mediate the prospective 
cross-disorder relations among emotional disorders. 
 The same three wave samples were used as in the chapter 3 study including 2981 
participants at baseline, 87.1% of the original sample at the 2 year follow-up, and 80.6% 
at the 4 year follow-up. The cross-sectional baseline data were used to perform separate 
ANOVA’s to compare worry/rumination levels between different groups with/without 
comorbidity. Structural equation modelling was used to fit the longitudinal mediation 
models. Like in chapter 3, the distress (GAD, MDD, DYS)-fear (SOC, PD, AGO) model 
was chosen to represents the latent structure and stability of emotional disorders as it 
had the best fit to the data. Two longitudinal mediation models were examined: one 
examining the role of rumination as a putative mediator of the longitudinal association of 
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distress with fear disorders (and vice versa) and one examining the role of worry in these 
longitudinal relations. In this way we could analyze whether baseline distress disorders 
predicted changes in rumination/worry and whether these changes predicted subsequent 
changes in fear disorders (and vice versa).
  Our cross-sectional baseline findings showed that worry and rumination scores 
were elevated in both the fear and distress group when compared to participants with 
no current emotional disorder. Moreover, participants with distress disorders obtained 
higher scores than participants with fear disorders. Critically, worry and rumination levels 
were particularly high in those with comorbid fear and distress diagnoses. This finding is 
in line with results from the McEvoy et al. (2013) study and supports the transdiagnostic 
hypothesis, which assumes that higher levels of RNT are associated with higher levels of 
comorbidity.
  Results of the longitudinal mediation models showed that worry and rumination 
both significantly mediated the longitudinal association between baseline fear disorders 
and later (4-year follow-up) distress disorders. These mediation results suggest that the 
increased risk of a future distress disorder when suffering from a fear disorder is partly 
attributable to worry and rumination. Partly attributable, as the mediation effects are 
small. The same applies for the longitudinal distress (baseline)  fear (4-year follow-up) 
association with the exception that only rumination significantly mediated this association 
and worry did not.
  Overall, the findings from the present study suggest that repetitive negative thinking 
in the form of rumination or worry constitutes an important transdiagnostic factor 
responsible for the co-occurrence of emotional disorders. In transdiagnostic treatment 
interventions for emotional disorders it seems warranted to include interventions 
specifically targeting this transdiagnostic factor.
Part B: Mechanisms involved in worry: Avoidance
In chapters 5 and 6 experimental studies are presented addressing the second main aim 
of this thesis (i.e., studying process and functional characteristics of worry). As the NESDA 
study is not designed to investigate worry at process level additional experimental studies 
were conducted to accommodate for this.
Chapter 5 presents two experimental studies examining worry at process level, 
specifically, whether reduced concreteness is a pivotal component in explaining the 
cognitive avoidance function of worry and indeed leads to poorer problem solving as 
is often suggested. The prevailing theory concerning worry’s avoidance function is the 
Avoidance Theory of worry (Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998) which postulates that worry 
is a form of cognitive avoidance that operates via the reduction of aversive imagery with 
the purpose to avoid somatic anxiety reactions. However in doing so it is believed to 
undermine emotional processing and thereby contribute to the maintenance of worry. 
The two studies discussed in this chapter focussed on a caveat in the avoidance theory 
namely on how worrying leads to reduced imagery. The Reduced Concreteness theory 
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of worry (Stöber, 1998; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002) posits that the mediator between 
worrying and reduced imagery is reduced concrete thinking (increased abstract thinking), 
which is presumed to be characteristic of worry. Concrete thinking is defined as “distinct, 
situationally specific, unequivocal, clear, singular” whereas abstract thinking is described 
as “indistinct, cross-situational, equivocal, unclear, aggregated” (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002, 
p. 92). The Reduced Concreteness theory hypothesizes that it is the relatively abstract 
style of thinking during worry which is responsible for reduced aversive visual imagery. 
So far the presence of reduced concreteness in worriers has been established to occur 
in the problem analyses phase (Stöber, 1996; Stöber, Tepperwien, & Staak, 2000; Stöber 
& Borkovec, 2002), however not yet during the problem solution generation phase. The 
latter had thus far only been investigated, and found, in participants with depression 
(Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005).
  Experiment 1 investigated whether high trait worriers (N = 40) adopt a more abstract 
thinking style compared to low trait worriers (N = 40) during the phase of problem 
solution generation and whether concreteness training improves social problem solving 
(SPS). SPS skills were assessed with the Worry Domain Means-Ends Problem Solving task 
(WD-MEPS). In this task participants were presented with a problem situation relevant 
to their personal circumstances and asked to find the ideal strategy for overcoming the 
problem situation and thereby reach a given ending (Marx, Williams, & Claridge, 1992). 
Problem solutions were rated for the number of steps (means) provided and on their 
effectiveness. Experiment 2 was a replication of the first study (high trait worriers N = 
49, low trait worriers N = 48) extended to examine other aspects of SPS related to worry: 
problem orientation, problem solving style and problem solving confidence. 
  Results from both studies indicated that there were no baseline differences in 
thinking style (abstract/concrete) or problem solving skills (means/effectiveness) between 
high and low trait worriers. The claim that level of concreteness has a causal effect on 
problem solving was partly supported as results from the second experiment revealed 
that concreteness training had a positive effect on problem solving (number of means) 
relative to the abstract training. Effectiveness scores showed a similar pattern but this did 
not reach significance. Although high worrier’s problem solving skills were not found to 
be impaired, compared to low worriers they did report low problem solving confidence, 
a dysfunctional (negative) problem orientation and an overall avoidant problem solving 
style. Overall these results, combined with results from previous studies showing reduced 
concreteness in the problem analysis phase, suggest that high trait worriers’ SPS skills 
are intact and that impairments lie within the early stages of SPS. Although results differ 
from those found in depressive samples differences in study characteristics could possibly 
account for that, leaving the matter as to whether worry and rumination share this 
mechanism of reduced concreteness only partly answered. 
Chapter 6 presents an experimental study focussing on the presence of behavioural 
avoidance in decision making and how this affects the maintenance of worry. Findings 
from a previous study by Mueller et al. (2010) suggest that worrying leads to improved 
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decision making on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) as evident through a steeper learning 
curve. In the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994), four decks of cards are simultaneously presented to 
the participant. Each selection of a card leads to either an addition or subtraction of points 
(money). The task is designed in such a way that repeated selection of card decks A and 
B leads to long term net loss and repeated play of decks C and D leads to long term net 
gain. Participants are instructed to maximize their winnings. The reinforcement schedule 
is too complicated for participants to figure it out but they typically develop an intuitive 
preference for decks C and D. The positive effect of worry on decision making reported 
by Mueller et al. (2010) could pose a reinforcement mechanism underlying pathological 
worrying. However, the standard IGT does not reflect decision making in a social context 
and critically, due to the forced nature of the task, it does not accommodate for anxiety 
disorder’s hallmark characteristic: avoidance. Pathological worriers tend to engage in 
mental procrastination and dwell on certain issues which may lead them to postpone 
or abandon decision making altogether. In order to examine the role of such avoidance 
behaviour or ‘inaction’ in decision making, the current study used both the standard IGT 
and a newly developed adaptation of the IGT that included a pass option (IGT-P). We 
expected high worriers to engage in avoidance behaviour (selection of the pass button) 
more often than low worriers and that this would mediate the relationship with their 
performance on the task i.e. whether they would select from the long term advantageous 
decks.
  A total of 157 participants took part in the study of which 78 in the standard IGT and 
79 in the adjusted IGT-P. Results were mixed. We did not replicate Mueller et al.’s (2010) 
findings on the standard IGT that high worriers outperform low worriers; no differences 
between groups were observed. On the IGT-P on the other hand we found –as expected- 
that high worriers performed worse than low worriers when given the option to avoid 
decision making. Also we found that pass usage led to poorer IGT performance. However, 
the relationship between worry and performance on the IGT was –to our surprise- not 
mediated by avoidance.
  These results suggest that the mere option to avoid affects high worriers differently 
from low worriers. Explanations for this finding are speculative as the data do not 
provide a clear-cut answer. It is possible that the added complexity of the task by means 
of introducing a pass option increases uncertainty. With high worriers typically being 
intolerant of uncertainty (IU; Buhr & Dugas, 2006) it is possible that the impact was 
more pronounced in this group consequently fuelling worry related activity and exerting 
cognitive resources needed to unravel the task. 
  Overall, results from the present study do not support the notion of improved decision 
making in high worriers and therefore also do not provide evidence for the accompanying 
positive reinforcement hypothesis. On the contrary, when extending the IGT with an option 
to avoid decision making and thus to more closely resemble real-life, performance is even 
worse in high compared to low worriers. Whether the added complexity of the task affects 
ruminators in a similar way as worriers can not be determined from the present data and 
should be addressed in future studies.
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Theoretical integration of findings
Worry and rumination have been proposed to be conceptualizations of the same 
shared underlying transdiagnostic process that in their definition only differ in their 
temporal orientation (worry-future; rumination-past). In order to qualify as being both 
transdiagnostic and as being reflections of the same underlying process several criteria 
(described at the start of this general discussion) should be met. In this section findings 
from the present thesis will be linked to these criteria and placed within a broader context. 
Overlapping criteria will be collapsed to avoid repetition. 
Present across and in the same disorders
Thus far the assumption that worry and rumination are transdiagnostic processes was 
mainly based upon studies showing that both cognitive processes were present across 
multiple disorders (Harvey et al., 2004; Ehring & Watkins, 2008). However these studies 
did often not consider the option that comorbidity of disorders may be responsible for 
the observed elevated levels. The results from the present thesis show that levels are 
elevated during both the acute phase and the remitted phase of emotional disorders 
(chapter 2) and that even when taking comorbidity into account worry and rumination 
are both involved across fear and distress disorders (chapter 3). From a hierarchical 
point of view worry has a more defining role in GAD and rumination in MDD (chapter 
2). This does not contradict the transdiagnostic nature of both concepts, it only means 
that they are more prominently present in some disorders than others. This may partly 
be due to the specific wording of the questionnaire items and repeating the analyses 
with a more generic RNT measure is advisable. In sum, the data presented in this thesis 
supports the first criterion of a transdiagnostic process as well as that of a shared 
underlying process. 
  Besides worry and rumination there are other candidate transdiagnostic thought 
processes that are likely to play an important role in all or some of the emotional 
disorders. In recent years, literature has for instance seen a real boost of articles proposing 
perfectionism (for an overview see Egan, Wade, & Shafran, 2011) and intolerance of 
uncertainty (e.g. Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012; Carleton, 2012) as transdiagnostic concepts. 
In addition to thought processes, there are also memory processes (e.g. explicit selective 
memory), reasoning processes (e.g. emotional reasoning), and behavioural processes 
(e.g. avoidance/safety behaviour) which are likely to meet transdiagnostic criteria (Harvey 
et al., 2004, p.270). Even with processes common to multiple (emotional) disorders, the 
way psychological disorders present themselves can vary greatly. Mansell et al. (2008) 
have proposed three possible explanations for this: (1) variations in idiosyncratic current 
concerns; (2) variations in the degree of shared processes and (3) distinct processes for 
specific disorders or groups of disorders (Mansell, Harvey, Watkins, & Shafran, 2008). 
Further examination of these propositions is necessary to get a better understanding of 
how transdiagnostic processes can be placed within existing frameworks and in order 
to more clearly define their role in understanding and treating psychological disorders.
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Shared process characteristics across and in the same disorders
Worry and rumination have many similarities; they are both repetitive forms of thinking, 
negative in valence (e.g. Ehring & Watkins, 2008) and characterized by cognitive inflexibility 
and difficulty in switching attention from negative stimuli (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; 
Hazlett-Stevens, 2001). Another proposed central element of both worry and rumination 
is reduced concreteness. Previous studies have shown that reduced concreteness plays 
a pivotal role in dysphoric individuals and that increasing concreteness improves social 
problem solving (solution generation phase) (Watkins & Moulds, 2005) and reduces 
depressive symptomatology (Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009; Watkins & Moberly, 2009; 
Watkins et al., 2012). In worry/GAD the presence of reduced concreteness has been found 
in the problem analyses phase (Stöber, Tepperwien, & Staak, 2000; Stöber & Borkovec, 
2002) but not in the problem solution generation phase (chapter 5). These contrasting 
findings highlight a potential difference between worry and rumination, namely that 
there is a nuance to be made regarding the aspects they influence and consequently the 
moments in time during which their influence is most pronounced. This difference is not 
in line with the criterion that worry and rumination share the same process characteristics 
even though the mechanism itself (reduced concreteness) is essentially the same. More 
differences between worry and rumination have been articulated over the years (see 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008 for an overview), of which the most well-
known is that of the direction of processing. Whereas worry is considered to be future 
oriented focussing on anticipated threats, rumination on the other hand is considered to 
be past-oriented focussing on issues of self-worth, meaning and themes of loss (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008). Other differences concern the conscious and non-conscious 
motives underlying both cognitive processes. Whereas the conscious motive to worry 
is to prepare and anticipate for threat (Borkovec, Hazlett-Stevens, & Diaz, 1999), that of 
rumination is to gain insight, solve problems and to understand the deep meanings of 
events (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Watkins & 
Baracaia, 2002). The non-conscious motives of worry and rumination are both concerned 
with avoidance. In line with the Avoidance Theory of worry (Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 
1998) the non-conscious motive of worry is thought to be the avoidance of somatic 
anxiety reactions and negative affect whereas that of rumination is the avoidance of 
aversive situations and the responsibility to take action (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
Although different, at a higher level both types of avoidance can be referred to by the 
overarching concept Experiential Avoidance. Experiential avoidance has been defined 
as the phenomenon that occurs when a person is unwilling to remain in contact with 
particular private experiences (e.g. bodily sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories, 
behavioral dispositions) and takes steps to alter the form or frequency of these events 
and the contexts that occasion them (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Folette & Strosahl, 1996). The 
term avoidance refers to both cognitive avoidance (chapter 5) and behavioural avoidance 
(chapter 6). Elevated levels of EA have indeed been reported in GAD and MDD (Cribb, 
Moulds, & Carter, 2006; Salters, Raffa, & Orsillo, 2005) and suggest a general inability 
to accept things as they are, and to just let things be. Interestingly, interventions such 
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as ‘Mindfullness based therapy’ (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002) and ‘Acceptance and 
Commitment therapy’ (Hayes, 2004; Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda & Lillis, 2006) focus 
on skills to address these deficiencies. Overall, it seems that at a higher level worry and 
rumination seem very similar, even identical, but that once these aspects are dissected, 
differences emerge. Therapeutic interventions aimed at higher level processes may well 
be effective. However, it is likely that to really optimize clinical effects fine-tuning of 
interventions is needed to address the lower level differences. 
Co-occurrence of worry and rumination, and their contributions to onset, 
maintenance and/or recurrence of psychopathology
Co-occurrence of anxiety and depressive disorders is very common (e.g. chapter 2, 3 and 
4) and is associated with higher levels of worry and rumination than in the instance of a 
single diagnosis (McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013; chapter 4). This link between 
heightened levels and comorbidity supports the hypothesis that worry and rumination 
are transdiagnostic concepts; however, it does not exclude the option that they are merely 
epiphenomena reflecting –in the instance of comorbidity- more severe psychopathology. 
  Findings reported in the present thesis confirmed the presence of heightened 
levels of worry and rumination during both the acute and remitted phase of emotional 
disorders, even when controlling for residual symptoms (chapter 2). Hence, these results 
do indicate that there is more to worry and rumination than just being epiphenomena. 
This conclusion is in line with longitudinal prospective studies that showed that rumination 
predicts the occurrence of both anxiety and depressive symptoms over time, including new 
onset of depressive disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). Likewise, worry has been found 
to be a vulnerability factor predicting increments of anxiety and depressive symptoms 
over time (Hong, 2007). Furthermore, an extensive review of the literature on repetitive 
(negative) thinking (RNT) also revealed that RNT is a vulnerability factor for both anxiety 
and depressive disorders (Watkins, 2008). The present thesis adds to these longitudinal 
findings by showing that both worry and rumination mediate the relationship between 
the presence of fear disorders at baseline and the occurrence of distress disorders 4 years 
later. Moreover, the association between baseline distress disorders and changes in fear 
disorders is mediated by changes in rumination, although changes in worry as a mediator 
did not reach significance in this prospective analysis (chapter 4). Overall, it appears that 
the accumulating evidence on the causal status of worry and rumination reveals a very 
similar overall pattern for both cognitive constructs, hence in line with requirements for a 
shared underlying process. Nonetheless, it is an area which is still very much in progress 
and there is plenty of ground left to uncover.
High interrelatedness of worry and rumination 
The assumption that worry and rumination share the same process is largely based on 
studies showing significant correlations between the two constructs (e.g. Segerstrom et 
al., 2000, r = .32 to r = .46; Muris et al., 2004, r = .55; Watkins, 2004, r = .51; Hong, 2007, 
r = .42). It is surprising how easily and frequently worry and rumination are referred to as 
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being one and the same considering that these correlations are –although significant- not 
as high as would be expected of processes that are hypothesized to be so similar. The 
reason for these relatively low correlations is not clear. Results from this thesis provide 
however a possible explanation. When disentangling trait and state components of worry 
and rumination it becomes clear that trait components are highly related (chapter 3, r = 
.76) whereas state level fluctuations are only moderately related (chapter 3, r’s varying 
between .39 and .45). The observed score correlations mentioned before, are lower than 
the trait correlations. However, the observed scores also include a state component which 
represents the effects of external circumstances and measurement error. This is likely an 
important contributing factor to the lower observed score correlation. However at trait 
level worry and rumination are highly interrelated and thus meet preconditions for a 
shared process.
Advantages and disadvantages of the transdiagnostic approach
The disorder specific approach has been really successful in elucidating the onset and 
maintenance of various psychiatric disorders and has resulted in the development of many 
(cognitive-behavioural) therapies that have proven to be very effective (e.g. Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979 [depression]; Clark & Ehlers, 2004 [posttraumatic-stress disorder]; 
Salkovskis, 1989 [obsessive-compulsive disorder]; Clark, 1988 [panic disorder]). However, 
the progress made within this perspective seems to be levelling off and there is still a large 
group of patients left that do not respond (sufficiently) to existing therapies. Furthermore, 
over time it has become evident that comorbidity among disorders is very common, while 
disorder specific therapies do not adequately address comorbidity among disorders. In 
cases where there is comorbidity the clinician has several options: 1) Treat one disorder 
with the idea that this will impact upon the comorbid disorder: this is indeed the case, 
however effects on the comorbid disorder are limited and there is propensity to relapse in 
the comorbid disorder; 2) Apply evidence based treatments sequentially: the downside to 
this approach is mainly the higher costs involved; 3) Combine evidence based treatments: 
this option is however at risk of diluting efficacy and has been reported to be less effective 
than applying one single disorder specific treatment; and 4) Apply a transdiagnostic 
approach addressing the shared maintaining mechanisms: this latter option has recently 
sparked a lot of interest and appears to be the most promising. For a more extensive 
overview and discussion of these four options in treating comorbid disorders we refer to 
McManus et al. (2010).
The recent interest in a transdiagnostic approach to psychiatric disorders has resulted 
in an ever increasing number of papers on candidate transdiagnostic processes (e.g. 
Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011) as well as 
on transdiagnostic therapies (e.g. McManus et al., 2010: Clark, 2009; Mansell et al., 2009; 
Clark & Taylor, 2009) in which some clear advantages, but also disadvantages are outlined. 





Firstly, many processes (e.g. worry, thought suppression, experiential avoidance) that were 
initially proposed to be specific to a certain disorder have turned out to be present across 
multiple disorders. Thus investigating transdiagnostic processes seems to fit better with 
the nature of psychopathology and therefore provides a better use of limited research 
resources. Secondly, the transdiagnostic approach holds promise in understanding and 
explaining the high comorbidity rates among disorders as well as why certain disorders 
in particular seem to group together. From a transdiagnostic point of view processes 
common to multiple disorders are the ones that may be (partly) responsible for the co-
occurrence of disorders. A view supported by findings presented in the present thesis 
(chapter 4). Thirdly, insight into the different transdiagnostic processes as well as into how 
they are all interrelated provides new angles for therapeutic interventions. For a more 
extensive overview and discussion of these advantages of investigating transdiagnostic 
factors we refer to Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins (2011).
Disadvantages
Firstly, and most importantly, although transdiagnostic processes may be very useful in 
explaining comorbidity among disorders, research has fallen behind in explaining how 
people characterized by the presence of the same process can suffer from different 
disorders. Harvey et al. (2004) suggested that the factor defining which disorder one 
develops is the topic of current concern. More recently however Nolen-Hoeksema 
and Watkins (2011) proposed a heuristic for developing transdiagnostic models of 
psychopathology, in which topic of current concern is only one factor in an elaborate model 
in which biological factors also have an important role. Their model includes different 
levels of transdiagnostic risk factors, mechanisms and mediators which all interact and 
contribute to the development of a certain disorder. This attempt to provide a framework 
in which to place transdiagnostic factors is promising but in need of further study. It is 
for instance not clear how the different levels of transdiagnostic (risk) factors are exactly 
related. A second disadvantage of the transdiagnostic approach is that it has thus far not 
succeeded in explaining how the presence of the same transdiagnostic factor can lead 
to the development of different disorders at different times in someone’s life (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). Especially between childhood/adolescence and adulthood 
there appears to be a shift in the presented symptoms. McLaughlin and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(2011) observed this in the instance of the transdiagnostic risk factor rumination and 
attributed the difference to the fact that internalized psychopathology in youths is less 
differentiated than in adults. However, what mechanisms or factors are responsible for this 
differentiation is not yet clear.
Research into candidate transdiagnostic processes, their causal role and the development 
of models explaining their interrelatedness is of fundamental importance for the 
development of new transdiagnostic therapies. In recent years research on transdiagnostic 
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processes has indeed received more attention. This is not only reflected in the large 
number of articles published in this area but for instance also by an announcement of 
NIMH in 2013 stating a new research framework that abandons the symptom focussed 
categories of DSM-5 and alternatively focuses on domains containing functions that 
transcend disorder categories. As mentioned before one of the questions that remains 
is which processes should be included as targets for therapeutic interventions. A process 
that is very likely to make the cut is repetitive negative thinking (worry/rumination), a 
choice which is supported by the findings in this thesis.
Transdiagnostic therapies
Advantages
Firstly, as mentioned above, a transdiagnostic approach may prove to be a good way to 
deal with comorbidity among disorders. Addressing the processes that are shared by the 
comorbid disorders might elicit positive changes across the board (e.g. Mansell et al., 
2009; McManus, Shafran, & Cooper, 2010; Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). A second 
advantage concerns the costs involved. A transdiagnostic approach lends itself better for 
group therapy as it can be applied in heterogeneous groups. Considering group therapy 
is cheaper and with the pressure on mental health care to reduce its costs, this constitutes 
an important benefit (Clark, 2009). Thirdly, therapists will need to learn fewer techniques/
protocols, which increases the chances of dissemination of the therapy and ultimately 
a higher rate of patients that receive evidence based treatments (e.g. McManus et al., 
2010; Clark & Taylor, 2009). Fourthly, transdiagnostic treatments could be beneficial for 
patients who do not respond to disorder specific treatment and for those who suffer from 
disorders ‘not otherwise specified’ for which there is currently no clear specific treatment 
(Mansell et al., 2009). In addition transdiagnostic treatments may be useful in treating 
residual symptoms or in preventing people who are at risk of developing mental health 
problems (Clark, 2009; McManus et al., 2010).  
Disadvantages 
The main disadvantage of embracing the transdiagnostic perspective is the risk of 
losing the progress that has been made with the disorder specific approach. It should 
not be forgotten that the existing disorder specific therapies do yield positive effects for 
many; a result which is still questionable for the transdiagnostic approach (McManus 
et al., 2010; Clark & Taylor, 2009). Furthermore, the disorder specific therapies already 
include components that target transdiagnostic mechanisms (e.g. avoidance in anxiety 
disorders), thus the differences between the two perspectives is really one of degree 
(Clark & Taylor, 2009). Therefore the question remains whether a transdiagnostic 
approach will really add enough additional value to existing and well-established 
therapies. The second disadvantage is inherent to the early stage the transdiagnostic 
approach is currently in. Its (theoretical) concept and practical consequences are 
still rather vague and seem to include many different components. It is at risk of 
becoming too complex and failing to connect sufficiently to clinical practise (cp. 
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Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). Although clinical practise is erratic and relatively 
simple explanatory models do not always suffice, they do provide a working model 
that can be disseminated to clinical practise at large. With time, hopefully a clearer 
working model of the transdiagnostic perspective will be developed, overcoming these 
obstacles. Thirdly, therapies focussing on altering transdiagnostic processes may not 
appeal to patients consequently resulting in higher dropout rates and less motivation 
for therapy. After all, compared to interventions tackling general processes a disorder 
specific approach more closely resembles the patients’ thoughts and experiences thus 
providing a feeling of being understood and implying expertise of the therapist. So 
even when using a transdiagnostic approach it may be important to add disorder 
specific and/or idiosyncratic elements. 
Some efforts to develop new transdiagnostic therapies have already been made. Fairburn, 
Cooper and Shafran (2003) for instance proposed a general therapy for eating disorders 
(Fairburn et al., 2009), Barlow, Allen and Choate (2004) developed a unified treatment for 
emotional disorders and then there are treatments that target disorders in general such as 
mindfulness (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002) and acceptance and commitment therapy 
(ACT: Hayes, 2004; Hayes et al., 2006). Results of these interventions are somewhat mixed 
and reflect the early stages of transdiagnostic treatments as well as the bulk of work still 
needing to be done. So the question remains where in the therapeutic landscape the 
transdiagnostic treatment should be located? Should it replace disorder specific therapies? 
Is it best suited as a pre-therapy preceding the ‘real’ disorder focussed therapy? Or should 
it be regarded as the main therapy followed by a few sessions targeting disorder specific 
elements? These questions are not answered as yet but the overall consensus seems to 
be that it should be complementary as it is very unlikely to outperform disorder specific, 
tailored, interventions (Clark, 2009; Clark & Taylor, 2009). 
Overall it can be concluded that the transdiagnostic approach is still in its infancy and a 
lot of work is still needed to be done. The importance of the advantages and the clear 
potential that this approach has warrants further research into this area. 
 
Strengths and limitations
The studies described in this thesis all have certain strengths and limitations which are 
described in detail in the respective chapters. The most important ones will be repeated 
and elaborated upon here.
Strengths
Some of the main strengths of this thesis come from using data from the Netherlands 
Study of Depression and Anxiety (NESDA) (chapters 2, 3 and 4). The NESDA study 
provided us with the unique opportunity to examine worry and rumination in a large 
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population (power) coming from different health care settings (generalizability) within a 
longitudinal design including multiple waves. Thus far rumination and especially worry 
have mainly been studied using a cross-sectional design or prospectively with relatively 
short follow-up periods, limiting the interpretation of the findings. NESDA’s longitudinal 
design allowed us to examine the stability, fluctuations, and interactions between worry 
and rumination as well as with emotional disorders over a four year period. Our studies 
further benefited from the inclusion of numerous disorders in NESDA, allowing us to add 
to the existing literature by examining the incremental validity of worry and rumination 
in predicting various emotional disorders as well as by investigating the transdiagnostic 
nature of both cognitive constructs while taking comorbidity into account.
 Another strength concerns the tasks used in the experimental studies (chapters 5 
and 6). Existing well established experimental paradigms were modified to tailor for 
worry specific characteristics subsequently allowing us to study worry at process level. 
The problem solving task MEPS-P used in chapter 5 was especially designed to meet 
an important prerequisite of worry, namely that topics need to have personal relevance 
(Stöber et al., 2000). Also, in the same study, the focus of the abstract/concreteness 
manipulation was altered to fit themes characteristic of anxiety disorders, i.e. fear-future. 
Another worry related modification was the added avoidance option in the decision 
making task (IGT) in chapter 6. Previous studies using the standard decision making task in 
a high worry population failed to feature this hallmark of anxiety disorders in their design. 
Our modified version provides a novel and crucial twist to the existing paradigm allowing 
for more accurate assessment of decision making in high trait worriers. A final strength of 
the experimental studies reported in this thesis is that we successfully included students 
with worry scores resembling those found in clinical GAD samples.
Limitations
The studies in this thesis have several general limitations. First of all our findings are 
limited to the repetitive negative thinking processes of worry and rumination. There are 
other forms of repetitive negative thinking (RNT) such as post event processing (Rachman, 
Gruter-Andrew, & Shafran, 2000; McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 2010). Whether our results 
can be generalized to these other processes has to be examined in future studies. In line 
with this is the absence of a generic measure of RNT that transcends specific content 
such as the Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire (RTQ; McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 2010) 
and the Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring et al., 2011). Inclusion of such 
a generic RNT measure could provide a more accurate picture of RNT’s role in emotional 
disorders as current assessment of worry and rumination is coloured by the wording of 
questions and by the disorder it was based upon when originally designed. However 
available generic measures are also not entirely objective. The RTQ for instance, was 
developed from a pool of questions drawn from the Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
(PSWQ; Meyer et al, 1990), the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991) and the Post-Event Processing Questionnaire-Revised (PEPQ-R; McEvoy & 
Kingsep, 2006); thus possibly restricting its scope to these three processes. This may be 
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an accurate resemblance of RNT if it turns out that RNT is only made up by these three 
processes. Because research of different type of processes involving RNT is still ongoing 
this decision to restrict the scope of RNT may be premature.
 Another limitation concerns the assessment of worry and rumination. For rumination 
we used the subscale ‘rumination on sadness’ from the Leiden Index of Depression 
Sensitivity - Revised (LEIDS-R; Van der Does, 2002; Williams, et al., 2008); a questionnaire 
measuring cognitive reactivity to sad mood. Worry was determined by the PSWQ. Thus, 
both cognitive processes were assessed by a singular instrument. This was the result of a 
trade-off in order to obtain data from a large population by the NESDA study. There are 
however also other measures of rumination and worry and it cannot be excluded that 
these would yield slightly different results. It is for instance, with the current assessment 
of rumination on sadness, not possible to make the distinction between brooding and 
reflection.
  A related and general limitation concerns the self-report measures used in the 
studies reported. One could question whether people are able to accurately indicate and 
reflect upon their psychological state of mind, cognitive processes they are engaging in, 
the vividness of their thoughts, etcetera. Also, self-report is more liable to be affected 
by social desirability bias as may have been the case in experiment 1 of chapter 5 where 
self-report VAS measuring the success of the manipulation did not match ratings by 
independent raters. In this particular situation we were able to overcome this by using 
the latter scores. Even though self-report measures have obvious downsides most 
of the instruments reported upon in this thesis are well established and accepted in 
research.
 The use of data from the NESDA study has besides the aforementioned multiple 
major strengths, also a few limitations. Findings are for instance limited to the disorders 
assessed in the standard diagnostic procedures and consequently, some diagnostic 
categories such as PTSD and OCD in which RNT is believed to play a crucial role, are 
missing. Also, over the multiple waves, attrition was not entirely random. The response 
rate was 87.1% at wave 2 and 80.6% at wave 3, and non-response was significantly higher 
among those with younger age, lower education, higher levels of psychopathology, higher 
levels of worry, and among those with a history of abuse and neglect: i.e. the more severe 
group. Consequently generalizability of our study results is somewhat restricted.
  Another limitation related to the longitudinal studies in this thesis concerns causality. 
Even though with a longitudinal design it is possible to get a better understanding of 
relations between certain factors and clinical disorders over time when compared to 
cross-sectional studies, it still does not give a conclusive answer regarding causality. In 
order to investigate causal relationships experimental studies are indispensable. 
  A final limitation that should be mentioned concerns the non-clinical samples used 
in the experimental studies. Although all experiments included participants scoring within 
the clinical range this is not the same as meeting diagnostic GAD criteria of which worry is 
only one aspect. It can therefore not be excluded that the same experiments would yield 




In general, and in line with the limitations mentioned above, future studies should include: 
other candidate RNT processes such as post-event processing; other disorders in which RNT 
is expected to play an important role like PTSD and OCD; general RNT measures that are 
content independent like the RTQ and PTQ.
  Regarding the criteria for a transdiagnostic process and those for a shared underlying 
process, there’s still work to be done with regard to the causal status of worry and rumination 
i.e. do they contribute to the onset, maintenance and/or recurrence of psychopathology 
across disorders. The present thesis includes findings supporting worry and rumination 
as mediators for the prospective cross-disorder relations among emotional disorders 
(chapter 4). Although these findings are encouraging there are – as mentioned above – more 
aspects of causality in need of attention before firm conclusions on worry and ruminations 
causal status can be drawn. Overall, studies with longer follow-up periods consisting 
of multiple waves to obtain a better notion of worry and rumination’s role in the onset, 
maintenance and recurrence of emotional disorders are warranted. The inclusion of multiple 
waves would also provide the opportunity to examine the presence of for instance scarring. 
Importantly, in order to get conclusive answers regarding causality, merely a longitudinal 
design does not suffice; the field is in need of more experimental studies investigating 
worry and rumination’s causal status.
  Another possible venture for future studies concerns the biological underpinning of 
RNT. The present thesis includes a series of experiments investigating worry at process 
level by focussing on how worry operates and establishes its negative effects from a 
cognitive perspective. An alternative angle from which to study similarities between worry 
and rumination and their transdiagnostic nature would be to tackle it at different levels 
focussing on for instance genetic influences or brain functioning. Given the complexity and 
intertwined nature of the biological underpinning of emotional disorders it seems likely 
that these do not correspond with the diagnostic boundaries of DSM-5 (APA, 2013) and 
that they will display many similarities across disorders and across processes. Studies have 
already shown for instance that rumination is linked to an imbalance in activity between 
different areas of the brain (Hamilton et al., 2011; Marchetti, 2012; Zhu et al., 2012) and 
that this imbalance may posit an underlying mechanism of rumination, impaired attentional 
control and cognitive reactivity (Marchetti et al., 2012). This example illustrates that worry 
and rumination may constitute endophenotypes for emotional disorders and that paying 
attention to their biological underpinning may provide us with a better understanding of 
the disorders which could help to develop alternative therapeutic interventions.
  In Chapter 5 a study was presented where, in contrast with hypotheses, no differences 
were found between high and low worriers regarding their social problem solving skills. 
Considering that there is no defect needing fixing, it seems only logical to move on to 
those problem solving related aspects that are suboptimal. High worriers have low problem 
solving confidence, dysfunctional (negative) problem orientation and possess an overall 
avoidant problem solving style characterized by passivity and inaction (e.g. Dugas, Freeston, 
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& Ladouceur, 1997; Dugas, Letarte, Rheaume, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1995; Davey, 1994; 
Ladouceur, Blais, Freeston, & Dugas, 1998; chapter 5). When aiming at improved social 
problem solving these aspects should be targeted in therapeutic interventions in order to 
yield clinically significant effects.
  Finally, the Iowa Gambling Task with pass option (IGT-P) constitutes a novel twist of an 
existing and established decision making paradigm. Its novelty also implies that replication 
is needed, preferably also including replication in clinical populations. Also, it is still unclear 
how the option to avoid establishes its negative effect and why its influence is different 
in high worriers compared to low worriers. Several suggestions have been put forward 
in chapter 6, such as differential influences of distraction, intolerance of uncertainty, or 
increased exertion of cognitive resources; however additional studies will be needed to test 
their accuracy. In general the contrasting findings between using the traditional IGT and 
our modified IGT-P version (chapter 6) illustrate the importance of tailoring a paradigm 
according to the group of interest. Thus far this is not common practise in IGT research. 
Nonetheless studies conducted in MDD with the traditional IGT generally show impaired 
decision making in clinical MDD groups (e.g. Cella, Dymond, & Cooper, 2010; Han et al, 
2012). Although MDD is more past than future oriented and therefore not in line with 
the goal of the pass option to avoid, it may still meet a characteristic process; rumination. 
As speculated in chapter 6 the pass button may also have a retrospective component. In 
instances of high loss it may trigger rumination due to the fact that loss could have been 
averted if only the pass option had been used. It would therefore be interesting to see 
whether the pass option would indeed negatively affect performance in people suffering 
from MDD.
Clinical implications
Overall, the studies presented in this thesis support worry and rumination as transdiagnostic 
processes. However, as the foregoing discussion on advantages and disadvantages 
surrounding the transdiagnostic approach has already laid out, the fact that worry and 
rumination can be considered transdiagnostic does not necessarily mean that transdiagnostic 
therapeutic interventions are clinically the most effective. Results from chapter 2 illustrate 
that processes like worry and rumination may be transdiagnostic but play a more defining 
role in one or a few specific disorders. Therefore, it seems only logical that these primary, for 
the specific disorder characteristic, processes deserve priority in clinical interventions. The 
awareness of the existence of these transdiagnostic processes is however helpful in making 
educated guesses as to the effects certain interventions will have on comorbid disorders 
sharing the same transdiagnostic process(es) while treating the primary disorder.
  Clinical implications can also be taken from our studies regarding the similarities 
between worry and rumination. Both processes are very similar and more and more often 
they are regarded as the same as reflected in the increased use of the overarching term 
RNT and the introduction of new RNT measures like the PTQ and RTQ. This fusion may in 
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many instances be harmless or even favourable, however it is important to stay aware of 
the differences that are thereby ignored and how this affects clinical practise. For instance, 
the experiments conducted on abstract-concreteness in worriers revealed that reduced 
concreteness is not directly affecting the generation of problem solutions (chapter 5) 
but the preceding problem analyses phase (Stöber, Tepperwien, & Staak, 2000; Stöber & 
Borkovec, 2002). Rumination on the other hand does affect the solution generation phase 
and the therapeutic intervention ‘Concreteness Training’ has yielded positive effects in 
dysphoric participants (Watkins & Moberly, 2009; Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009; Watkins 
et al., 2012). Tailoring Concreteness Training to tackle the affected problem solving phase 
in worry/GAD (i.e. problem analyses phase) may be necessary in order to establish any 
clinically significant changes. Finally, it has to be noted that Concreteness Training has not 
been directly compared to other therapeutic interventions such as mindfulness, traditional 
cognitive therapy, or competitive memory training and thus still needs to prove its added 
value for clinical practise; not only for GAD but also for MDD.
  Another clinical implication that has spun from the findings in this thesis concerns 
the focus of CBT. Our state-trait model approach described in chapter 3 revealed that state 
level changes in worry/rumination are not responsible for state level changes in emotional 
disorders 2 years later but that levels rather seem to covary. Trait level components were on 
the other hand substantial and highly related. These results are in line with studies showing 
that change in cognitive content does not predict change in depressive symptoms (Jarrett, 
Vittengl, Doyle, & Clark, 2007) nor are a cause of improvement in anxiety symptoms (Smits, 
Julian, Rosenfield, & Powers, 2012). Translated to clinical practise our findings suggest 
that changes in state cognitions (such as negative automatic thoughts) may be primarily a 
reflection of changes at symptom level and that in order to establish long lasting changes in 
psychopathology it may well be necessary to alter underlying cognitive vulnerabilities (i.e., 
cognitive structures and schema’s) which when activated are presumed to give rise to more 
momentary cognitive content c.q. negative automatic thoughts. 
Overall conclusion
The main aim of the present thesis was to contribute to the worry-rumination debate by 
investigating whether worry and rumination are transdiagnostic processes and whether 
they represent a shared underlying process. Overall the studies presented in this thesis 
yielded support for both accounts: worry and rumination are highly related, are present 
across emotional disorders and show both similarities and differences at process level. 
Especially at a general, abstract, level similarities between worry and rumination seem 
to predominate. However, at a more concrete and specific level both similarities and 
differences are observed. Such differences can be relevant for research as well as therapeutic 
interventions. Depending on the questions in a certain research or clinical context emphasis 
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Piekeren (kenmerk gegeneraliseerde angststoornis) en rumineren (kenmerk depressie) zijn 
twee termen die refereren aan cognitieve processen die beide repetitief, oncontroleerbaar 
en negatief van aard zijn. De vele overeenkomsten hebben ertoe geleid dat beide vaak 
door elkaar gebruikt worden en dat ze in de laatste jaren ook steeds vaker onder één noe-
mer geplaatst worden: repetitief negatief denken (RND; Ehring & Watkins, 2008). De vraag 
is echter of dit wel terecht is en of piekeren en rumineren daadwerkelijk representaties zijn 
van hetzelfde onderliggende proces. Er zijn namelijk ook verschillen waarvan de meest be-
kende de gerichtheid van het denkproces betreft: piekeren is meer toekomstgericht en ru-
mineren richt zich juist overwegend op het verleden. Naast de discussie rondom de vraag 
of piekeren en rumineren nu al dan niet hetzelfde zijn is er de laatste decennia een ont-
wikkeling gaande waarbij piekeren en rumineren een steeds belangrijkere rol toebedeeld 
krijgen bij het ontstaan en voortduren van verschillende vormen van psychopathologie: 
angst- en stemmingsstoornissen in het bijzonder. Of het hier echter gaat om echt trans-
diagnostische processen is nog onduidelijk. Dit proefschrift richt zich op bovengenoemde 
twee discussiepunten. Om deze vragen te beantwoorden wordt uitgegaan van een aantal 
criteria welke onderzocht zullen worden in de daaraan gekoppelde hoofdstukken.
Criteria transdiagnostisch proces
Een transdiagnostisch proces wordt verwacht te voldoen aan de volgende criteria: 
1)  aanwezigheid bij meerdere stoornissen welke niet enkel is toe te schrijven aan co-
morbiditeit met één specifieke stoornis (hoofdstukken 2 en 3);
2) vergelijkbare proceskarakteristieken bij verschillende stoornissen (hoofdstuk 5); 
3)  bijdragen aan het ontstaan, in stand houden en/of recidiveren van psychopathologie bij 
verschillende stoornissen (hoofdstuk 4).
Criteria gemeenschappelijk onderliggend proces 
Zelfs als piekeren en rumineren beide transdiagnostische processen zijn, dan betekent dit 
nog niet dat zij ook hetzelfde onderliggende proces vertegenwoordigen.
Criteria voor een gemeenschappelijk onderliggend proces zijn:
1) aanwezig zijn bij dezelfde stoornissen (hoofdstukken 2 en 3);
2) dezelfde causale status hebben voor deze stoornissen (hoofdstuk 4);
3) dezelfde proceskarakteristieken bezitten (hoofdstukken 5 en 6);
4) zeer sterk aan elkaar gerelateerd zijn (hoofdstuk 3).
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit twee delen. Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift, deel A (hoofd-
stukken 2, 3 en 4), maakt gebruik van data uit een longitudinale cohort studie. Centraal 
in dit gedeelte staat de vergelijking tussen piekeren en rumineren; zowel hoe zij zich tot 
elkaar verhouden evenals hoe zij zich tot angst- en stemmingsstoornissen verhouden.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift, deel B (hoofdstukken 5 en 6) bestaat uit experimen-
tele studies. Deze studies richten zich op het procesmatige karakter van piekeren.
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Bevindingen uit dit proefschrift
Deel A: Piekeren en rumineren: hoe verhouden zij zich tot de angst- en stemmings-
stoornissen
In de hoofdstukken 2, 3, en 4 worden studies beschreven die allen uitgevoerd zijn met 
data van de Nederlandse Studie naar Depressie en Angst (NESDA). NESDA is een omvang-
rijke longitudinale cohortstudie waarvoor 2981 proefpersonen zijn geïncludeerd die vele 
jaren gevolgd zijn. De stoornissen waar NESDA zich op richt zijn de angst- (paniekstoornis, 
gegeneraliseerde angststoornis, sociale angststoornis, agorafobie) en stemmingsstoor-
nissen (dysthymie, depressie).
 De opzet van NESDA kent een aantal sterke punten, zoals het grote aantal partici-
panten, het prospectieve design en de inclusie van herhaalde metingen. Hierdoor levert 
NESDA unieke data op die het beantwoorden van een aantal belangrijke vragen op het 
gebied van piekeren en rumineren mogelijk maakt. 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een cross-sectionele studie beschreven waarin onderzocht wordt 
of piekeren en rumineren voorspellend zijn voor de aanwezigheid van een voorgeschie-
denis van angst- en stemmingsklachten (remissie) dan wel de aanwezigheid van een 
huidige diagnose. Hierbij werd tevens gekeken of piekeren en rumineren als voorspellers 
wel iets toevoegden aan de meer algemene persoonlijkheidstrekken neuroticisme en 
extraversie. 
 Scores voor piekeren en rumineren waren verhoogd voor alle angst- en stemmings-
stoornissen in zowel de huidige diagnose groep als in de in-remissie groep. Naast de 
aanwezigheid van piekeren en rumineren in meerdere stoornissen (criterium transdiag-
nostisch proces) waren ze ook aanwezig in dezelfde stoornissen (criterium gemeenschap-
pelijk onderliggend proces). Verder bleek piekeren een relatief sterke voorspeller van de 
gegeneraliseerde angststoornis (huidige diagnose) en rumineren voor depressie (huidige 
diagnose en in remissie). Hierbij was de additionele voorspellende bijdrage ten opzichte 
van neuroticisme en extraversie substantieel. Deze resultaten bleven ook overeind staan 
wanneer er gecorrigeerd werd voor comorbiditeit. Kortom, piekeren en rumineren zijn 
interessante constructen die niet te reduceren zijn tot epifenomenen van een huidige 
diagnose.
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft een longitudinale studie bestaande uit drie herhaalde metingen: 
een meting bij de start, na 2 jaar en na 4 jaar. Centraal in deze studie staat de stabiliteit 
van piekeren, rumineren en psychopathologie in de tijd evenals de wederkerigheid van 
de relaties tussen deze drie componenten. Tot nu toe hebben de meeste studies enkel 
gekeken naar cross-sectionele of enkelvoudige relaties en deze studie is dan ook een 
belangrijke aanvulling op de bestaande literatuur. Ten behoeve van dit onderzoek werd er 
onderscheid gemaakt tussen stabiele trek-componenten (trait) en toestands-componen-
ten (state) van piekeren, rumineren en psychopathologie.
 Psychopathologie werd hierbij onderverdeeld in een‘vrees’-categorie (paniekstoor-
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nis, sociale angststoornis, agorafobie) en een‘dys-stress’2–categorie (depressie, dysthymie, 
gegeneraliseerde angststoornis).
 Deze studie leidde tot een aantal belangrijke bevindingen. Ten eerste dat stabie-
le trekcomponenten van piekeren en rumineren sterk met elkaar samenhangen (criteria 
gemeenschappelijk onderliggend proces). Ten tweede dat fluctuaties van piekeren en ru-
mineren op toestandsniveau samengaan (criteria gemeenschappelijk onderliggend pro-
ces). Ten derde dat piekeren en rumineren op vergelijkbare wijze gerelateerd zijn aan de 
psychopathologie categorieën vrees en dys-stress. Dit ondersteunt het idee dat ze beide 
een belangrijke rol spelen in meerdere vormen van psychopathologie (criteria transdiag-
nostisch proces). Tot slot dat er géén sprake is van een neerwaartse spiraal waarin er een 
elkaar versterkend effect is tussen piekeren en rumineren enerzijds en psychopathologie 
anderzijds. Fluctuaties van psychopathologie gaan vooraf aan fluctuaties van piekeren/
rumineren maar niet vice versa. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat fluctuaties van piekeren 
en rumineren eerder een afspiegeling zijn van veranderingen in het toestandsbeeld: epi-
fenomenen. Om langdurige therapeutische effecten te bewerkstelligen lijkt het dan ook 
van belang om veranderingen te bewerkstelligen op het niveau van de onderliggende 
stabiele trekcomponenten van piekeren en rumineren.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een studie beschreven waarin gebruik wordt gemaakt van zowel 
cross-sectionele als longitudinale data om de rol van piekeren en rumineren bij comorbidi-
teit te onderzoeken. Meer specifiek kijkt deze studie of piekeren en rumineren de cross-sec-
tioneel aanwezige overlap tussen verschillende angst- en stemmingsstoornissen kunnen 
verklaren en of ze longitudinaal gezien als mediatoren verantwoordelijk zijn voor de ontwik-
keling van dys-stress stoornissen in personen met vrees stoornissen en vice versa, de ont-
wikkeling van vrees stoornissen in personen met dys-stress stoornissen. Wanneer piekeren 
en rumineren inderdaad transdiagnostische processen zijn dan is te verwachten dat zij deels 
verantwoordelijk zijn voor de hoge incidentie van comorbiditeit. Immers, als ze bij meerdere 
stoornissen een belangrijke rol spelen dan is het ook te verwachten dat ze eraan bijdragen 
dat dergelijke stoornissen vaker gelijktijdig, dan wel op elkaar volgend in de tijd, voorkomen.
 De resultaten van deze studie waren in lijn met de verwachtingen. Pieker en ru-
minatie scores waren verhoogd in groepen met psychopathologie ten opzicht van een 
groep gezonde participanten. Cruciaal, de scores waren het hoogste wanneer er sprake 
was van comorbiditeit van vrees en dys-stress stoornissen. Verder bleken zowel piekeren 
als rumineren als mediatoren een rol te spelen in de longitudinale relatie tussen vrees en 
dys-stress stoornissen en vice versa. 
 Concluderend kan gesteld worden dat repetitief negatief denken in de vorm van 
piekeren en rumineren een belangrijke transdiagnostische factor is en deels verantwoor-
delijk is voor de comorbiditeit onder angst- en stemmingsstoornissen. Het lijkt dan ook 
van belang om in transdiagnostische therapieën interventies op te nemen die zich richten 
op deze processen.
2  Vrij vertaald uit het Engels (distress) bij ontbreken van geschikte Nederlandse vertaling
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Deel B: Mechanismen die een rol spelen bij piekeren: Vermijding
In de hoofdstukken 5 en 6 worden experimentele studies beschreven die zich richten op 
de functionele karakteristieken en het procesmatige aspect van piekeren. Aangezien de 
NESDA studie niet geschikt is voor het onderzoeken van piekeren op proces niveau, zijn 
een aantal aanvullende experimentele studies uitgevoerd om in dit onderzoek te voor-
zien. In hoofdstuk 5 staat cognitieve vermijding centraal en in hoofdstuk 6 gedragsmatige 
vermijding.
In hoofdstuk 5 worden twee experimenten beschreven waarin onderzocht wordt of ‘ver-
minderde concreetheid’ een essentiële component is in de verklaring van de vermijdings-
functie van piekeren en of het inderdaad leidt tot een verminderd probleemoplossend 
vermogen zoals wordt aangenomen. Tot op heden werd verondersteld dat hoge pieke-
raars verminderd concreet denken (meer in abstractheden) om zo vervelende fysiologi-
sche ervaringen, waarmee een concrete voorstelling van een probleemsituatie gepaard 
gaat, te vermijden. Deze vermijding c.q. verminderde concreetheid zou leiden tot een 
slechter probleemoplossend vermogen. Het is immers lastiger om een probleem goed te 
definiëren en geschikte oplossingen te genereren wanneer je in vage abstractheden blijft 
hangen.
 In deze studies werd er geen verschil gevonden tussen hoge en lage piekeraars wat 
betreft de mate waarin zij abstract/concreet denken en hun probleemoplossend vermo-
gen. Wel werd er gevonden dat proefpersonen die getraind werden in concreet denken 
een lichte verbetering vertoonden in hun probleemoplossend vermogen. Kortom, er lijkt 
wel een verband te zijn tussen mate van concreet denken en probleemoplossend ver-
mogen, maar het is niet zo dat hoge piekeraars een verminderde concreetheid van het 
denken vertonen.
 Alhoewel het probleemoplossend vermogen van hoge piekeraars niet onderdeed 
voor dat van de lage piekeraars hadden ze wel minder vertrouwen in de door hen ge-
genereerde oplossingen, een negatieve probleemoriëntatie en een algeheel vermijdende 
houding ten aanzien van problemen.
 Wanneer deze resultaten afgezet worden tegen vorige onderzoeken dat lijkt het erop 
dat de probleemoplossende vaardigheden van hoge piekeraars intact zijn (deze studie) 
maar dat ze wel, zoals in eerdere studies aangetoond, gehinderd worden door verminder-
de concreetheid in de hieraan voorafgaande fase, namelijk die van de probleemanalyse. 
Alhoewel deze resultaten niet overeenkomen met bevindingen van studies bij depressie 
is het nog te vroeg om te concluderen dat piekeren (gegeneraliseerde angststoornis) en 
rumineren (depressie) verschillen op procesmatig niveau, omdat de gevonden verschillen 
mogelijk te wijten zijn aan verschillen in de studieopzet.
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een experimentele studie besproken die de aanwezigheid van ver-
mijding in het besluitvormingsproces onderzoekt alsook hoe deze vermijding van invloed 
is op het voortbestaan van piekeren. In een eerdere studie van Mueller en collega’s (2010) 
werd gevonden dat piekeren leidt tot het maken van betere beslissingen op de Iowa 
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Gambling Task (IGT), wat zich vertaalde in een stijlere leercurve. Echter, in de betreffende 
studie werden participanten gedwongen tot het maken van keuzes terwijl voor angstige 
mensen -zoals piekeraars- vermijding nu juist zo kenmerkend is. In de huidige studie werd 
gepoogd de bevindingen van Mueller te repliceren en tevens om te onderzoeken of -wan-
neer er de mogelijkheid tot vermijding werd toegevoegd aan de taak- deze toevoeging de 
resultaten van hoge piekeraars in negatieve zin zou beïnvloeden. 
 De resultaten waren gemengd. Bij gebruik van de standaardversie van de IGT werden 
de resultaten van Mueller niet gerepliceerd: er was geen significant verschil tussen de leer-
curves van hoge en lage piekeraars. De versie waarbij vermijding van het nemen van een 
beslissing was toegestaan liet wel een verschil zien: hoge piekeraars maakten slechtere 
keuzes dan de lage piekeraars. Verrassend genoeg was het verschil echter niet te verklaren 
door de mate van vermijding.
 Deze resultaten laten zien dat puur het hebben van de mogelijkheid om te vermijden 
een differentieel effect heeft op hoge en lage piekeraars. Mogelijk ligt de toegenomen 
complexiteit van de taak ten grondslag aan dit verschil doordat het ook meer onzekerheid 
introduceert, iets waar hoge piekeraars niet goed mee om kunnen gaan. Deze verklaring 
is echter speculatief en dient verder onderzocht te worden in toekomstige studies.
 Wat betreft de invloed van rumineren op het besluitvormingsproces is er nog weinig 
bekend en de studies die er wel zijn laten geen eenduidig beeld zien. Vooralsnog is het 
dan ook nog te vroeg om te stellen dat piekeren en rumineren qua proceskarakteristieken 
overeenkomstig zijn (criteria gemeenschappelijk onderliggend proces).
Klinische implicaties
Over het geheel genomen onderschrijven de studies uit dit proefschrift piekeren en ru-
mineren als zijnde transdiagnostische processen die tevens een gemeenschappelijk on-
derliggend proces lijken te delen. De belangrijke rol die piekeren en rumineren (oftewel 
repetitief negatief denken) lijken te spelen bij de angst- en stemmingsstoornissen maken 
het geschikte kandidaten om opgenomen te worden in transdiagnostische therapieën 
voor angst- en stemmingsstoornissen. Een transdiagnostische aanpak: biedt een oplos-
sing voor situaties waarin er sprake is van comorbiditeit, is geschikt voor situaties waarin 
niet duidelijk voldaan wordt aan de criteria van een specifieke stoornis of in het geval van 
restsymptomen, en kan kostenbesparend zijn. Nu de rek er bij stoornisspecifieke thera-
pieën langzaamaan uit is en er nog steeds niet voor iedereen geschikte behandelingen 
beschikbaar zijn, nemen transdiagnostische therapieën toe in populariteit. Echter, naast 
de voordelen zijn er ook enkele nadelen aan te wijzen en het is dan ook wenselijk dat de 
keuze voor transdiagnostische interventies niet zonder meer maar weloverwogen wordt 
gemaakt.
 Een klinische implicatie die in het verlengde hiervan ligt betreft het feit dat piekeren 
en rumineren steeds vaker onder één noemer worden geschaard als zijnde hetzelfde. Nu 
is dit vaak onschadelijk en mogelijk zelfs gunstig, maar het is van belang dat men zich 
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bewust is van de verschillen die daarmee genegeerd worden en de effecten die dit kan 
hebben op klinisch niveau. De experimentele studies uit dit proefschrift lieten bijvoor-
beeld zien dat er op procesniveau mogelijk toch enkele verschillen zijn tussen piekeren 
en rumineren en het kan dan ook in sommige situaties wenselijk zijn om interventies juist 
af te stemmen op deze verschillen om een optimaal effect te bereiken. Tot slot impliceren 
de bevindingen van dit proefschrift dat voor het bewerkstelligen van langdurige thera-
peutische effecten het noodzakelijk is om interventies te richten op de onderliggende 
cognitieve kwetsbaarheden (m.a.w. op cognitieve structuren en schema’s) en niet enkel op 
toestandscomponenten (zoals bijvoorbeeld negatieve automatische gedachten).
Algemene conclusie
Over het geheel genomen ondersteunen de bevindingen van dit proefschrift piekeren en 
rumineren als zijnde transdiagnostische processen die tevens een gemeenschappelijk on-
derliggend proces vertegenwoordigen. Zo zijn piekeren en rumineren sterk aan elkaar ge-
relateerd, spelen ze een rol in meerdere angst- en stemmingsstoornissen en vertonen ze 
zowel procesmatige overeenkomsten als verschillen. De overeenkomsten tussen piekeren 
en rumineren overheersen in het bijzonder wanneer analyses uitgevoerd worden op een 
algemeen, abstract niveau. Op een meer specifiek en concreet niveau daarentegen zijn er 
zowel verschillen als overeenkomsten zichtbaar. Dergelijke verschillen kunnen relevant zijn 
voor zowel onderzoek als voor klinische interventies. Afhankelijk van de vraag die centraal 
staat in een bepaalde onderzoeks- dan wel klinische context is een algemeen-abstract 








Er zijn vele mensen die direct of indirect hebben bijgedragen aan de totstandkoming van 
dit proefschrift. Een aantal daarvan wil ik graag in het bijzonder bedanken.
Allereerst uiteraard Philip. Als promotor en dagelijks begeleider ben je heel nauw betrok-
ken geweest bij mijn proefschrift. Ik ben erg blij en dankbaar dat je je schat aan kennis 
en ervaring met me wilde delen, en ik heb onze wekelijkse overlegmomenten dan ook 
als ontzettend waardevol ervaren! Je aanstekelijke interesse voor statistiek is er zonder 
meer verantwoordelijk voor dat er een aantal vrij geavanceerde analyses hun weg in mijn 
proefschrift hebben gevonden. Ik heb onze samenwerking als zeer plezierig ervaren en 
ben je de afgelopen jaren niet alleen als wetenschapper enorm gaan waarderen maar ook 
als mens!
Willem, doordat je me opnam in je depressie-groep van aio’s en postdocs heb ik me zeker 
meer verbonden gevoeld met de afdeling en, niet onbelangrijk: hierdoor heeft depressie/
rumineren/LEIDS-R een grote rol in mijn proefschrift gekregen. Ik heb in het bijzonder 
veel geleerd van je talent om de zaken beknopt en ‘to-the-point’ onder woorden te bren-
gen. Daarnaast heeft je oog voor het belang van het sociale aspect en het belang van 
lekker eten mijn aio-tijd meer ‘schwung’  gegeven.
Graag wil ik alle participanten die belangeloos hebben deelgenomen aan zowel de Ne-
derlandse Studie naar Depressie en Angst (NESDA) als aan de experimentele studies uit dit 
proefschrift hartelijk bedanken voor hun deelname. Zonder deze bijdrage zou onderzoek 
in zijn algemeenheid, en in het bijzonder de totstandkoming van dit proefschrift, niet 
mogelijk zijn geweest. 
Mijn collega’s en mede promovendi aan de UL wil ik bedanken voor de vele overlegmo-
menten, stress-meetings, input en de plezierige samenwerking! Mijn (aio) tijd aan de UL 
was een prachtige periode en ik vindt het dan ook erg leuk dat ik nog aan de afdeling 
verbonden blijf.
Roomies van 2B39: wat ben ik blij dat ik jullie heb leren kennen en dat we alle successen 
maar ook alle frustraties die horen bij een promotieonderzoek hebben kunnen delen!
Lot en Eline, paranimfen: ik vindt het ontzettend fijn dat jullie hier vandaag naast mij 
staan! Ik ken jullie allebei al vele jaren en jullie vriendschap is mij heel veel waard. Wat 
er ook is, ik kan altijd bij jullie terecht. Fijn dat jullie ook bij deze mijlpaal in mijn leven er 
weer bij zijn!
Jaap en Nelleke, pap en mam; jullie betrokkenheid, interesse en steun zijn voor mij -en 
ons als gezin- van onschatbare waarde, dank voor alles wat jullie doen en wie jullie zijn!
163
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Dank ook aan mijn broer(tje) Michiel; ver weg maar toch dichtbij!
Gary, samen met jou is alles mooier. Wie had, toen we elkaar 10 jaar geleden in Cambodja 
voor het eerst ontmoetten, nu gedacht dat de toekomst er een samen zou zijn: maar wat 
ben ik er blij om. Je bent een geweldige steun geweest tijdens met name het laatste ge-
deelte van mijn proefschrift, en de beste papa die Rosalie zich maar kan wensen!
Rosalie en baby-bump: het leven heeft dankzij jullie een nieuwe schakering aan kleur en 
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